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Abstract 
The U.S. Department of State disseminates counter-radicalization information through 
social media but has been unable to reach users due to an inability to create engaging 
posts due to a lack of understanding of the interests of the general population. The pur-
pose of this quantitative study was to assess the utility of data analytics when administer-
ing counter-radicalization social media campaigns. The population for this study were so-
cial media posts published on the Quilliam Facebook page between 1 January 2018 and 
31 December 2018. The nonexperimental quantitative descriptive research design sought 
to examine the correlation between the independent variables (topic of a post, use of vis-
ual aids in the post, and the geopolitical region the post addresses) and the dependent var-
iables (resulting likes and shares). This study relied on the strategic choice theory which 
argues that individuals perform a cost and benefit analysis when deciding to join a terror-
ist organization and commit acts of terrorism. Specifically, individuals are often inter-
ested in participating in terrorism in an effort to gain resources and feel a sense of belong-
ing but can be dissuaded upon realization that terrorism can actually degrade their quality 
of life. The research found that social media can be used as a tool to increase the per-
ceived costs of terrorism and decrease the perceived benefits of terrorism. The study con-
cluded that posts which involved a personal story emphasizing the ramifications of terror-
ism and included a video resulted in the highest number of likes and shares, respectively. 
The findings provide a strong argument for utilizing data analytics to improve the dis-
semination of counter-radicalization information which could prevent individuals from 
joining terrorist organizations and committing acts of terrorism. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
On 15 April 2013, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and Tamerian Tsarnaev, detonated two explosive 
devices near the finish line of the Boston Marathon (Sinai, 2017). The brothers were motivated 
to defend Islam and left a note stating that the bombings were retribution for U.S. military action 
in the Middle East (Sinai, 2017). The brothers were not connected to any terrorist organizations 
(Sinai, 2017). They were radicalized by listening to the thoughts and opinions of their friends 
and family who were sympathetic to the jihad and viewing jihadist material on the internet (Si-
nai, 2017). The brothers chose the Boston Marathon because it was an upcoming event in their 
area. Further, the brothers used instructions from Al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine to create the ex-
plosive devices using a pressure cooker and fireworks (Sinai, 2017). 
The Boston Marathon Bombing marked a substantial shift in global terrorist strategy. At-
tacks no longer required years of planning where known terrorists had to routinely communicate 
to recruit followers, plan the attack (choose target, date, time, method, personnel, etc.), and ac-
quire sophisticated weapons. Attacks are now executed by the inspired who require no contact 
with known terrorists, minimal planning, and weapons comprised of household items. As a re-
sult, the historic approach to counterterrorism involving the intercept of communications to pre-
vent attacks is quickly becoming obsolete. 
Background of the Study 
Over time, terrorism has evolved. From 1972-2002, terrorist organizations used directed 
attacks where fighters traveled to the terrorist organization’s headquarters, completed extensive 
training, and were given specific instructions to execute an attack that was meticulously planned. 
From 2002-2010, terrorist organizations were forced to use enabled attacks because fighter  
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could no longer travel to the Middle East to receive training. Terrorist organizations feared that 
foreign governments would monitor fighters who return or send operatives to infiltrate their 
ranks (Vidino, Marone, & Entenmann, 2017). In response to these changes, recruiters began 
providing detailed information and instructions to fighters over the internet and occasionally de-
ploying recruiters to meet with fighters to provide further assistance. After 2010, terrorist organi-
zations began using inspired attacks because they believed that the communications of recruiters 
were being heavily surveilled by various governments (Brantly, 2017). Recruiters began posting 
general information and instructions about how to execute attacks to the masses through a range 
of websites (Baaken & Schlegel, 2017). 
The internet is a source of information and a means of communication that can also 
enable spreading ideology and indoctrinating recruits. With the emergence of social media, a 
growing number of citizens from Europe, Canada, and the United States are being provided 
terrorist content and becoming radicalized. The majority of terrorist content on social media is 
generated by the Islamic State which has over 50,000 affiliated accounts that average 200,000 
posts a day (Berger & Morgan, 2015). Much of the progress is the result of between 500 and 
2000 accounts, many of which are bots that simply repost Islamic State content so that it trends 
(Berger & Morgan, 2015). The Islamic State uses many social media applications; such as 
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Tumblr, Telegam, Kik, WhatsApp, and Surespot to 
reach their target audience of males between the ages of 16 and 25 (Wilner & Rigato, 2017).  
Many citizens are drawn to the Islamic State for religious, ideological, and material 
reasons. Many fighters want to assist in the development of a caliphate for Muslims that is 
governed by Sharia Law as they believe is stipulated in the Quran (Stacey, 2017). Other fighters 
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are drawn to the Islamic State because they want to be a part of a revolution that changes the 
balance of power in the world. Some fighters are drawn to the Islamic State because of the 
promises of a luxurious lifestyle which includes cars, houses, and multiple brides. Regardless of 
the reason, the inspired no longer need to travel to the Middle East to learn how to plan and 
execute an attack. Instead, they only need an internet connection. The Islamic State administers 
countless social media sites which explain how to build a bomb, which gun to purchase for a 
mass shooting, and where to drive a truck into a crowd of people (Stacey, 2017). The evolution 
of terrorism from directed, to enabled, to inspired, attacks has made it impossible to detect 
terrorists and uncover their plans; this, in turn, leaves governments to pursue another option – 
counter-radicalization (Stacey, 2017). 
Problem Statement 
Most research on radicalization focuses on the recruitment of an individual to execute an 
attack and ignores the factors that caused the individual to consider becoming involved in 
terrorism. Researchers have not studied what is effective, or ineffective, at reaching the general 
population with the intention of dissuading at-risk individuals from joining terrorist 
organizations. What makes a person want to become involved with terrorism? What makes a 
person plan a terrorist attack? What makes a person execute a terrorist attack? What can prevent 
a person from completing each step? Questions, like these, all target the fundamental problem of 
developing and disseminating information that can successfully prevent radicalization. 
Radicalization is a process. It typically starts when people are frustrated with their 
surroundings at a local or global level. The individuals then begin voicing their frustration to 
friends and family who agree with them (van Eerten, Doosje, Konijn, de Graaf, & de Goede, 
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2017). Once their perspective is validated, they begin searching for more information (usually 
via the internet) that further affirms their beliefs that Islam is under attack, Islam must be 
protected, and that it is their duty to protect Islam (van Eerten et al., 2017). The available 
ideological information often also explains the benefits of joining a terrorist organization, which 
often include things such as camaraderie, spouses, leadership who represent them and their 
interests, a house, and a vehicle (Faria & Arce, 2005). Finally, there is a trigger; the individual 
will experience a great injustice either at a community or global level resulting in a commitment 
to the cause and encourage them to plan and execute an attack (Rowe & Saif, 2016). This study 
will rely on the strategic choice approach as it focuses on the first stage of the radicalization 
process where individuals begin discussing their frustration with friends and family and 
searching for more information on the internet (van Eerten et al., 2017). The outcome of this 
study is based on a statistical evaluation of a nongovernmental counter-radicalization social 
media campaign to determine what types of information reach and engage the general user 
population on social media.  
Purpose of the Study 
This quantitative study sought to assess the utility of data analytics when administering 
counter-radicalization campaigns on social media. The descriptive design examined the 
correlational relationship between the independent variables (CATEGORY, CONTENT, and 
GEOPOLITICAL REGION) and the dependent variables (resulting LIKES and SHARES). The 
findings provide a strong argument for utilizing data analytics when administering a counter-
radicalization social media campaign. 
                 Several countries are in the process of administering counter-radicalization social media 
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campaigns to prevent vulnerable populations from being recruited. The United Kingdom 
administers Prevent Tragedies, Canada administers Extreme Dialogue, and the United States 
administers, The Global Engagement Center. With under 20,000 followers for each account, 
these governmental counter-radicalization social media campaigns are not reaching the general 
population (Mazza, Monaci, & Taddeo, 2017). However, there are currently several 
nongovernmental counter-radical social media campaigns that are gaining a following.  
Quilliam is a Think Tank founded by Maajid Nawaz, Rashad Zaman Ali, and Ed Husain, 
who are all former members of Hibut-Tahrir, an organization that has been accused of supporting 
and participating in terrorist activity (Hamid, 2016). The absence of government involvement 
and the founders illicit background has fostered a sense of credibility that has undoubtedly 
contributed to its popularity (Hamid, 2016). After all, those with ties to terrorist activity are most 
equipped to discuss terrorism. Their Facebook page has over 25,000 followers who routinely 
like, share, and comment on the content posted (see Figure 1). The content posted emphasizes 
the destruction being caused by religiously motivated terrorism and promotes a moderate 
practice of the religion (see Figure 2).  
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Note. From “Quilliam,” in Facebook [Group page]. Retrieved December 28, 2018, from 
https://www.facebook.com/QuilliamInternational/ 
Figure 1. Quilliam Facebook page 
 
 
Note. From “Quilliam,” in Facebook [Group page]. Retrieved December 28, 2018, from 
https://www.facebook.com/QuilliamInternational/ 
Figure 2. Quilliam newsfeed 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
The study attempted to answer the following three questions to understand if certain posts 
are more likely to trend on social media than others: 
1. Are some categories of information posted on social media more appealing to the 
general user population than others? If so, which categories of information posted on 
social media are more appealing to the general user population than others? 
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2. Are some content styles on social media more appealing to the general user 
population than others? If so, which of the content styles on social media are more 
appealing to the general user population than others? 
3. Are some social media posts concerning geopolitical regions more appealing to the 
general user population than others? If so, which geopolitical regions are more 
appealing to the general user population than others? 
Each post in the sample was coded based upon its CATEGORY (personal story, news 
article, research/policy analysis, military defeats, religious doctrine), CONTENT (written status, 
written status with a link to a website, written status with a video, written status with a 
photograph), and GEOPOLITICAL REGION (West, Middle East, global, cyber). The dependent 
variable was the effectiveness of the social media posting measured by the number of LIKES and 
SHARES. The results led to the acceptance or rejections of the following null and alternate 
hypotheses:  
H01: The social media post CATEGORY of personal story will reach more social media 
users than other categories. 
Ha1: The social media post CATEGORY of personal story will not reach more social 
media users than other categories.  
H02: The social media post CONTENT of written status with a link to a website will 
reach more social media users than other CONTENTs. 
Ha2: The social media post CONTENT of written status with a link to a website will not 
reach more social media users than other CONTENTs. 
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H03: The social media post GEOPOLITICAL REGION of Middle East will reach more 
social media users than other GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs. 
Ha3: The social media GEOPOLITICAL REGION of Middle East more social media 
users than other GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs. 
Theoretical Framework 
        The field of terrorism is dominated by two overarching approaches. The first approach 
claims that terrorists are psychopaths who choose to attack others due to mental abnormalities or 
traumatic past experiences leading to mental challenges (Borum, 2011). This approach is insuffi-
cient because it is unable to explain the majority of attacks that have occurred over the last 2 dec-
ades. The 1995 Paris subway bombings, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, 2005 London 
subway bombings, and 2015 coordinated Paris attacks were all found to be orchestrated by ter-
rorist organizations which, afterwards, communicated the specific goals that the attacks were in-
tended to achieve  (see Table 1). 
Table 1 
Terrorist attacks and motive 
Attack Year Terrorist organization 
responsible 
Stated goal 
Paris Subway Bomb-
ing 
1995 Armed Islamic 
Group of Algeria 
To force France to end its 
aid to Algeria’s military 
rulers 
9/11 2001 Al Qaeda Retribution for U.S. sup-
porting: 
-attacks on Muslims in 
Somalia and Chechnya 
-Indian oppression of 
Muslims in Kashmir 
-Israeli aggression against 
Muslims in Lebanon 
-the presence of U.S. 
troops in Saudi Arabia 
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London Subway 
Bombing 
2005 Al Qaeda Retribution for the British 
supporting: 
-attacks on Muslims in 
Chechnya 
-oppression of Muslims 
in Palestine 
-military occupation of 
Afghanistan and Iraq 
Coordinated Paris At-
tack 
2015 The Islamic State -Revenge against 
France’s participation in 
the international coalition 
to eliminate the Islamic 
State 
-To show the world that 
the Islamic State’s reach 
is not limited to the Mid-
dle East 
-To recruit new followers 
 
Note. From “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” by 
M. Abrahams, 2008, International Security, 32(4), p. 78-105. 
 
The second approach is the strategic choice approach, which asserts that attacks are used 
as an instrument to achieve religious, social, political, and/or economic goals (Borum, 2011). 
This approach assumes that terrorists and terrorist organizations are rational and perform a cost 
and benefits analysis when making decisions (Borum, 2011). The strategic choice approach also 
attempts to explain the dynamics within terrorist organizations as the individuals are concerned 
with their own power and the group’s power, both of which can be a higher priority than ideolog-
ical goals. The flaw in the strategic choice approach is that while terrorist organizations are 
largely motivated by power, there are also other factors that play a role such as values, especially 
when the terrorists involved are deeply religious (Borum, 2011).  
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Social Movement Theory 
The strategic choice approach laid the foundation for the social movement theory, which 
has been used to explain how people become radicalized (Borum, 2011). The social movement 
theory suggests that people are motivated to carry out or resist social change when they feel 
deprived of resources. The creation of the social movement theory cannot be attributed to a 
single philosopher but has been developed over the years by Davies who published Toward a 
Theory of Revolution in 1962, Touraine who published Sociologie de l’action, in 1965, and C. 
Tilly who published As Sociology Meets History in 1981. Davies argued that revolutions were 
due to rising individual expectations and falling levels of perceived well-being (Davies, 1962). 
Touraine (1965) and Tilly (1981) further explained that individuals will unite over their 
disappointment with economic conditions and attempt to implement change, which results in a 
social movement.  
With the emergence of social media and its constant accessibility, individuals have 
become keenly aware of their socioeconomic status. It only takes a few minutes to scroll through 
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter to see the lavish life of others and compare it to one’s own 
circumstances. Terrorist organizations exploit this vulnerability by advertising the obtainment of 
resources not only for themselves but for others who are like them (Boucek, 2011). These 
resources are often social (i.e., camaraderie and spouses), political (i.e., leaders who represent 
them and work towards their interests), and economic (i.e., jobs, houses, and cars). If the social 
movement theory is true, then it is possible to prevent radicalization by improving social, 
political, and economic living conditions in communities that encourage susceptible people to 
ignore recruiters (Boucek, 2011) 
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Social Identity Theory 
The social identity theory builds upon the social movement theory by explaining that in-
dividual see themselves based on their knowledge of membership to a group. This understanding 
is used to predict an individual’s and group’s behavior. The social identity theory was originally 
formulated by Tajfel and Tuner in the 1970s and 1980s who published several papers. Tajfel in-
dependently published Inter-individual and Intergroup Behavior (Tajfel, 1978). Turner inde-
pendently published Social Categorization and Social Discrimination in the Minimal Group Par-
adigm (Turner, 1978). Then, Tajfel and Turner jointly published The Social Identity Theory of 
Intergroup Behavior (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Tajfel and Turner argued that if an individual 
wants to enhance her self-image, she will change her perspective and actions to improve the sta-
tus of the in-group and degrade the status of the out-group, essentially dividing the world into 
“us” and “them” (Borum & Neer, 2017). Tajfel and Turner believed that this phenomenon is ini-
tiated when an individual categorizes himself as part of a group, then he adopts the identity of the 
group and behavior of others in the group, and finally he begins to compare his group with all 
other groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Applying Social Movement and Social Identity Theories to Radicalization 
Terrorist organizations are often motivated to collect and maintain a large number of sup-
porters and utilize the social movement theory and social identity theory to achieve these goals. 
Terrorist organizations attempt to provide their members with more benefits than costs leading to 
emotional attachment to the group and improving cohesion (Al Raffie, 2013). Benefits often in-
clude a mixture of social, political, and economic resources and group membership, as explained 
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by the social movement theory and social identity theory. When a group can offer more individ-
ual benefits and fewer costs, recruits will join (Al Raffie, 2013). When a group offers fewer indi-
vidual benefits and more costs, members will defect (Al Raffie, 2013). If joining a terrorist or-
ganization and choosing to execute an attack appear to be strategic choices made after weighing 
the costs and benefits, then a potential strategy to prevent radicalization could be to decrease the 
perceived benefits of terrorism and increase the perceived costs of terrorism. This strategy as-
sumes that individuals who choose to commit acts of terrorism are rational actors making a stra-
tegic choice. Individuals who are mentally unstable could join regardless of costs and benefits 
and most likely would not be dissuaded by a counter-narrative. 
This study attempted to develop a preliminary understanding of what information about 
the cost of terrorism captures the attention of the general user population on social media. This 
was accomplished by measuring the reach of information about the costs of terrorism. It focused 
on the type of the cost (personal stories about those who are affected by terrorism and military 
defeats) and how the cost was communicated to the general user population. The results of this 
study could be used to design a follow-on study which builds on the strategic choice approach to 
test the validity of the social movement theory and social identity theory. The social movement 
theory suggests that individuals join terrorist organizations and commit attacks when they feel 
deprived of resources (Borum, 2011). Further research could focus on providing information 
about the lack of resources within the Islamic State’s caliphate and measuring the resulting pub-
lic perception of the Islamic State. Social identity theory suggests that individuals join terrorist 
organizations and commit attacks to feel like a member of a group (Borum & Neer, 2017). Fur-
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ther research could focus on providing information about Islamic State fighters who were ostra-
cized by the terrorist organization and measuring the resulting public perception of the Islamic 
State. 
Communication Concepts 
Targeted Information 
In addition to the strategic choice approach, social movement theory, and social identity 
theory, this study also relied on several communication concepts. On social media, users are 
constantly bombarded with information from a variety of different platforms. Currently, terrorist 
organizations primarily use Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, and YouTube (Wilner & Rigato, 2017). 
While viewing information contributes to radicalization, an individual’s social interactions also 
play a pivotal role. This study focused on Facebook because 22% of the world’s population uses 
Facebook, making it the most popular social media platform (Donnelly, 2018). In addition, 
unlike Twitter, Telegram, and YouTube, it leverages a user’s social network when disseminating 
information (Tremayne, 2017). When compared to Twitter, Telegram, and YouTube, Facebook is 
more often used as a source of information rather than a means of communication (Westerman, 
Spence, & Van Der Heide, 2014). Facebook exposes its users to pictures, videos, and links, 
which are of interest to them. This provides an opportunity for journalists, local and federal 
governments, nonprofit organizations, and corporations to engage their audiences about topics 
ranging from impending inclement weather in their town to social issues around the world (Haro-
de-Rosario, Sáez-Martín, & del Carmen Caba-Pérez, 2018).  
When Facebook was first created, most users saw their friends posts, which were 
displayed on their newsfeed in the order that they were posted. Over time, users became 
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overwhelmed by the amount of meaningless information that they were receiving. In response, 
Facebook created algorithms to manipulate what each user sees in their newsfeed based on their 
specific interests. As a result, there are three types of information that a user will see on their newsfeed: 
following information, trending information, and targeted information.  
Following information includes statuses, pictures, videos, and links posted by friends that 
a user follows. A user can actively follow a friend by clicking follow. A user can also often 
passively follow a friend when the Facebook algorithms determine that the user has repeatedly 
shown interest in that particular friend. Perhaps the user has regularly searched for the friends 
page, or the user regularly clicks to view their pictures, videos, and links that populate on their 
newsfeed. Either way, Facebook has discovered that the user is interested in this friend and will 
therefore show more posts made by this friend to satisfy the user’s desires.  
Trending information includes posts that have been liked or shared by many people. For 
example, a user has a friend that they are not interested in. The user has never searched for this 
friend and have never clicked on this friends posts. When this friend announces an engagement 
or pregnancy, hundreds of people that the user is friends with like the picture, which makes it 
trend and show up on the users’ newsfeed. Facebook knows that while the user typically is not 
interested in this friend, something has happened that might be of interest to the user because it is 
of interest to so many others in their social network. 
Targeted information includes posts that Facebook algorithms have chosen to display on a 
user’s newsfeed based on their historical web browsing, which includes prior searches and 
clicks. For example, if a user recently searched to see what movies are playing this weekend, 
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Facebook may begin showing them previews for similar movies or interviews with the actors and 
actresses for movies that they may have previously expressed interest in. 
Together, followed information, trending information, and targeted information are 
consolidated and balanced to present a unique newsfeed to each user. When a user comes across 
a post, she has the choice to like it and share it. If a user likes a post, it is assumed that the user 
agreed with the information presented. If a user shares a post, it is assumed that the user wants 
other users to view it. Users like and share posts to appear thoughtful and knowledgeable, to 
inform or entertain others, to promote causes that they believe in, and to stay connected to others 
(Berger & Milkman, 2012). The decision to like and share content is influenced by the content of 
the post, what users will see the liked and/or shared post, and the desires of the user who likes 
and/or shares the post (Wong & Burkell, 2017). Users specifically look for content that will be 
relevant to themselves and to others (Wong & Burkell, 2017). 
Social Media Consumption 
With never-ending newsfeeds, social media users have choices when it comes to viewing 
information. As a result, the information presented on social media has evolved to meet the de-
mands of social media users who want easily digestible information on topics that are of interest 
to them. With limitless publishing, the quality of information circulating the internet has been de-
graded, yet social media users still seek articles that are relevant and credible (Westerman et al., 
2014). When users view information on social media, they make certain assumptions about its 
reliability (Westerman et al., 2014). The topic provides insight into what users believe is rele-
vant. If a user thinks a post is relevant, then the user will like and share the post with others (Ber-
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ger, 2013). The source provides insight into what users consider to be credible. Receiving infor-
mation from a source with high credibility will lead to a positive acceptance, resulting in an 
abundance of likes and shares; receiving information from a source with low credibility will lead 
to rejection and an absence of likes and shares (Berger, 2013). 
Information in social media posts can be presented as either a cost or benefit depending 
on how it is framed (Hilverda, Kuttschreuter, & Giebels, 2017). Communicators use placement 
(timing and platform), approach (positive or negative), and words (ethical, emotional, logical) to 
frame messages that influence perception (Hilverda et al., 2017). This study does not delve into 
message framing. Instead, it focuses on the superficial elements of a post – its topic and source. 
The study is limited because while likes and shares can easily be objectively counted, an individ-
ual’s attitude towards a post cannot. The study is interested in discovering what posts can capture 
a user’s attention, not a comprehensive evaluation of the persuasive techniques of the post and 
the effect that they have on a reader.  
When a post gets a high number of likes and shares it is considered viral. For example, in 
2015, a picture of a dress was posted on Tumblr went viral (Wong & Burkell, 2017). When 
viewers looked at the dress, some thought that it was blue and black while others thought that it 
was white and gold due to the differences in human color perception. The dress was discussed in 
homes, school, and workplaces all over the world (Wong & Burkell, 2017). The dress represents 
the power that one post can have on society. Viral posts are the objective of a radicalization 
campaign and a counter-radicalization campaign. When posts become viral, they can reach the 
entire general user population, which inevitably reaches those who are contemplating terrorism 
(Badawy & Ferrara, 2017).  
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Nature of the Study 
The emergence of social media has changed radicalization because individuals no longer 
need to search for terrorist organizations. Instead, content has become popular enough to trend to 
the extent where content is recommended to users. Terrorist ideology cannot easily be contained 
because each social media user can reproduce existing content and can produce new content, 
which exponentially increases the amount of information circulating (Hamblet, 2017). In 
addition, the ability to constantly post allows individuals to provide content from social media to 
be adaptive and meet the needs of a changing audience (Rowe & Saif, 2016). Social media 
platforms are also interactive, which leads to the development of relationships between users and 
has a significant impact on radicalization (Gill, Corner, Conway, Thorton, Bloom & Horgan, 
2017). Therefore, social media represents a threat—and an opportunity—to governments around 
the world to curtail terrorism.  
This quantitative study sought to examine the correlation between the independent varia-
bles (CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION) and the dependent variables 
(number of LIKES and SHARES). Preliminary research was conducted by searching for counter-
radicalization Facebook pages and viewing their posts. During the process, it was discovered that 
posts often fell into four categories of information, including (1) personal stories, (2) news arti-
cles, (3) research/policy analysis pieces, (4) military defeats, and (5) religious doctrine. These 
categories of information also varied in what GEOPOLITICAL REGION they addressed and 
how they were presented. Posts were often about (1) the West, (2) the Middle East, or they were 
(3) global, or about (4) cyber. Posts were often presented as: (1) a written status, (2) a written 
19 
 
 
status with a link to a website, (3) a written status with a video, or (4) a written status with a pho-
tograph. Therefore, it seemed indicative to choose a specific counter-radicalization Facebook 
page and code each Facebook post by CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL RE-
GION. The resulting LIKES and SHARES could then be counted, recorded, and analyzed with 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) tests.  
After assessing several counter-radicalization Facebook pages, Quilliam was chosen. 
Quilliam is a United Kingdom-based think tank that focuses on counter-radicalization and pro-
moting a moderate interpretation of Islam through community and social media outreach 
(Quilliam, 2018a). Quilliam was chosen because the administrator uploaded posts regularly and 
had over 25,000 followers (Quilliam, 2018a). The population for the study was all 2018 postings 
on the Quilliam Facebook page (Quilliam, 2018a). The sample for this study was all posts in the 
population.  
Definitions 
For clarity, the following terms needed to be defined and explained: 
Directed terrorist: Terrorist who has received general information and instructions to execute an 
attack (Vidino, Marone, & Entenmann, 2017). 
Echo Chamber: When a group of individuals radicalize each other by sharing their similar 
beliefs and values (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). 
Enabled terrorist: Terrorist who has received training, weapons, and specific instructions to 
execute an attack (Vidino et al., 2017). 
Following information: A status, picture, video, or link posted by a friend who a user is actively 
(clicked follow) or passively (Facebook has determined that the user regularly views) following. 
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General user population: Individuals who regularly accesses social media. 
Headquartered terrorist: Terrorist who resides within close proximity of a terrorist organization 
and interacts on a regular basis with terrorist organizations. 
Inspired terrorist: Terrorist who has had no contact with a terrorist organization but has become 
inspired by jihadist material (Vidino et al., 2017). 
Islamic State: A terrorist organization that follows the Salafi doctrine of Sunni Islam and is 
attempting to develop a caliphate. Also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Daesh. 
Islamic Terrorism: Using violence to invoke fear and achieve social, political, and/or economic 
goals which are rooted in Islamic ideology. 
Lurker: Social media users who do not create or engage with posts but are still viewing them and 
developing opinions on the topics (Leiner, Kobilke, Rueß, & Brosius, 2018). 
Newsfeed: An on-going page of information that begins when a user joins a social media 
platform. 
Targeted Information: Information that Facebook algorithms have chosen to display on a user’s 
newsfeed based on their historical preferences (prior searches and clicks). 
Terrorist Attack: An act of violence perpetrated by a headquartered, directed, enabled, or inspired 
terrorist to achieve social, political, and/or economic goals. 
Trending Information: Information that has received a large number of LIKES and SHARES and 
as a result, social media platforms show it to more users, which results in even more LIKES and 
SHARES. 
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Quilliam International: A United Kingdom-based think tank that focuses on counter-
radicalization and promoting a moderate interpretation of Islam through community and social 
media outreach (Quilliam, 2018a). 
Viral Information: Information that receives such a large number of LIKES and SHARES that it 
reaches beyond social media and is discussed in society. 
Vulnerable population: Individuals who feel sympathetic towards the jihad and may eventually 
become radicalized. 
Assumptions 
This study relied on two critical assumptions involving both the theoretical framework 
and conceptual framework. The theoretical framework relied on the strategic choice theory, 
which argues that individuals are rational and perform cost and benefit analysis when deciding to 
join a terrorist organization (Borum, 2011). However, it is possible that some individuals are not 
rational and may decide to join a terrorist organization because they have psychological prob-
lems or are under duress. Presenting a counter-narrative to individuals who are not rational will 
be futile. However, this study assumed that most individuals who become involved in terrorism 
are rational and can be deterred if provided with information that changes their perspective. The 
communication concepts such as targeting information, trending information, and following in-
formation rely on the flawless interpretation of social media consumption. When user comes 
across a post, the user has the choice to like it and/or share it. If a user likes a post, it is assumed 
that they agreed with the information presented. If a user shares a post, it is assumed that they 
want other users to view it. However, users often make mistakes when navigating social media 
because they are distracted or tired while scrolling through their newsfeed (Hurst, Mankoff, & 
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Hudson, 2008). Researchers are currently attempting to develop mechanisms that can identify 
and eliminate unintentional clicks from studies but have had limited success given the uncontrol-
lable nature of the users (Tolomei, Lalmas, Farahat, & Haines, 2018). Even if social media stud-
ies are conducted in an environment where researchers can ensure that the users could concen-
trate on the content, users may still mistakenly click LIKE or SHARE while scrolling due to im-
perfect finger control (Hurst et al., 2008). This margin of error has been accepted for the study 
because it is difficult to overcome.  
Scope and Delimitations 
When evaluating the spread of information on social media, there are clear trends. These 
trends need to be studied and understood to ensure that beneficial information can reach the 
masses. Because this study is observational, there were few threats to validity. The study was 
open to all social media users because the page measured was open to all social media users. 
However, some social media users were more likely to see the page being measured simply be-
cause they viewed similar pages. As a result, it is possible that this study provided insight only 
into the behavior of users who are already interested in counter-radicalization, either because 
they strongly support terrorism or strongly oppose terrorism. Therefore, this study may not be 
generalizable to the entire population of social media users. This study could have been more 
generalizable if it had focused on posts which were displayed on every single social media user’s 
newsfeed, regardless of their viewing preferences. However, this feat could be accomplished 
only by the social media platform, which can override the algorithms that regulate what content 
is displayed. In the past, social media platforms, including Facebook, have experimented on their 
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users by pushing content and measuring the user reaction (Grimmelmann, 2015). While the ex-
periments did not cause physical or mental harm to users, they generated outrage from users who 
felt that the experiments violated business ethics (Grimmelmann, 2015). Therefore, research in 
the field of social media is forced to rely on measuring the reach of content posted on individual 
pages, which will always have a specific viewership (Grimmelmann, 2015). After all, even the 
most popular pages featuring brands such as Coca-Cola, Samsung, and Barak Obama are only 
going to be seen by their target audiences.  
Limitations 
The data collection for this study was limited because the study was conducted without 
administrator privileges for Facebook. Administrators can view insights to track metrics, which 
gauge social media outreach and engagement. For example, the view insights function measures 
the number of times content was displayed on the newsfeed of subscribers, known as impres-
sions, and the number of times content was liked and shared by the subscribers who were ex-
posed to the content. These metrics would have enabled the study to demonstrate how many sub-
scribers were seeing the content and what percentage of those subscribers were providing feed-
back, which would demonstrate how engaging specific content is. An administrator could also 
see the total number of users who choose to hide all posts from the page and the total number of 
users who unsubscribed from the page. Viewers hide all posts and unsubscribe from pages for a 
variety of reasons. Perhaps the administrators are posting too frequently and dominating the us-
ers’ newsfeed or maybe the administrators are posting content that is not relevant or credible to 
the user. This information could have provided valuable information about user perception of 
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specific content and the overall performance of the page (Dolan, Conduit, Fahy, & Goodman, 
2017).  
Instead, this study had to rely on manually coding posts and counting the existing LIKES 
and SHARES. Choosing the CONTENT and GEOPOLITICAL REGION was objective and easy 
to code. However, choosing the CATEGORY was subjective and more difficult to code. For ex-
ample, an editorial piece published by a news outlet about a woman who joined the Islamic State 
to become a bride but defected because of the poor living conditions could fall into the personal 
story, news article, research/policy analysis, military defeats, and religious doctrine categories. 
To ensure that coding was consistent, criteria were developed to determine the CATEGORY 
based on the information source as seen below in Table 2. 
Table 2  
Criteria for coding 
Category of social 
media post 
Information source Example 
personal story 
-current terrorists 
-defected terrorists 
-friends and families of terrorists 
-victims of terrorism 
-bystanders 
-testimonials 
news article -news outlet 
-recent attacks 
-thwarted attacks 
research/policy Analysis 
-interviews with experts 
-articles from reputable sources (i.e. 
The Independent, The Atlantic, The 
Economist) 
-interviews 
-research studies 
military defeats -news outlet 
 
-campaign updates 
 
religious doctrine -religious scholars 
-fatwas (religious 
declarations) 
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The study also did not account for the existence of lurkers. Lurkers are social media users 
who are viewing posts and forming opinions but refrain from liking or sharing posts because 
they do not want to publicize their stance on controversial issues (Leiner, Kobilke, Rueß, & 
Brosius, 2018). Not only is terrorism a controversial issue, but many social media users fear that 
discussing it over the internet will prompt government surveillance. Therefore, lurkers may be 
present and have a significant impact on this type of research. Because the findings of this study 
are contingent on observing participant behavior in their natural environment, a public forum, 
there is no way to unveil the lurkers. Due to the unknown impact of lurkers on this type of re-
search, this study is less generalizable to the global population. A follow-on study may benefit 
from unveiling the lurkers by assuring anonymity for all participants and soliciting feedback 
from all social media users who view the content.  
Significance of the Study 
           Academic researchers are often far removed from terrorism, which degrades the validity 
and reliability of their findings. Headquartered terrorists live within proximity of their terrorist 
organization and interact on a regular basis with their terrorist organization. Headquartered ter-
rorists are extremely difficult to study because they are often in remote regions, speak local dia-
lects (for which there are no interpreters), can be dangerous to meet with, and are often unwilling 
to be interviewed. Inspired terrorists are either already imprisoned or would face imprisonment if 
they divulged their inclinations and intentions to researchers. As a result, the field of terrorism 
research has been dominated by the only people who have access to terrorists: military and intel-
ligence agencies. Further, these same researchers with access who view terrorism as a threat, and 
a belief that they must be defeated, makes them inherently biased (Pipes, 2017). To make matters 
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worse, military and intelligence agencies often have not been trained to overcome their bias and 
follow a methodology for data collection and analysis that led to unreliable findings (Pipes, 
2017). 
Given the many challenges involved in communicating with terrorists, academic research 
has focused on case studies that seek out individuals who have committed an act of terrorism 
(Jensen, James, & Tinsley, 2015). They answer common questions, such as where they were 
raised, what socioeconomic class their family was from, did their biological mother and father 
raise them, what was their performance in school, did they attended religious services, who they 
were talking to online (Jensen et al., 2015). Researchers often do not have access to the terrorist 
to ask why the person became interested in becoming a terrorist and what information had an im-
pact on their decision.  
Significance to Theory and Practice 
Further, radicalization research should focus on an area that can be empirically studied, 
such as understanding what information about terrorism is of interest to the general user popula-
tion. When information trends within the general user population, it inevitably reaches individu-
als who are in the first and second phases of radicalization, and who also support the ideology, 
and may eventually encourage others to execute attacks or choose to execute attacks themselves. 
This study is being conducted because when used properly, social media has the potential to 
reach general user populations, which include the at risk population, and prevent radicalization. 
This study will be of interest to governmental and nongovernmental organizations throughout the 
world, which are attempting to eradicate terrorism with counter-radicalization campaigns. The 
findings are expected to provide insight into the potential of radicalization research to shift the 
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efforts from only eliminating wanted terrorists to also preventing the creation of future terrorists 
by leveraging data analytics on social media.  
Significance to Social Change 
 A deeper understanding of how counter-radicalization influences social trends and terror-
ist acts may lead to greater safety of the global community as well as the full impact of social 
media. Further, research should focus on understanding what makes a counter-radicalization in-
formation trend, which will require constant study because the atmosphere of social media 
changes every single day. This understanding could then be utilized by governmental and non-
governmental counter-radicalization efforts when uploading information to social media to en-
sure that messages are liked and shared to trend. Trending messages can reach the general user 
population, which includes those who are considering supporting or joining a terrorist organiza-
tion. The outcome of this study could demonstrate that disseminating information on social me-
dia to prevent radicalization is effective. It could be used for disseminating information using 
other platforms, such as community programs where governments and nongovernmental organi-
zations are currently expending resources. If governmental organizations and nongovernmental 
organizations are able to increase the reach of their counter-radicalization efforts, then they may 
be able to decrease the amount of terrorist attacks. 
Summary 
To prevent more attacks like the Boston Marathon Bombing, it is essential to identify the 
key opportunities and obstacles in disseminating counter-radicalization information. This chapter 
provided an overview of the problem, purpose of the study, research questions and hypotheses, 
and delved into the theoretical framework and conceptual framework which the study is based 
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upon. Executing an attack on behalf of a terrorist organization is a strategic choice. Terrorists 
weigh the costs and benefits based on the information that is available to them (Borum, 2011). It 
is critical to develop an understanding of common motivations that push individuals towards rad-
icalization and pull individuals away from radicalization (Bertram, 2015). This chapter also ad-
dressed the assumptions, limitations, and significance of the study that aims to determine if there 
is a relationship between the content of a social media post and reaction to the social media post. 
If a relationship is found, then further research on the use of data analytics for counter-radicaliza-
tion efforts may be warranted.  
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the existing literature on counter-radicalization efforts 
made by governmental and nongovernmental organizations throughout the world and illuminates 
gaps in the research that will be filled by this study. Chapter 3 presents the chosen research de-
sign and methodology and addresses threats to validity. Chapter 4 delves into the statistical anal-
ysis, results, and interpretation of the results. Chapter 5 is devoted to discussion of the findings, 
limitations of the study, policy implications, conclusions, and recommendations for further study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This research addressed historical, current, and possible future efforts at the dissemina-
tion of counter-radicalization information made by governmental and nongovernmental organi-
zations throughout the world. Counter-radicalization information is readily available but is not 
reaching the general user population (Khatib, Dutton, & Thelwall, 2012). As a result, the individ-
uals who are at risk of being radicalized are viewing only jihadist propaganda and not viewing 
information that contradicts the jihadist propaganda. The purpose of this study was to assess the 
utility of data analytics when administering counter-radicalization campaigns on social media to 
ensure that the posts are reaching and engaging the general user population. This chapter reviews 
the literature by looking at the history of terrorist recruitment, the emerging use of social media 
in terrorist recruitment, the effectiveness of prior counter-radicalization efforts, and the potential 
of utilizing data analytics. Most importantly, this chapter describes the empirical research in the 
field of counter-radicalization efforts and sets up the study to examine the outreach of a specific 
counter-radicalization information operation.  
Literature Search Strategy 
This literature review examined the research across numerous significant topics and 
fields relevant to the study: (a) terrorist recruitment; (b) counter-radicalization; (c) information 
operations; (d) governmental and nongovernmental counter-radicalization efforts; (e) nongovern-
mental counter-radicalization efforts; and (f) social media. The review included aspects of the 
theoretical framework of the social movement and social identity theories that were both derived 
from the strategic choice approach to terrorism. These theories state that individuals evaluate 
costs and benefits when considering supporting or joining a terrorist organization (Al Raffie, 
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2013). The perception of costs and benefits are heavily influenced by the information that at risk 
individuals have access to (Al Raffie, 2013). Existing research was placed into categories to sys-
tematically examine how terrorist recruitment has evolved with the emergence of social media 
and the potential use of data analytics to improve outreach. 
In this study, the following databases were used: Google Scholar, International Security 
and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Homeland Security Digital Library, West Point’s 
Combatting Terrorism Center, Military and Government Collection, Sage Publications, and 
RAND Publications. Examination of the literature was conducted between the years 2015 and 
2018, using the following search terms: terrorist recruitment, jihadist ideology, jihadist social 
media strategy, self-radicalization, online radicalization, counter-radicalization, information op-
erations, trending information, and viral information. The reference lists within the listed publi-
cations and related bibliographies of the studies were further examined for additional sources. 
The resulting studies discussed how terrorist organizations are currently recruiting and 
how to undermine their strategies. The studies emphasized two prevalent concepts. The first 
concept was the need to understand the ideology and how terrorist organizations gain followers. 
The articles also attempted to determine the perceived costs and benefits of terrorism. The 
second concept was to provide information that would encourage a moderate interpretation and 
practice of the ideology. Some of the papers, articles, and speeches proposed ideas that could be 
effective in preventing people from becoming terrorists and included an evaluation of current 
counter-radicalization efforts. However, none of the papers, articles, or speeches discussed the 
use of data analytics to focus counter radicalization-efforts on social media platforms. 
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The History of Terrorist Recruitment 
Terrorist organizations justify their existence and operations with fragments of passages 
from ancient religious texts. However, their recruitment strategy has changed over the years as 
they have been forced to repeatedly defend their lands from foreign invaders. With the emer-
gence of the internet, terrorist organizations have taken their efforts online.  
The Concept of Jihad 
There are three distinct sects of Islam: Sunni’s, Shi’as, and Kharijites, and each sect has 
its own jurisprudence schools. Under each jurisprudence school, there are even more divisions. 
The Sunni Mulsims believe that the successors of Mohammed should be democratically elected 
and follow the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’I, and Hanibali schools of jurisprudence (Khalid, 2018). 
The Shi’a Muslims believe that the successors of Mohammed should be descendants of Moham-
med and follow the Fivers, Seveners, and Twelvers (Khalid, 2018). The Kharijites believe that 
the successor of Mohammed should be chosen by God through battle and follow the Sufris, 
Azariqa, Najdat, Adjarites, and Ibadis (Khalid, 2018). While the many sects and schools of juris-
prudence follow different laws, they all believe that it is their duty to practice the purest form of 
Islam. 
The practices of Islam are determined by the Quran and Hadith. The Quran is the ideo-
logical text as dictated by Mohammed. The Quran explains how to live as a Muslim, how to cre-
ate an Islamic Society, and how to navigate a world where there are many enemies of Islam 
(Khalid, 2018). The Hadith is a collection of traditions which are based on what Mohammed may 
have said or done (Khalid, 2018). Both the Quran and Hadith have been interpreted by religious 
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scholars and teachers which has resulted in various interpretations of Islam. Most Muslims inter-
pret jihad as the internal struggle to be a devout Muslim who follows the five pillars of Islam; 
faith, prayer, charity, fasting, and pilgrimage (Boutz, Benninger, & Lancaster, 2018). A minority 
of Muslims interpret jihad as the struggle to rid the world of infidels (Boutz et al., 2018).  
There are different types of jihad, including: verbal support, written support, physical 
support, and funding support. Waging jihad can be profitable for fighters. Muslims are required 
by the Hadith to pay zakat which is a tax that is levied annually at 2.5% – 10 % of income de-
pending on wealth and local conditions. Zakat is disbursed for the needy, local government 
workers, and those fighting jihad. For jihadists, zakat can pay for their fighting expenses and per-
sonal expenses. In addition, those who become a martyr receive entry into paradise where they 
will be forgiven of all sins and live a life of luxury while securing admission into paradise for 
relatives as stated in the Quran. Between promises of payment and eternal bliss, jihadism is not 
only a religious duty but a lucrative career (Boutz et al., 2018).  
The Return of the Caliphate 
From the year 632-750 CE, Muslims experienced expansion under the Rashidun Cali-
phate and Umayyad Caliphate which conquered large portions of the Sassanian Empire and Byz-
antine Empire. During this time, jihad was viewed as a form of warfare used to gain and protect 
territory. Rules to guide this view of jihad were documented and included the protection of non-
combatants and explained that those conquered only had to submit to the rule of the caliphate 
and did not have to convert. When the Abbasid Caliphate and Ottoman Caliphate were over-
thrown, the concept of jihad was weakened (Israeli, 2017).  
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It was not until the Middle East was invaded by colonial powers, that the concept of jihad 
was revived (Kraidy, 2018). After World War I, France and the United Kingdom decided that be-
cause of their victory they were entitled to ownership of land in the Middle East. A politician 
from each side, Sykes and Picot, created an agreement to divide the land and drew arbitrary lines 
to create the countries known today as Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel (Fawcett, 2017). For both 
France and the United Kingdom, colonization of the Middle East was a failure because it was ex-
pensive and unsurprisingly difficult to enforce European social, political, and economic infra-
structure in regions where the natives did not welcome their presence. As a result, France and the 
United Kingdom eventually pulled out of the Middle East, but left their boundaries in place as 
seen in Figure 1. Those boundaries cut apart the religious tribes’ access to sacred lands and natu-
ral resources, igniting conflicts throughout the region leading to the fundamentalist movement 
(Kraidy, 2018). 
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Note. From “The Gulf/2000 Project,” by M. Izady, 2000, Columbia University. Retrieved from 
http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/. 
Figure 3. Sykes Picot agreement 
 
The new fundamentalist movement brought a resurgence of writings on jihad. Most 
notably, Ibn Taymiyya, who encouraged the forced conversion or killing of all infidels and 
Abdullah Azzam, who made it permissible to no longer protect non-combatants when fighting 
(Hasan, 2018). Terrorist organizations began developing in the 1970’s as foreign invaders re-
entered the region. Maktab al-Khidamat, also known as the Afghan Services Bureau, was created 
in the 1970’s to support the Mujahideen as they traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the 
Soviet invasion (Cragin, 2017). Following their victories, Maktab al-Khidamat created a wave of 
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publications including the magazine, al Jihad, the leaflet, Defense of Muslim Lands, and the 
book Birth of the Afghani Arabs, all argue why it is a religious duty to support the jihad (Cragin, 
2017). Maktab al-Khidamat also provided classes on their teachings which are founded on the 
concept of only one God’s existence and a literal interpretation of the Quran which 
emphasizes the rejection of what is new and different (Cragin, 2017). These teachings discussed 
the establishment of a society built on Sharia Law that reaches across nations and is seen as a 
solution to poverty and injustice and is guided by the caliph. Sympathizers of the caliphate may 
condemn the use of violence, but still see terrorism as at least doing something to resolve 
society’s problems (Cragin, 2017).  
The Process of Radicalization 
According to Bloom (2017), terrorist recruitment is often cyclical. When a terrorist 
organization is conceived, its leadership is motivated to fill the ranks, known as manpower-
focused (Bloom, 2017). During this time the terrorist organization will recruit whoever is 
available. Often, this includes average criminals who do not have specialized skills. As the 
terrorist organization matures, its leadership becomes more selective and searches for expertise, 
known as expertise-focused (Bloom, 2017). Recruitment strategy also must shift throughout the 
life of a terrorist organization to overcome external pressures. For example, if a terrorist 
organization has withstood several defeats, it may have trouble recruiting expertise and must 
revert back to being manpower-focused (Bloom, 2017). On the contrary, if a terrorist 
organization is gaining popularity, it may choose to become expertise-focused when recruiting to 
preserve its message (Bloom, 2017). Regardless of what stage a terrorist organization is at, this 
cyclical nature explains why researchers encounter average and expert terrorists in the 
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operational environment. Depending on what stage a terrorist organization exists, eliminating 
terrorists can be counter-productive because an average terrorist could be replaced by an expert 
terrorist (Bloom, 2017). When a terrorist organization is combatting foreign invaders, they may 
equally split their recruitment between manpower-focused and expertise focused (Bloom, 2017). 
The radicalization process for manpower-focused and expertise focused terrorist recruitment 
follows the same four phases but often includes different incentives.  
Radicalization is achieved over time and through multiple channels of communication 
(Cragin, 2017). There is consensus among researchers who separate radicalization into four 
phrases – sensitivity, discovery, group membership, and commitment to action (Cragin, 2017). 
Sensitivity begins when an individual is surrounded by friends and family who are frustrated 
with their government or other governments domestic and foreign policies and become 
sympathetic to jihadism (van Eerten et al., 2017). Often, this will lead the individual to seek 
more information about the ideology on the internet and/or in their community, known as 
discovery. Indoctrination occurs when the individual begins to feel a sense of belonging from 
these interactions (Borum & Neer, 2017). Group membership interactions can be as cursory as 
reading about a terrorist organization’s vision and goals, which align with their own, and talking 
to others who are interested in terrorism (Borum & Neer, 2017). Interactions can also be as 
complex as involving years of prolonged contact with recruiters (Borum & Neer, 2017). 
Recruiters can make contact anywhere - on the internet, at school, during prayer, and while 
playing sports, to name a few (Bloom, 2017). Recruiters often adapt to different environments, 
adjusting the method and message to fit the individual (Bloom, 2017). The fourth phase, 
commitment to action, varies from individual-to-individual. Again, the trigger can be as 
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superficial as becoming aware of perceived injustices in their community or another community, 
or it can be as complex as the death of a family member or friend (Cragin, 2017). The ideological 
motivations of terrorists are undoubtedly tied to political and economic condition but are also 
heavily influenced by the availability of information and social interactions. 
The authors of Analyzing Pathways of Lone-Actor Radicalization: A Relational 
Approach, Malthaner and Lindekilde (2017), analyzed relational configurations and their 
evolution over time to identify common patterns. The authors gathered empirical data on lone-
actor radicalization by studying 30 cases in the U.S., Europe, and the Middle East. In each case, 
they looked for perpetrator characteristics (heritage, socioeconomic status, personality, 
popularity, religious devotion, and academic performance), attack types (sophisticated or 
unsophisticated), and social ties. They found that beliefs do not always result in action. Instead, 
beliefs combined with available information and social interactions, result in action (Malthaner 
& Lindekilde, 2017). The researchers concluded that radicalization can either be top-down, 
where the terrorist organization contacts the individual, or bottom-up where the individual seeks 
out the terrorist organization. Either way, radicalization begins with the individual already being 
susceptible to recruitment because they are frustrated with society and surrounded by friends and 
family who feel the same. In top-down radicalization, the individual is often exposed to teaching 
by a recruiter, asked to participate in radical activities, and creates personal ties to others in the 
terrorist organization – all of which commits them to the cause. To radicalize individuals, 
terrorist organizations often attempt to further isolate followers by encouraging them to stop 
associating with mainstream Muslims and only associate with likeminded Muslims. This tactic 
has been known to accelerate radicalization. In bottom-down radicalization, individuals are often 
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searching for further information either by looking online and/or reaching out to recruiters. They 
then become involved in the terrorist organization, participate in radical activities, and create 
personal ties – all of which makes the individual unwavering in their radical beliefs and commits 
them to the cause (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017).  
In both top-down and bottom-up recruitment there are several points in the radicalization 
process that depend on social networks. Malthaner and Linekilde (2017) found that two of the 
most effectual motivators are the pre-existing ties to friends and family and the group dynamics 
they encounter once indoctrinated to a terrorist organization. If either of these motivators are 
interrupted, there is a possibility that radicalization could be prevented. For example, if an 
individual has pre-existing ties to friends and family who condemn terrorism, they will be less 
likely to feel enticed by a terrorist organization (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). Likewise, if a 
terrorist organization is filled with individuals who do not truly believe in the cause, perhaps 
because they are being exposed to information that conflicts with the ideology, then members 
will become deradicalized (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). Just as an echo chamber can 
radicalize individuals, it can also deradicalize individuals (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). The 
effect of pre-exiting ties to friends, family, and group dynamics make it impossible to develop a 
profile for potential terrorists. However, relational analysis can improve an understanding of how 
relationships are intertwined in the process of radicalization and may explain why some 
individuals become radicalized while others with the same characteristics do not (Malthaner & 
Lindekilde, 2017).  
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The Evolution of Terrorism 
Terrorist organizations are constantly forced to evolve in order to plan, coordinate, and 
execute attacks without detection. In addition, terrorist organizations have to ensure that their at-
tacks are inspiring enough to gain followers who are willing to further the cause.  
The Fall of Al-Qaeda 
Al-Qaeda developed in the 1970s while fighting to expel the Soviet Union from 
Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda turned their 
attention to overthrowing what they believed to be corrupt regimes throughout the world 
(Ibrahimi, 2017). They specifically intervened in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Israel, and reached 
out to other regional terrorist groups to indoctrinate them in their cause (Siebert & Keeny, 2017). 
By using a localized strategy that focused on pursuing short-term political goals for various local 
communities, they were able to create a sophisticated network of affiliated terrorist organizations 
that loosely followed their guidance (Siebert & Keeny, 2017). 
Operationally, Al-Qaeda has never had enough manpower and funding to wage a conven-
tional war. Instead they have sought to undermine their opponents through desecration of honor 
(Jones & Libicki, 2008). Attacks are meant to challenge their opponents’ ability to protect them-
selves which makes the opponent appear weak to its own people, allies, and enemies (Jones & 
Libicki, 2008). If the opponents’ response to an attack is unpopular, then their reputation may be 
further tarnished (Jones & Libicki, 2008). For example, the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Cen-
ter, Pentagon, and Pennsylvania, demonstrated Al-Qaeda’s desecration of honor. The attack was 
a symbolic strike on U.S. financial and economic might, military headquarters, and U.S. civil-
ians/citizens. Therefore, the attack demonstrated that the United States was unable to protect its 
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own infrastructure and people. The 9/11 attacks also succeeded in provoking an unpopular re-
sponse, the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, which caused the public to lose even more faith in the 
United States. The choice of targets chosen by Al-Qaeda provides further insight into their strat-
egy. Al-Qaeda did not have broad religious goals of ridding the world of infidels and developing 
a caliphate. Instead, they were driven by narrow political goals that focused on eliminating im-
mediate threats to Muslim sovereignty (Klein, 2016).  
In addition to planning and executing unconventional attacks, Al-Qaeda also intended to 
be a source of expertise that could enable other terrorist organizations (Ibrahimi, 2017). Affiliates 
were invited to travel to their camps to receive spiritual, basic military, and survival training 
(Ibrahimi, 2017). The jihad experience created cohesive bonds between affiliates who were then 
sent throughout the world to complete their duties (Ibrahimi, 2017). However, in the 1990s, Al-
Qaeda was forced to stop bringing affiliates to training camps because travel was being closely 
monitored and there was a fear of infiltration (Ibrahimi, 2017). Instead, Al-Qaeda attempted to 
continue recruiting and indoctrinating affiliates through the internet. Al-Qaeda created several 
websites to articulate their ideas. In keeping with their localized strategy, thinkers such as Abu 
Musab al-Suri, Abu Bakr Naji, Yusuf al-Ayyiri, Saif al-Adl and Louis Atiyatallah provided 
input on the issues of local Islamic practices and local politics to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ 
of local communities (Ibrahimi, 2017). Al-Qaeda used the internet to create repositories for 
ideological information rather than as an interactive platform where interested individuals could 
develop relationships (Rudner, 2017). While they were able to recruit some followers, the focus 
on the local level severely limited their outreach. To make matters worse for them, Al-Qaeda was 
unable to properly indoctrinate these limited followers without training camps and subsequently 
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lost control of their planning and execution of attacks (Torres-Soriano, 2016). As a result, 
followers often executed attacks that also killed Muslims and undermined the credibility of Al-
Qaeda (Torres-Soriano, 2016). Al Qaeda also attempted to recruit from Madrasahs where the 
focus is on teaching extremist religion and not on useful skills. These unskilled terrorists often 
made lethal mistakes when attempting to plan and execute attacks which further undermined the 
credibility of Al-Qaeda (Torres-Soriano, 2016). 
The rise and fall of A-Qaeda proves that all terrorist organizations do not last forever. 
Like a business, they are highly susceptible to failure and cycles. The median duration of a 
terrorist group is one year (Jones & Libiki, 2008). Jones and Libiki (2008) studied 648 cases and 
concluded that terrorist organizations dismantle due to a variety of reasons, including policing, 
military intervention, splintering, and politics. Al-Qaeda failed due to a combination of policing, 
military intervention, splintering, and politics, but only because it was severely weakened by its 
own localized strategy. By focusing only on highly politicized local issues, the leadership lost 
touch with the religious base for the ideology. This made it difficult to recruit and indoctrinate 
terrorists who were willing to follow orders at all costs. A terrorist organization’s ability to 
develop a structure, delegate responsibilities, adapt to counterterrorism efforts, and implement 
changes also impact its success in recruitment and indoctrination. It also impacts a terrorist 
organization’s viability in recruitment and indoctrination (Byman, 2017).  
The Rise of the Islamic State 
Unlike Al-Qaeda, and its affiliate terrorist organizations, the Islamic State has a vision. 
During the 800th Century, a Sunni scholar, Ahmad bin Mujammad bin Hanbal Abu Abd Allah al-
Shaybani, developed an orthodoxy of literal interpretation of Islam (Haykel, 2016). During the 
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13th century, Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, also a Sunni scholar, made that orthodoxy 
stricter (Haykel, 2016). During the 17th century, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab another Sunni 
scholar, turned the orthodoxy into a movement, known as Wahhabism, and began spreading his 
teachings throughout the Middle East (Haykel, 2016). The end goal of Wahhabism is to establish 
a caliphate where everyone follows Sharia Law and is ruled by a caliph who is a descendent 
from the Prophet’s Tribe. The Islamic State is highly influenced by Wahhabism, but they have 
also added social and political elements. As a result, they have created not just a religion, but a 
utopian way of life. In their attempt to establish a caliphate, they are building an infrastructure of 
law and order and providing clean water, food, clothing, and shelter to their followers. Rather 
than attempting to win over ‘hearts and minds’ by fighting for one community at a time, the 
Islamic State has broadcasted a message throughout the world about the re-establishment of a 
caliphate (Hamblet, 2017). The caliphate appeals to followers because it promises desirable 
amenities and has been interpreted to have a deeply religious meaning (Al-Ghazzi, 2018). Yet, in 
the Quran and Hadith, there are mentions of a caliph, but there is no mention of a caliphate that 
is governed by a single legislative, executive, and judicial system (Al-Ghazzi, 2018). However, 
many Muslims who feel discriminated against and marginalized by their countries are willing to 
overlook this detail when deciding to support the Islamic State (Al-Ghazzi, 2018). 
The Islamic State operates by gaining territory by force and establishing infrastructure 
once the territory is claimed (Phillips, 2017). They recruit the unskilled followers for fighting 
and professionals (such as doctors, nurses, engineers, and computer scientists) to provide 
services to their constituents (Phillips, 2017). To accomplish these goals, the Islamic State uses a 
targeted manpower-focused and expertise-focused recruitment strategy and a general religious-
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based and caliphate-based messaging strategy to develop a resilient brand (Bloom, 2017). The 
Islamic State has been successful in radicalizing followers because they understand their 
audience and are willing to use a variety of approaches to reach them. 
The manpower-focused marketing strategy involves capturing attention, feeding on 
individual and society frustrations, and offering benefits. The Islamic State posts graphic and 
violent images and videos on social media to capture attention (Gill et al., 2017). These uploads 
are specifically created to appeal to youth and often include rap songs and memes. In order to 
recruit manpower, the Islamic State promises two very sought-after concepts to Muslims who 
feel rejected by society and without a future– identity and power (Haykel, 2016). In the U.S., 
Europe, and Canada, Muslims are often first-, second-, or third-generation citizens who 
immigrated to a new country and had to completely re-build a career and life (Haykel, 2016). As 
a result, many Muslims communities in these countries live in poverty (Haykel, 2016). To make 
matters worse, many of these Muslim communities are often discouraged from using outside 
assistance such as job training, job searching, and job guidance programs (Haykel, 2016). In 
order to find a job, they must use a network, if they cannot find a job, they cannot afford an 
apartment, if they cannot afford an apartment than they will not be married and have children 
(Haykel, 2016). The Islamic State feeds on these frustrations using social media to emphasize the 
hopelessness of their current lives and the promises of identity and power that the Islamic State 
will provide them (Haykel, 2016). The Islamic State highlights the sophisticated weapons that 
fighters will be able to use which include explosives, machine guns, and rocket-propelled 
grenades, and emphasize the admittance to paradise if they are chosen to be a martyr (Schmid, 
2017). In addition, the Islamic State also provides material luxuries such as homes and cars 
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which are often extremely enticing to Muslims who have only known poverty (Schmid, 2017). 
The Islamic State also offers camaraderie and companionship which is often appealing to 
Muslims who have felt isolated and seek a sense of belonging (Schmid, 2017). The unskilled 
followers independently view the content from the Islamic State and become inspired enough to 
travel to Iraq and Syria to fight, or execute lone-wolf attacks, in their country without requiring 
direct communication (Gill et al., 2017).  
The expertise-focused strategy requires more resources. The Islamic State actively 
searches for potential candidates at universities and workplaces (Bloom, 2017). Recruiters then 
craft a tailored message which includes altruistic messages aimed at the educated (Bloom, 2017). 
The benefits presented with the expertise-focused strategy include being a part of something 
bigger than themselves (Bloom, 2017). The recruiters will often show potential candidates 
images and videos of women and children who need medical treatment and access to shelter, 
clean water, and food (Bloom, 2017). Similarly, to the manpower-focused strategy, the expertise-
focused strategy also emphasizes the economic benefits of homes and cars and social benefits of 
camaraderie and companionship that are provided by the Islamic State (Schmid, 2017). 
In addition to their manpower-focused and expertise-focused recruitment strategies, the 
Islamic State also uses a general religious-based and caliphate messaging strategy to ensure that 
the entire world understands the necessity of the caliphate and acknowledges their sovereignty. 
The religious-based messaging strategy explains that their interpretation of Islam is under attack 
(Robinson, 2017). The Islamic State uses social media to cultivate widespread fear of an 
approaching apocalypse and the urgent need for a caliphate (Schmid, 2017). Historically, this 
tactic has been effective in promoting action and justifying the use of violence (Schmid, 2017). 
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With frequent references to verse in the Quran they gain credibility from the religion. Then they 
describe how they are going to overcome these threats and urge their followers need to 
participate (Robinson, 2017). Their caliphate messaging strategy is executed by using social 
media platforms to broadcast information about what the caliphate can offer for those who 
choose to live and work within its boundaries. In addition, the Islamic State uses billboards, radio 
stations, posters, food packaging, and public events to demonstrate the services they provide 
which include housing, medical care, schooling, and disaster relief, among other things (Ingram, 
2015). While the Islamic State never sought to develop a network of affiliate terrorist 
organizations, the religious-based and caliphate messaging has helped the Islamic State to 
develop affiliate terrorist organizations throughout the world who also provide funding, weapons, 
and additional manpower (Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist 
Recruitment, 2015). Various terrorist organizations, including Boko Haram in Nigeria, have 
pledged their allegiance to the Islamic State (Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of 
Terrorist Recruitment, 2015). As the Islamic State loses territory, they have become increasingly 
reliant on this unintended source of assistance. However, affiliate terrorist organizations easily 
and often withdraw their support when they become displeased with the Islamic States practices 
(Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment, 2015).  
Both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State capitalized on the first stage of radicalization, 
sensitivity, when individuals feel frustrated with society, are desperately seeking community, and 
begin to explore the concept of jihad. Where Al Qaeda and the Islamic State differed in their 
recruitment strategy is where they derive their legitimacy and their use of the internet. The 
Islamic State has a global strategy that derives its legitimacy from religion, and utilizes various 
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social media platforms, to recruit and indoctrinate committed followers. Al-Qaeda uses a local 
strategy which derives its legitimacy from making local political gains (Hamblet, 2017). In the 
early 2000’s, their outreach was limited to a small number of websites and corresponding 
chatrooms (Hamblet, 2017). As a result, their varying messages only reached local audiences and 
those who were actively seeking guidance (Hamblet, 2017). Al Qaeda supporters were typically 
middle-class males under the age of 35 descending from the Middle East, North Africa, and 
South Asian cultures who were already followers of Islam (Hamblet, 2017). The Islamic State, 
however, understands the potential of the internet and its ability to develop a brand to entice 
those who are vulnerable to radicalization (Hamblet, 2017). The Islamic State expanded their use 
of the internet by creating an ecosystem of radicalization using almost every available platform 
for constantly broadcasting their message and tailored individual and group correspondence. 
While the Islamic State is active on Facebook, Tumblr, Telegam, Kik, WhatsApp, and Surespot, 
their success has been mostly attributed to Twitter (Berger & Morgan, 2015).  
 Several social media platforms have developed programs to detect terrorist rhetoric and 
close accounts. The Islamic State attempts to evade detection by using encrypted applications 
when possible; and when accounts are inevitably closed they are poised to immediately create 
new accounts that pick off exactly where the last left off to ensure continuity (McDowell-Smith, 
Speckhard, & Yayla, 2017). The Islamic State also creates an echo chamber with nodes, 
amplifiers, and shout-outs to spread their message (Hamblet, 2017). The nodes post the initial 
content, the amplifiers share the content, and the shout-outs promote nodes and amplifiers so that 
users will follow their online activity (Hamblet, 2017). By casting a wider net, the Islamic State 
expanded past Al Qaeda’s demographic to capture a larger number of supporters. Islamic State 
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supporters are typically males under the age of 26, who tend to be heavy users of social media, 
and are also from a wide range of social and ethnic backgrounds (McDowell-Smith et al., 2017). 
Interestingly, Islamic State was able to not only recruit those already practicing Islam for 
radicalization, but also convert individuals to Islam for the same purpose (Hamblet, 2017). 
During 2014 and 2015, it was common for social media users to stumble across content posted 
by the Islamic State without looking for it because there were so many nodes, amplifiers, and 
shout-outs which that were being posted throughout the day and night (Hamblet, 2017). 
Hamblet’s (2017) article, The Islamic State's Virtual Caliphate, observed that due to the Islamic 
State’s aggressive online marketing during 2014 and 2015, they averaged 4.1 recruits per month, 
but those numbers have significantly fallen as the Islamic State continues to lose credibility as a 
terrorist organization that can maintain its territory and provide for its citizens. While Islamic 
State content varies, there are several recurring themes. For those who are radicalized, nodes 
encourage individuals to leave their home countries and immigrate to the Islamic State, and if 
this travel is not possible, to plan and execute attacks in their home countries (Hamblet, 2017). 
According to Phillips (2017), Bloom (2017), and Hamblet (2017), eradicating terrorism 
requires an emphasis on preventing recruitment. Some scholars such as Haykel (2016) feel that 
policies focusing on reducing repression and increasing economic opportunity for Muslims are 
effective at abating recruitment. After all, if there are less individuals experiencing sensitivity to 
radicalization, then less individuals are available to be radicalized. However, policies that reduce 
repression and increase economic opportunity are expensive for governments to finance and 
difficult to implement. Scholars, such as Robinson (2017) and (Schmid, 2017), have studied the 
recruitment and messaging strategy of the Islamic State believe that another way to counter the 
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rhetoric is to use the same tactics. For example, in order to detract from the Islamic State’s 
narrative that the caliphate can provide houses and cars, there should be a counter-narrative that 
shows a dozen fighters living in a two-bedroom house and sharing one car. Exposure to an 
alternative truth can cause vulnerable individuals to question the rhetoric of the Islamic State and 
prevent their future radicalization (Schmid, 2017). 
Rejecting Extremism 
Radicalization is extremely difficult to study because most individuals who consider 
joining a terrorist organization, or who have joined a terrorist organization, are reluctant to admit 
their inclinations and involvement for fear of retribution. However, a group of researchers from 
RAND Corporation managed to conduct two empirical studies in Palestine and Yemen. 
Interestingly, both studies found that demographics such as education, economic status, religion, 
gender, and age were associated with radicalization, but not significantly (Cragin, Bradley, 
Robinson, & Steinberg, 2015). In addition, both studies found that providing alternatives to 
political violence does not diminish propensity toward violent extremism (Robinson, Frier, 
Cragin, Bradley, Egel, & Steinberg, 2017). Instead, developing a sense of apathy diminishes 
propensity toward violent extremism (Robinson et al., 2017).  
In, What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism, Cragin et al. (2015) separate 
the factors contributing to radicalization into two distinct groups - structural and individual. 
Structural factors include poverty and a lack of opportunities. Individual factors include personal 
experiences of discrimination and absent parents. The researchers interviewed ten elected and 
appointed officials, national political leaders, and local mayors in the West Bank because they 
could easily choose to become involved in violent extremism and were also accessible for 
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interviews. In addition, the researchers surveyed 600 Palestinian youth living in the West Bank 
with a wide range of backgrounds and beliefs. The interviews and surveys measured attitudes 
toward suicide attacks against civilians and willingness to engage in violent protests. Like much 
of the other existing research on radicalization, this study posits that radicalization is a multiple 
stage process with sensitivity, discovery, indoctrination, and commitment to action. The 
researchers for this article conclude that during this process, the influence of family and friends 
have a stronger influence on the decision to join a terrorist organization than structural and 
individual factors. When evaluating the influence of family members and friends, family 
members had a more significant influence than friends. Specifically, a feeling of obligation to 
their family members who had been arrested and detained outweighed their own fears of 
retaliation. Therefore, subjects who had family members who were arrested and detained by the 
opposition were more likely to engage in violent extremism. Other contributing factors were 
revolutionary objectives, personal grievances (i.e., death of a loved one), benefits, and sacred 
meaning. Also, the closer associated a person was to Hamas, the more likely they were to support 
violent extremism. Most surprisingly, the researchers found that opportunities to participate in 
non-violent political activism does not prevent radicalization. If anything, apathy, thinking that 
nothing will work, is most effective at preventing radicalization. These findings contradict held 
beliefs about counter-radicalization and may help focus further counter-radicalization research. 
When considering the impact of friends and family, interactions have to be physical or can they 
be virtual. For example, if a friend or family posts a link on social media condemning jihadism, it 
could dissuade an individual from joining. The outcome of this study left the researchers 
interested in determining if perhaps some benefits more alluring than others or if the absence of a 
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specific benefit could influence the decision to join a terrorist organization. Given the results, the 
researchers were also interested in determining if social media posts can help individuals to 
develop a sense of apathy (Cragin et al., 2015).  
A follow-on research study, Rejecting Extremism in Yemen, was conducted by Robinson, 
Frier, Cragin, Bradley, Egel, & Steinberg (2017) with the same basic analysis construct as What 
Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West 
Bank by Cragin et al (2015). The researchers conducted six focus groups with ten participants 
each in Yemen’s capital and then distributed a national survey to each of Yemen’s regions to 
1,200 individuals. The authors determined that there are two types of radicalized individuals – 
individuals who support violent extremism and individuals who engage in violent extremism. 
The questions assessed the individuals’ level of opposition toward political violence by asking if 
they would support a friend who traveled overseas to fight in the jihad or if they were willing to 
engage in street demonstrations. The questions also gaged the individuals’ level of political 
activism, level of hope for the future, level of influence of friends and family, and level of 
religious devotion to discover patterns among the responses. Unsurprisingly, individuals who 
exhibited a high level of political activism were more likely to support violent extremism and 
individuals with a high level of hope for the future were less likely to support violent extremism. 
Findings suggest that constructs such as political activism and hope for the future should be 
viewed on a spectrum with violent extremism requiring the most commitment to political 
activism and the least hope for the future. The study also found that individuals living in urban 
environments were more likely to support violent extremism and engage in violent extremism 
but less likely to travel abroad to do so. This research suggests that counter-radicalization efforts 
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in urban environments should focus on local participation in violent extremism while counter-
radicalization efforts in rural environment should focus on foreign participation in violent 
extremism. Like the study on individuals in Palestine, this study found that the concept of 
promoting alternatives to political violence did not diminish propensity toward violent 
extremism. In contrast to the prior study in Palestine, the study did not address the peer-to-peer 
relationship but found that individuals in Yemen are not influenced by parents and religious 
leaders because they have a general distrust of authority. In addition, religious devotion did not 
influence individual attitudes towards violent extremism though it did have some effect in 
Palestine (Robinson et al., 2017). 
While both studies relied heavily on the openness and honesty of participants with little 
incentive to cooperate, the results are still notable. Several federal and local governments, 
including those in the United States, Europe, and Canada are currently investing a significant 
amount of resources to improve the individual and structural factors that are believed to 
contribute to extremism and provide alternatives to political violence. Yet, this study shows that 
investing in efforts that cultivate a sense of apathy could be more effective. In addition, the 
differences between the two studies in Palestine and Yemen further demonstrate that counter-
radicalization efforts must be tailored to specific audiences. This study suggests that while 
focusing efforts on familial relationships and religious devotion may be effective in Yemen, they 
could be ineffective in Palestine. It is critical that researchers develop an understanding of what 
an audience values before attempting to engage them (Robinson et al., 2017).  
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The Emergence of Social Media 
Social media provides terrorist organizations with a platform to broadcast their message 
throughout the world and deliver enabling support to followers. The Islamic State is particularly 
savvy with social media and use various tactics to make their movement appear larger, stronger, 
and more exhilarating than it actually may be. While a robust social media presence can impact 
recruitment, it could also contribute to attrition if the Islamic State cannot provide more benefits 
than costs. 
The Internet as a Gateway to Radicalization 
          Gill et al (2017) studied the police interviews, trial records, and computer records of 223 
convicted terrorists in the United Kingdom. Gill’s et al., work attempted to determine if and how 
terrorists the internet to become radicalized, prepare for an attack, and execute an attack. The 
researchers found that 61% of the convicted terrorists utilized the internet to view content 
including beheadings and executions, crimes against Muslims, interviews with various notable 
radical fighters and preachers, jihadist texts, and attack preparation and training videos. They 
found that many of the terrorists went online not to have their beliefs changed, but to have their 
beliefs reinforced and to develop an understanding of how to commit attacks. The study 
concluded that the convicted terrorists who had completed significant online research were more 
likely to choose hard targets (i.e., government facilities) and conduct sophisticated attacks. As a 
result, the researchers recommended that governmental and nongovernmental organization 
efforts focus less on changing ideology and more on eliminating online content that inspires and 
instructs terrorists on how to commit attacks. The sample included lone-actors and groups who 
were convicted of planning an attack or facilitating terrorism (i.e., financing operations and 
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distributing propaganda). The researchers concluded that lone-actors were 2.64 times more likely 
to use the internet to plan and execute an attack because they lacked the variety of expertise that 
is often found in groups (Gill et al., 2017). 
          In a similar study, Koehler (2017) conducted interviews with former extremists to ask 
questions about how the internet changed and shaped their individual radicalization, and found 
that the majority credited the internet as their gateway to radicalization. Individuals who seek 
extremist information on the internet have already completed the sensitivity phase. In the 
discovery phase, an unfiltered ideology is presented to the recruit. In the group membership 
phase, the recruit can virtually meet and network with like-minded individuals and adapt a 
radical world view. In the commitment to action phase, the recruit can find instructions about 
targets and attack methods. Koehler (2017) found that the anonymity that the internet provides 
made individuals more likely to speak or act radically and the amount of user accounts also made 
the movement seem larger than it was which contributed to the belief that the movement could 
realistically achieve their short-term and long-term goals. In addition, by communicating with 
others online, individuals were able to easily build a reputation and network which enabled them 
to contribute to the existing ideology which not only gave them a sense of belonging but also 
made them feel empowered. The authors concluded that the internet is the most important 
element driving radicalization and could also make it the most effective platform for intervention 
(Koehler, 2017). 
          The studies conducted by both Koehler (2017) and Gill et al (2017) provide strong 
evidence of the dangers of self-radicalization which can be achieved without the influence of 
recruiters. While the sensitivity phase may be unavoidable, what occurs during the discovery 
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phase, group membership phase, and commitment to action phase should be researched to 
determine if there are opportunities for intervention. For example, both Koehler (2017) and Gill 
et al (2017) agree that the virtual and/or physical interaction with like-minded individuals play a 
pivotal role in radicalization, attack planning, and execution (Gill et al., 2017). Perhaps by 
stopping social media users from moving past the discovery phase or by stopping 
communication during the group membership phase, radicalization could be prevented. 
However, while Koehler (2017) believes that intervention should be solely focused on the virtual 
environment, Gill et al (2017) believes that intervention should be focused on both the physical 
and virtual environment because both have historically played a role in radicalization. 
Regardless, their studies convincingly argue that the internet influences the occurrence of 
radicalization and possibly the severity of attacks.  
The Islamic State’s Messaging Tactics 
Several researchers including Torok (2015), Badaway and Ferrara (2017), and Ingram 
(2015), have studied the specific messaging tactics used by terrorist organizations to gain a 
following on social media. As previously mentioned, Al-Qaeda attempted to cater to the needs of 
local populations to gain support. In contrast, the Islamic State rules with fear by offering only 
two options to the territories they conquer – conversion or death (Torok, 2015). They broadcast 
their brutality in theater productions that normalize radical attitudes and makes their tactics seem 
acceptable (Torok, 2015). Continued exposure to indiscriminate torture and killing may cause 
vulnerable individuals to define their perception of Islamic Rule. However, Torok (2015) and 
Ingram (2015), agree that graphic images alone do not radicalize individuals. 
55 
 
 
Badawy and Ferrara (2017) focused on Arabic content posted by the Islamic State as they 
traced the connection between terrorist rhetoric and global events. The authors used a dataset of 
25,000 Islamic State promotional accounts on Twitter and studied their tweets made between 
January 2014 and June 2015. During this time period, the Islamic State conducted crucifixions in 
Raqqa and invaded Mosul, Tikrit, and Sinjar – all causing spikes in online conversations. The 
authors separated Islamic State content into three categories: violence-driven, theological, and 
sectarian. They found that the violence-driven content is used to draw viewers and the 
theological and sectarian content is used to justify action.  
Torok (2015) found that once an individual is actively following the Islamic State on 
social media, they often are exposed to content that encourages them to isolate themselves from 
their prior personal relationships and encourages them to develop virtual networks, bolstering 
radicalization (Torok, 2015). The Islamic State facilitates the group membership phase by 
communicating a consistent narrative that focuses on the grievances Muslims have had to endure 
due to oppressive foreign powers and their duty to create an Islamic State (Torok, 2015). 
Interestingly, they do not downplay the risk of joining the Islamic State. Instead, they frame 
martyrdom as a challenge and reward for those courageous enough to participate (Torok, 2015). 
Torok (2015) concludes that the Islamic State messaging derives its legitimacy from passages in 
the Quran and Hadith, fatwas, and statements by prominent radical scholars. However, Ingram 
(2015), credits the Islamic State’s impressive following to their presentation of information that 
shapes perceptions of security, stability, livelihood, and develops an in-group versus out-group 
mentality. 
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The Islamic State portrays its governance as all-encompassing, sophisticated, and 
organized to create a vision of what life could be like for their supporters. They accomplish this 
task by regularly disseminating information about successful military operations, security 
posture, law and order, economy, social welfare programs, education, infrastructure, and positive 
relationships with various tribes in the region. At the same time, they craft messages that 
magnify crisis and position the caliphate as the only solution while reminding Muslims that it is 
their divine duty to participate in their efforts. The Islamic State also uses baiting to reinforce 
their message and polarize viewers. For example, in the video “Healing the Believers Chest,” the 
Islamic State had a captured Jordanian Air Force pilot walk through the rubble in Syria, past the 
dead bodies of women and children, before being burned alive. The purpose was to increase the 
perception of crisis and provoke a disproportionate response from Jordan which they could then 
further capitalize. The video sparked global backlash that enabled the Islamic State to further 
propagate their message (Ingram, 2015). 
 The Islamic State’s utilization of message framing argues that their efforts are 
meticulously planned and deliberate. Torok (2015) and Ingram (2015) agree that a feasible 
strategy to limit the influence of the Islamic State’s campaign is to dispute their core principles at 
every level, specifically challenging the depiction of crisis and control of the caliphate. A strong 
barrier to this approach is the Islamic State directly confronting the counter-narratives as false 
and misleading (Ingram, 2015). Therefore, the information provided by the counter-narrative 
would have to be constant, substantiated, and highly adaptive to criticism (Torok, 2015). 
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Attempted Solutions 
Several governments have attempted to reduce terrorism by administering immersive de-
radicalization programs, intervening militarily, implementing restrictive immigration policies, 
monitoring internet activities, and executing information operations. This section of the literature 
review discusses the limited success of these programs and the potential impact of studying and 
improving certain strategies.  
Immersive Deradicalization Programs 
Several countries administer immersive deradicalization programs. The author of, “How 
Could a Terrorist be Deradicalized,” was interested in determining what approaches are 
successful in eliminating radical beliefs and radical intent to act (Bertram, 2015). Bertram (2015) 
studied immersive deradicalization programs administered in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan 
by conducting interviews with terrorists and intervention personnel. The only unsuccessful 
program that the researcher studied was in Yemen, which focused on terrorists who have been 
captured. In contrast, the Saudi Arabian and Pakistani immersive deradicalization programs were 
focused on terrorists who chose to defect willingly. Bertram (2015) concluded that the most 
critical aspect of an immersive deradicalization program is the relationship between intervention 
personnel and the terrorist; working within a process that is flexible and adaptive. Bertram 
(2015) also noted that when studying deradicalization programs, social media often plays a role 
in the individual’s initial radicalization and therefore may also be a tool for countering the 
Islamic State’s narrative (Bertram, 2015). 
The Saudi Arabian immersive deradicalization program approaches deradicalization by 
providing educational support to assist individuals in understanding the ideology and emotional 
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support to address apprehensions about reintegrating into society. To accomplish this, they 
present defectors with religious authorities for educational support, trusted family, and fully 
deradicalized former terrorists for emotional support. Interestingly, the Saudi Arabian immersive 
deradicalization program also treated the terrorists as victims which eliminates fear of retribution 
and may contribute to their success. The Pakistani immersive deradicalization program focused 
on providing education and vocational training to ensure that individuals were able to support 
themselves when released. This approach is used because several terrorist organizations in 
Pakistan target financially vulnerable families. Like the Saudi-Arabian immersive 
deradicalization program, the Pakistani immersive deradicalization program also provided 
religious guidance. By targeting individuals’ religious beliefs, psychological states, 
socioeconomic status, and even family life, these immersive deradicalization programs attempt 
to completely re-shape the terrorist’s lives and allowed them to break free from jihadism.  
Immersive deradicalization programs are not used by most governments because their 
effectiveness has not been empirically tested. Webber, Chernikova, Kruglanski, Gelfand, 
Hettiarachchi, Gunaratna, and Belanger (2018) attempted to gauge effectiveness when studying 
an immersive deradicalization program in Sri Lanka for former members of the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam. The immersive deradicalization program was aimed at providing terrorists with 
sustained mechanisms for earning personal significance (Webber et al., 2018). Sustained 
mechanisms for earning personal significance include training on how to build a new social 
network, find a job, and even start a family. By surveying terrorists throughout the 
deradicalization program, researchers found that extremist thoughts and intentions were 
significantly reduced (Webber et al., 2018). The researchers also found that upon release, 
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beneficiaries expressed lower levels of extremism than their counterparts in the community 
(Webber et al., 2018). While these results appear to be promising, they are difficult to validate 
because it is challenging to assess whether a terrorist has been deradicalized or if they just want 
to appear compliant to avoid imprisonment. In addition, it is difficult for researchers to determine 
if a terrorist who has completed an immersive deradicalization program has re-entered their 
previous terrorist organization, or joined a new terrorist organization. The study also ignores the 
effect of other variables that could have had a more significant effect on deradicalization such as 
disappointment in the resources or group membership provided by the terrorist organization or a 
desire to return home and start a family. 
Other researchers such as Ferguson (2016) and Barelle (2015) claim that while immersive 
deradicalization programs are beneficial, they often do not cause deradicalization. Ferguson 
(2016) drew his conclusions studying defectors of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland 
while Barelle (2015) developed her conclusions studying various Islamic-based terrorist 
organizations in the Middle East. Individuals often chose to defect from terrorist organizations 
due to the same structural and individual factors that caused them to join in the first place 
(Cragin et al., 2015). Perhaps they were seeking a way to make a difference, or feel less isolated, 
but the terrorist organization was unable to satisfy those needs and may have even made their 
lives even more stressful (Barelle, 2015). Changes in perspective often contribute to what Barelle 
(2015) calls natural deradicalization that occurs as a terrorist gets older and their priorities 
change. Ferguson (2016) and Barelle (2015) both found that the terrorist organizations’ inability 
to meet expectations has a much more significant impact on deradicalization than an immersive 
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deradicalization program which provides educational, emotional, and sometimes even financial 
support. 
Military Intervention 
After 9/11, the United States embarked on the War on Terror, which involved the use of 
targeted killings aimed at eliminating senior leadership of various terrorist organizations. The 
purpose of targeted killings was to disrupt and degrade terrorist operations and deter future 
attacks. Targeted killings also discredit terrorist organizations by making it look incapable of 
protecting its own leadership which could make it more difficult to retain current followers and 
recruit new followers. The strategy was largely based off one notable success. In 2007, a terrorist 
organization headquartered in the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf, split into factions and became more 
focused on petty crime after its leaders were killed (Cronin, 2013). However, Abu Sayyaf was 
unique because it was hierarchically structured and lacked a clear succession plan (Cronin, 
2013). Over time, the War on Terror strategy expanded to include not only the targeted killing of 
leadership but also targeted killing of followers (Cronin, 2013). This expansion inevitably led to 
the accidental death of civilians (Cronin, 2013). Many critics of the War on Terror feel that 
eliminating leadership and followers does not necessarily solve problems and may prolong 
conflict because there is often an endless stream of replacements; or worse, more competent 
replacements (Bloom, 2017). In addition, terrorist organizations often use targeted killings to 
legitimize their cause, invigorate current followers, and recruit more followers – all of which 
increases a terrorist organization’s chance of survival. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State both 
regularly broadcast footage of drone strikes, portraying them as indiscriminate violence against 
Muslims.  
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Researchers have attempted to study the effectiveness of targeted killings by measuring 
the frequency and severity of attacks following strikes against key leaders. However, due to the 
reality that it can take a terrorist organization months, or years, to develop a plan to retaliate 
against a specific strike, the results have been largely inconclusive and even contradictory. For 
example, Carson (2017) examined the effects of 10 targeted killings on the average monthly 
number of attacks and number of days until the next attack and found that there was no 
significant effect on attack frequency. However, Carson’s (2017) study does not examine the 
effects of the targeted killings on the severity of attacks or attempt to attribute attacks to the 
terrorist organizations that were directly affected by the targeted killing. In another study, 
Johnston & Sarbahi (2016), found that drone strikes in Pakistan conducted from 2007-2011 were 
associated in decreases in the frequency and severity of attacks. This study is flawed because it 
does not attempt to attribute attacks to the terrorist organizations that were directly affected by 
the targeted killing (Johnston & Sarbahi, 2016). An increase, decrease, or stagnation in frequency 
and severity of attacks could be attributed to a multitude of reasons, including: seasonal fighting 
patterns, world events, and fluctuations in financing, among others.  
Researchers have also attempted to study the rate of recruitment following targeted 
killings. A study conducted by Shah (2018) examined the local and global impact of drone strikes 
in Pakistan on terrorist recruitment. To complete his study, Shah (2018) interviewed citizens 
living in the most heavily targeted districts in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) and examined the surveys of 500 detained terrorists. In addition, Shah (2018) examined 
the trial testimonies and accounts of terrorists convicted in the U.S. Based on the responses, the 
researcher concluded that there was not a significant impact on terrorist recruitment at the local 
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or global levels (Shah, 2018). Instead, he found that other factors such as identity crises, 
political, and economic grievances have more effect on terrorist recruitment (Shah, 2018). Shah 
(2018) also noted that online exposure to jihadist ideologies and influence of peers and social 
networks have a more significant impact on radicalization than military intervention. While the 
interviews conducted in the FATA were focused on assessing the effect of drone strikes on 
terrorist recruitment, the surveys, trial testimonies, and accounts of terrorists were more general.  
Shah (2018) utilized thematic content analysis to identify key themes, highlighting text 
that appeared to describe an opinion, and then recording the incidence/variance and direction of 
responses which were reported as percentages for the whole sample. This method is highly 
subjective due to its dependence upon the researcher’s interpretation of incidence/variance and 
direction. In addition, interviews, surveys, and trial testimonies are often unreliable sources of 
data because they are dependent on the participant’s honesty. Many of the participants in this 
study feared reprisals from the governments that developed the questions and the terrorist 
organizations who often threaten participants for cooperating with researchers. However, Shah’s 
(2018) research is the only systematic study of the effect of drone strikes on terrorist recruitment. 
 The lack of substantiated research on the effectiveness of military intervention and the 
many obstacles to developing substantiated research on the effectiveness of intervention make it 
a controversial solution to terrorism. Cronin (2013) encourages governments to research 
alternatives. Cronin (2013) concludes that a more effective way to defeat terrorist organizations 
may be to discredit its message and divide followers. Terrorist organizations already have 
disagreements about short-term and long-term goals, mission, and vision (Cronin, 2013). Cronin 
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(2013) argues that these disagreements should be exploited to make potential followers doubt the 
messages they are hearing and viewing.  
The Muslim Ban 
On 27 January 2018, the President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, signed an Ex-
ecutive Order called “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” 
also named “the Muslim Ban.” The purpose of this Executive Order was to prevent radicalized 
terrorists from entering the country by the following: (1) lowering the number of refugees to be 
admitted into the U.S. by 50,000, (2) halt the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days 
while a new system was put in place to increase vetting, (3) ban entry of foreign nationals for 90 
days from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen with exceptions to be granted on 
a case-by-case basis, and (4) ban the entry of foreign nationals from Syria indefinitely. While the 
Muslim Ban was blocked by various courts and only upheld for 50 days, more than 700 travelers 
were detained and up to 60,000 visas were provisionally revoked during this time (Patel & Lev-
inson-Waldman, 2017). 
In the distinguished study, “Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the 
West” the authors researched 51 successful attacks throughout the U.S., Europe, and Canada be-
tween 2014 and 2017 to determine the legal status and motivations for the attackers. The re-
searchers found that 73% were citizens (Vindino et al., 2017). Of the citizens, the majority were 
second generation citizens. The researchers concluded that while the first-generation citizens still 
feel connected to their native country, the second-generation citizens often feel little connection 
to their native country and marginalized by their new country leading them to find new ways to 
define their identity. As a result, second generation citizens pose the greatest terrorist threat to the 
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U.S., Europe, and Canada, not legal residents, refugees, or illegal immigrants (Vindino et al., 
2017).  
In addition to being unenforceable and ineffective, the Muslim Ban also led to wide-
spread islamophobia. While terrorist attacks are salient in the minds of many Americans, they 
represent a relatively small actual threat to livelihood compared to heart disease, cancer, gun vio-
lence, car accidents, and diabetes, among others (Mosher & Gould, 2017). Since 9/11, foreign-
born terrorists have killed an average of one American per year and home-grown terrorists have 
killed an average of six Americans per year (Mosher & Gould, 2017). In addition, of the 1.5 bil-
lion Muslims in the world, roughly 25% of Muslims believe in the Islamic State, and roughly 1% 
of that 25% of Muslims believe that violence should be used to develop the Islamic State 
(Beydoun, 2017). These statistics translate to only a few thousand, and of that few thousand, 
only a few hundred are focusing their efforts on global terrorism (Beydoun, 2017).  
Monitoring Social Media 
When considering terrorism there are typically three types of terrorists. There are enabled 
terrorists who receive training, weapons, and instructions to commit attacks that are planned by 
terrorist organizations. There are directed terrorists who only receive instructions to commit at-
tacks that are chosen by terrorist organizations. And finally, there are inspired terrorists who of-
ten have minimal, if any, contact with terrorist organizations and instead have to plan and exe-
cute their attacks with general information (Vindino et al., 2017).  
Of the different types of inspired terrorists, Maltene and Lasse (2017) categorize two 
types – the peripheral drifter and the failed joiner. The peripheral drifter has difficulty maintain-
ing personal relationships with family and friends, mental health issues which cause them to 
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withdraw further, and only feel acceptance once they discover a terrorist group. The failed joiner 
attempted to connect to a terrorist group but fails and decides to act alone (Malthaner & Lin-
dekilde, 2017). The peripheral drifter and failed joiner make an enticing case for developing a 
profile for terrorists and monitoring social media to discover their presence and intentions. 
Most social media data mining efforts focus on attempting to develop a profile of users 
who are at risk of being radicalized and then monitoring their activity. Lara-Cabrera, Pardo, Be-
nouaret, Faci, Benslimane and Camacho (2017) used various algorithms to evaluate risk of radi-
calization for a sample of social media users. The researchers began by using the Alter-Ego Net-
work Model where they labeled specific users as Ego and the users that they interacted with as 
Alters. Lara-Cabrera et al (2017) then applied multiple bottom-up and top-down algorithms to 
map different communities and understand how they connected. Once the social communities 
were mapped, the researchers worked to identify users within them who have a high risk of being 
radicalized and then they analyzed the social communities that they interacted with. The re-
searchers used five indicators to assess vulnerability to radicalization, including frustration, in-
troversion, and perception of discrimination for being Muslim, negative views of the West, and 
positive views of jihadism. The researchers measured frustration with word usage, capitalization, 
and introversion with sentence length, and the use of ellipses. The researchers also measured per-
ception of discrimination for being Muslim, negative views of the West, and positive views of 
jihadism by analyzing the content of posts and specifically looking for the presence of double 
keywords/phrases. For example, “hate and U.S.” or “divine duty and jihad.” While the research-
ers investigated 112 users, they noted that some of them may have been duplicate accounts 
owned by the same person. They found that most users posted less than 300 tweets since creating 
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their account and had approximately 1,000 followers but there were a few users who fell outside 
of that range with much more tweets and followers. Unsurprisingly, Lara-Cabrera et al (2017) 
researchers found strong correlations between perception of discrimination for being Muslim and 
expressing negative views of the West and positive views of jihadism. The researchers thought 
that once these individuals have been identified, actions can be taken to prevent their radicaliza-
tion (Lara-Cabrera et al., 2017). 
While researchers agree that social media can be used to radicalize at risk individuals, 
few studies have focused on how exactly radicalization is accomplished through social media. 
Rowe and Saif (2016) were interested in discovering how to detect when a user has adopted a 
pro-Islamic State stance and behavior. They identified specific social media users who became 
activated, which they defined as sharing radicalized content, and examined how their language 
and social interactions changed before, during, and after activation. Rowe and Saif (2016) 
measured the lexical terms used by a user, the content that was shared, and the references to 
other users. The researchers found that in addition to sharing specific word choices, many of the 
activated users also followed the same accounts. The authors concluded that activated users 
adopted their radicalized language and social interactions from users that were sharing 
radicalized content with them, and whom they also shared commonalities. This demonstrates that 
it is not only the content but the perception of belonging that radicalizes individuals (Rowe & 
Saif, 2016). In addition, in the days leading up to activation, the researchers saw a significant 
increase in radicalized language as if the users were rejecting their old way of thinking and 
communicating and immersing themselves in a new way of thinking and communicating (Rowe 
& Saif, 2016).  
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Of the many activated users that Rowe and Saif (2016) studied, very few planned and 
executed attacks because radicalization occurs on a spectrum. Once an individual is radicalized, 
their level of commitment can increase, decrease, or stay the same (van Eerten et al., 2017). On 
one side of the spectrum is passive terrorism, where individuals may simply encourage others to 
fight in the jihad either in person or virtually (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). On the other side 
of the spectrum is active terrorism, where individuals are planning and executing attacks 
(Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). Monitoring social media will inevitably lead to the discovery of 
a mixture of passive and active terrorists. There is currently no validated method that can help 
data miners distinguish between the two. In addition, developing a profile of what an at risk 
individual may look like, and then scouring social media for their presence, violates the civil 
liberties that most developed nations promise to protect in defend. 
A Failed Information Operation 
After 9/11 the U.S. Government decided to address online radicalization. Researchers 
examined several counter-narrative programs executed by the U.S. Department of State during 
the Bush and Obama Administrations. During the Bush Administration, the Digital Outreach 
Team (DOT) was tasked with debunking propaganda about U.S. foreign policy, but faced many 
challenges considering the United States’ long history of injustices. The campaign was quickly 
discredited by critics who pointed out the hypocrisy of the U.S. Government condemning 
violence while simultaneously us advanced interrogation tactics and killing civilians via drone 
strokes. The program was further undermined by the unauthorized disclosure of U.S. Central 
Command’s OPERATION Earnest Voice which involved using machine learning software to 
administer hundreds of online personas that promoted counter-radicalization content over the 
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internet without attributing itself to an employer – the U.S. Government. During the Obama 
Administration, the DOT shifted its strategy from promoting the U.S. and U.S. foreign policy to 
discrediting key disseminators and undermining the image of terrorism for social justice, false 
information about religion, claims of military success, deaths of innocent Muslims, mistreatment 
of women, and testimony of former foreign fighters. The DOT began using social media 
platforms to create a conversation with individuals in support of jihad and to develop a mutual 
understanding rather than impose a set of values on another culture. They engaged directly in 
English, Arabic, Persian, Urdu, and Farsi. Unlike other countries such as France, Israel, China, 
and Russia, who pose as ordinary users, the DOT identified themselves as the U.S. Department 
of State. Still, the campaign was criticized for being out of touch with the general user 
population. Posts and replies to commentary were long and well-written while terrorist recruiters 
were more relatable using wit and cultural references. Like the Bush’s campaign, it was seen as 
counterproductive because it drew attention to jihadists and also frequently prompted the 
discussion of the most shameful discretions of the U.S. Government (Khatib, Dutton, & 
Thelwall, 2012).  
Khatib et al. (2012) analyzed 181 posts from the DOT and 459 posts from other non-state 
counter-radicalization users and found that the DOT posts generated more negativity and were 
largely seen as counterproductive. In this study, only 4.8% of the comments expressed a positive 
view of the U.S. The authors also concluded that state sponsored counter-radicalization cam-
paigns face many limitations, whereas partnering with community groups and nongovernmental 
organizations to develop capacity, but not drive the message, may be a better option. The re-
searchers specifically focused on reactions to a speech made by President Barack Obama’s on 
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June 4, 2009, in Cairo, Egypt, calling for a new beginning with the Muslim World. The DOT be-
gan 30 threads by either posting a video or transcription of the speech which prompted 459 com-
ments by other users and 181 replies by the DOT. Khatib et al (2012) studied the reaction to the 
DOTs initial post and subsequent posts to measure stance (positive, negative, or natural), type of 
rhetoric (emotional, logical, religious), and tone (dismissive, refuting, engaging, accepting, con-
descending, or ridiculing.) They concluded that 80% of other posts were of a negative stance, 
92% were of other posts emotional rhetoric, and 56% of other posts were refuting in tone. In ad-
dition, the researchers noted that most of the other posts brought up U.S. imperialism, suffering 
in the Middle East caused by the U.S., downfall of the U.S., and U.S. support for Israel. Overall, 
the DOTs efforts appeared to be counter-productive as it exacerbated tension. However, the DOT 
argued that the study did not take into consideration the effect of silent observers, known as 
‘lurkers,’ who form views based on posts but not commenting. It is possible that the DOT was 
able to change the hearts and minds of lurkers who chose to remain silent because their opinion 
was in the minority (Khatib et al., 2012).  
The DOT faced many challenges while executing their campaign. They took an average 
of 2.77 days to respond because the group had to choose which posts to respond to, research the 
topic, develop a response, and then receive approval to post (Khatib et al., 2012). This is an issue 
in an environment where the administrators are already outnumbered by users who can spend all 
day and night freely posting. This imbalance in the amount of post inevitably makes the DOT 
and their arguments appear weak. In addition, the other users occasionally made posts that were 
impossible to respond to, such as the images of dead women and children. Despite the failures of 
the DOT, the researchers argue that foreign policy cannot be left up to the public’s interpretation. 
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Governments need to invest time and resources to ensure that their messages are heard in the 
way that they were intended. The researchers also propose that if a counter-narrative is unsuc-
cessful, perhaps a parallel narrative that preaches multiculturalism and inclusiveness could be 
more promising (Khatib et al., 2012).  
Competing Narratives and Counter-Narratives 
Governments have a window when they can successfully dissuade an individual from 
joining a terrorist organization. During this time, governments can provide a counter-narrative 
which emphasizes the costs of joining a terrorist organization, a competing-narrative which em-
phasizes the benefits of not joining a terrorist organization, or elements of both counter-narra-
tives and competing-narratives. Current research emphasizes the importance of tailoring these 
narratives to local populations.  
Phases of Radicalization to Focus On 
The researchers who published, Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks 
in the West, were particularly interested in why some European countries such as France, 
Germany, and Belgium have experienced a high number of attacks while other European 
countries such as Spain and Italy have experienced a low number of attacks (Vidino et al., 2017). 
After all, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Italy all have similarly sized Muslim 
populations (between 5% and 7%) and are not inclusive of Muslims from a political and social 
perspective (Vidino et al., 2017). Vidino, Marone, and Entenmann (2017) found that Spain and 
Italy, Muslims do not live in closed communities where they can easily discuss sympathetic 
attitudes towards terrorism. As a result, it very difficult for radicalized mosques to develop and 
spread their ideology. Once again, this research emphasizes the importance of the first two 
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phases of radicalization – sensitivity and discovery. In addition, Vidino et al (2017) states that to 
complete the radicalization process, an individual often needs to be influenced by either virtual 
or physical social networks which emphasizes the impact of the group membership phase. Rowe 
and Saif (2016) found that highly publicized world events involving the Islamic State, such as 
territorial gains by the Islamic State, attacks conducted by the Islamic State, and the execution of 
enemy hostages by the Islamic State appear to have significantly accelerated radicalization for 
many individuals. This provides a strong argument for the validity of the fourth stage of 
radicalization which involves a trigger event. These trigger events may not directly affect the 
individual but nonetheless solidifies their commitment to action (Rowe & Saif, 2016). There is 
very little a government can do to prevent an individual from experiencing the sensitivity and 
commitment to action phases of radicalization. However, a government may be able to intervene 
during the discovery and group membership phases of radicalization.  
Cronin (2013) stated that if terrorist organizations continue to perpetuate their message, 
they will not be defeated. The problem is not the terrorists, it is the ideology behind their actions. 
Therefore, terrorism cannot be solved by destroying domestic and transnational terrorist 
organizations. Terrorism can be solved by learning about the ideology, searching for 
vulnerabilities, and then communicating a new ideology (Cronin, 2013). The existing literature 
seems to distinguish by two types of narratives; competing-narratives and counter-narratives. 
Competing-narratives demonstrate the benefits of avoiding terrorism whereas counter-narratives 
demonstrate the costs of participating in terrorism. However, there is very little research on 
which approach is more effective in reaching the general user population, or how effectiveness 
should be measured.  
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An example of a competing-narrative is Minhaj-ul-Quran International which is run by 
the Islamic scholar Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri. Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri is a respected religious thinker who has 
authored books and given lectures addressing how terrorist organizations have misinterpreted the 
Quran and Hadith. He is known for releasing several fatwas denouncing extremism. In 2010, he 
released a fatwa which demonstrated each contradiction that the terrorists use to justify killing 
innocent women and children and to gain followers. He explained that Islam only justifies killing 
in self-defense (Shorer-Zeltser & Ben-Israel, 2016). He also emphasized that “tawhid” means be-
lief in one God and it does not mean that God must be obeyed in every way and that those who 
do not follow God’s laws should be persecuted (Shorer-Zeltser & Ben-Israel, 2016). These are 
commonly held ideas by the jihadists that could easily be dispelled if all Muslims could read the 
Arabic text within the Quran and Hadith. In addition to exposing contradictions between terrorist 
ideology and Islamic texts, Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri routinely criticizes the U.S. Government for en-
couraging the terrorist ideology by making Muslims feel threatened. Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri founded 
an institution. Minhaj-ul-Qur’an International, that uses several communication channels includ-
ing the internet to discuss the promotion of tolerance and urge Muslims to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered to them in the U.S., Europe, and Canada and to embrace the culture where 
they can live and practice freely. He emphasizes the opportunities available outside of the Is-
lamic State such as public education, jobs, and even recreational sports. Minhaj-ul-Quran Inter-
national also provides religious literature for those interested in Islam and organizes daily events 
throughout the world which encourage Muslims to learn more about their religion and become 
involved with their local and global communities (Shorer-Zeltser & Ben-Israel, 2016).  
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Betram (2015) argues that challenging the religious doctrine spread by the terrorist organ-
ization will be ineffective because most individuals viewing the information will not have the 
scholarly background required to be convinced by rational critique. Bertram (2015) believes that 
counter-narratives should expose the contradictions that exist within the ideology and discredit 
the goals. Betram (2015) suggests accomplishing this task by highlighting the poor living condi-
tions that terrorists endure and the atrocities that they witness. Betram (2015) specifically cited 
the case study of Mohammed Mahbub Husain who was a member of Jamat-e-Islami and Hizb ut-
Tahrir. It was not until there was a murder of an innocent man orchestrated by his terrorist organ-
ization that he began considering their goals and searching for more information. Through online 
research, Mohamed Mahbub Husain deradicalized and defected. The case study proves that a 
counter-narrative can be effective (Betram, 2015).  
The International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism interviewed 43 Islamic State 
defectors and produced video clips where they denounced the group (McDowell-Smith et al., 
2017). In the video clips, each of the Islamic State defectors told stories about the corruption and 
brutality of the Islamic State and closed with a final warning to others to refrain from joining 
(McDowell-Smith et al., 2017). This is an emotional approach to providing a counter-narrative 
which contrasts with the logical approach used by most counter-narratives. This approach 
focuses on providing factual religious, political, and social information that exposes the 
hypocrisy of the Islamic State. The video clips were focus-tested on a small normative sample of 
75 college students who then filled out a survey with closed-ended and open-ended questions 
(McDowell-Smith et al., 2017). Overall, the college students found the content to be authentic 
and disturbing which ultimately made radicalization seem unappealing. 95% of respondents 
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considered the Islamic State to be a terrorist organization and 90% of respondents also thought 
that if others watched the videos, they would be convinced not to join the Islamic State 
(McDowell-Smith et al., 2017). The authors note that this strategy does not address the 
underlying individual vulnerabilities that often lead to radicalization and that many of the college 
students already held a negative view of the Islamic State prior to completing the study, making 
it inherently bias. Since conducting their study, McDowell-Smith et al (2017) have begun 
experimenting with placing the videos on social media accounts of those endorsing the Islamic 
State and have even subtitled the videos in various other languages in an attempt to capture the 
attention of at risk individuals who may be inclined to support the Islamic State (McDowell-
Smith et al., 2017). 
A Localized Approach 
The previous research studies on radicalization in Palestine and Yemen prove that 
motivations differ from one country to the next and even from urban to rural environments. This 
reality calls for a localized approach to counter-radicalization. Mirahmadi (2016) recommends 
using community-based organizations to develop and communicate a counter-narrative. If the 
government builds partnerships with community-led initiatives by moderate Muslims, then it 
could deter individuals from radicalizing in the first place. Mirahmadi (2016) argues that 
moderate Muslims are best positioned to lead a counter-narrative, however, their networks in the 
U.S.— mosques, cultural associations, community centers, and college student groups— need 
help to develop their institutional capacity and improve their messaging capabilities. Partners 
should support religious freedom, non-violent conflict resolution, and the preservation of the 
constitution as the rule of law. Partners should also provide community centers that foster a sense 
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of belonging and provide access to mentors who preach socially responsible definitions of what 
it means to be a “good Muslim” based on shared American and Islamic values. Partners could 
even provide counseling that is authentic and therefore palatable to at-risk Muslims. While 
Mirahmadi (2016) only addresses intervention in physical communities, there are also 
opportunities to intervene in virtual communities (Gill et al., 2017). Communities can provide 
online forums where moderate Muslims issue statements against radical ideologies that breed 
violence and hatred; and post content that highlights Islamic values of religious tolerance, 
pluralism, gender equality, and social cohesion. Online forums reach even further than at risk 
individuals by providing the public with information that is geared toward preventing 
islamophobia and making Muslims feel welcome in all communities.  
Graduate students at Carleton University in Ottowa developed a fact-based counter-
narrative platform to prevent individuals who were just beginning to research terrorism from 
becoming fully radicalized (Wilner & Rigato, 2017). The administrators chose to use Facebook 
for its wide user base that included their target demographic of 16-25-year old and decided to 
focus on trustworthy messaging, engaging content, and accessible delivery. Their goals were to 
post and share accurate and timely information that undermined the extremist ideology, provided 
information about warning signs of radicalization, reduced feelings of social isolation, and 
disseminated credible voices (local and national community leaders, academia, and former 
extremists). Given these highly sensitive political subjects, they were also motivated to dismantle 
stereotypes to prevent islamophobia. The graduate students chartered two focus groups to 
develop their brand by providing feedback on content, material, style, and strategy. The focus 
groups showed a preference for pastel colors, visually simple designs, short sentences, and links 
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to reputable news articles. Over a period of three months in 2017, graduate students made 140 
posts. During this time, their most popular posts were testimonials from former terrorists and 
information about a recent terrorist attack that occurred in the United Kingdom. The researchers 
determined popularity by studying reach, clicks, and engagement. The number of newsfeeds that 
the posts appeared on measured reach. The number of times the link was accessed from their 
posts measured clicks. The number of comments made on each post measured engagement. 
Wilner & Rigato (2017) were surprised to find that while their campaign focused on Canadians 
and was specifically geared towards students attending University of Ottowa, it also reached 
U.S., India, Saudi Arabia, and Australia, demonstrating the potential of the campaign. While 
these metrics are telling, they do not measure the effect that a post had on the viewer. The study 
was also limited because they only posted in English which limited the reach; however, the 
information still appealed to local and global audiences (Wilner & Rigato, 2017). 
Saudi Arabia has also attempted to develop an online counter-narrative through a 
Nongovernmental Organization with support from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs known as the 
Sakinah Campaign (Casptack, 2015). The Sakinah Campaign uses scholars of Islam who 
complete four tasks to limit extremism. First, the scholars collect and catalog jihadist material 
which is used to understand the thinking. Second, the scholars open a dialogue with Muslims 
who are seeking information on the internet about their religion and encourage them to avoid 
militancy. These dialogues last from a few hours to a few months and are posted online for others 
to see. Third, the scholars infiltrate extremist websites with forums to create dissent by exposing 
the contradictions in the extremist’s interpretation of the religion. The government of Saudi 
Arabia also penalizes the owners of websites that promote Islamic Militancy which include a 
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maximum of 10 years in prison and/or fines reaching the equivalent of $1.3M. Fourth, the 
scholars maintain a website for the Sakinah Campaign that serves as a repository of factual 
religious information for those studying Islam and includes fatwa’s issued by clerics that 
denounce violence. The Sakinah Campaign has announced that it has persuaded several hundred 
individuals from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere to change their views on jihadism. The government 
of Saudi Arabia runs this counter-narrative in addition to an extensive immersive deradicalization 
program for prisoners. Experts involved in the immersive deradicalization program for prisoners 
believe that they have a 90% success rate due to the reality that an estimated 10% of jihadists are 
“hard-core” and refuse to cooperate with the rehabilitation process. Therefore, both immersive 
and online counter-radicalization efforts are focused on jihadist sympathizers and supporters who 
may already be somewhat disillusioned by terrorism (Casptack, 2015). 
Messaging Theories 
Current research suggests that quantity and quality are both important aspects to conduc-
ing a campaign on social media. Governments may want to focus on increasing the amount of 
posts while focusing on the audience, communicator, and content of posts. 
Creating the Illusion of Consensus with Constant Posting 
In addition to communicating a new message, social media can also be used to change an 
existing narrative. During the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Hezbollah manipulated and 
controlled information within the operational environment to its advantage. Hezbollah used 
staged and altered photographs and videos and limited where journalists went and what they saw 
(Matusitz, 2018). Hezbollah also timed releases of information for maximum strategic effect 
(Matusitz, 2018). These tactics made it appear as if Israel was disproportionately using force in 
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response the kidnapping of only two soldiers. Hezbollah used self-justifying posts to affect 
perceptions of blame and used self-congratulatory posts information to affect public perceptions 
of victory (Matusitz, 2018). Hezbollah's efforts focused on gaining trust and sympathy for its 
cause and because Israel provided no counter view - Hezbollah's perceptions were accepted 
regionally and worldwide (Matusitz, 2018). After the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Israel 
created a governmental department to study and execute information operations. They 
determined that while Lebanon incurred more losses, they were able to create a perception of 
failure for Israel (Matusitz, 2018). As a result, the world saw a win for Lebanon and a loss for 
Israel. For the Gaza War, Israel created a YouTube channel where they posted videos and 
received millions of views. The videos depicted precision airstrikes and made allegations that 
Hamas was deliberately drawing fire to schools and hospitals (Matusitz, 2018).  
The U.S. suffered a similar blunder in 2006 with OPERATION Valhalla. Special Forces 
killed a number of jihadist and destroyed a weapons cache but by the time they returned to the 
base, a terrorist organization known as Jaish al-Mahdi had repositioned the bodies and removed 
the weapons of the jihadists, so it looked like they were murdered during prayer (Waltzman, 
2017). Jaish al-Mahdi then photographed the bodies in these poses and uploaded the images to a 
website with a press release asserting that they were killed in a mosque (Waltzman, 2017). The 
U.S. Special Forces had evidence to disprove the claims but because the process for releasing 
information involved many approvals from higher-ups it did not reach the media for three days 
and by that time, the damage had been done (Mayfield III, 2011). Mayfield III (2011) argued that 
this situation could have been avoided if the U.S. understood how social media can be used in an 
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information operation. The authors conclude that information operations need to be studied for 
the U.S. to benefit from the use of social media.  
While the Islamic State is losing territory in the Middle East, they continue to radicalize 
and inspire attacks all over the world with their robust online presence. In The War of Ideas on 
the Internet: An Asymmetric Conflict on which the Strong Become Weak, McCauley (2015) 
credits the online success of the Islamic State to the existence of meta-opinions. He explains that 
people like to feel and look as if their way of thinking lies within the majority and will attempt to 
minimize their own deviation from what they believe is the norm (McCauley, 2015). For 
example, if a person thinks that everyone supports the Islamic State, then they will often 
outwardly express support of the Islamic State even if they have reservations. The Islamic State 
uses social media to make it appear that the public is in support of their ideology and operations 
by constantly uploading posts on a multitude of platforms from multiple sources (McCauley, 
2015). The very nature of social media compounds this effect by surrounding users with posts 
that are targeted to their interests and inevitably confirms their beliefs. For example, if a user 
clicks on a post about brides who are available for marriage in the Islamic State, then they will 
begin seeing more and more related posts until their entire newsfeed shows unanimous support 
for the Islamic State and its benefits. While the quality of Islamic State posts varies, the quantity 
is most impactful. If social media users were to encounter a counter narrative it may make the 
Islamic State seem less supported. McCauley (2015) posits that there is often a difference 
between actual public opinion and perceived public opinion and an event that reveals the true 
distribution of opinion can cause sudden political change. To disrupt the Islamic State, the 
appearance of consensus must be destroyed. McCauley (2015) notes that the counter narrative 
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should be communicated similarly to the Islamic State - informally, high quantity, distributed 
across platforms, and individualized to users. The challenge with administering a counter-
narrative is keeping messages consistent; but McCauley (2015) argues that if the quantity is 
vigorous, the counter-narrative should be successful in detracting from the Islamic State's 
appearance of a majority.  
Waltzman (2017) and Mayfield III (2011) both acknowledge that terrorist organizations 
have an undisputed advantage on social media due to their decentralized structures. Local 
commanders are often empowered to make decisions that allows them to be agile and flexible. In 
contrast, the governments that they seek to destroy are often unable to respond in an efficient 
manner because of the many layers of approvals required. Mayfield III (2011) argues that the 
U.S. Department of Defense needs to implement processes to guide the expeditious release of 
information at lower levels which know how to best communicate with local populations. 
However, neither Waltzman (2017) or Mayfield III (2011) explain who should be publicly seen 
as responsible for executing the campaign or what specific channels should be used. 
The Audience, Communicator, and Content  
There is consensus among terrorism researchers that the only way to defeat terrorist or-
ganizations is to use their same tactics. The Islamic State focuses on three aspects of communica-
tion: the audience, the communicator, and the content. Therefore, a competing-narrative or coun-
ter-narrative should theoretically focus on the same elements. McCauley (2015) stresses that no 
terrorist rhetoric should exist on the internet without a response. When terrorist rhetoric is all that 
is available to a vulnerable individual, it increases their chance of acceptance (MaCauley, 2015). 
The mere presence of a dissenting opinion can prevent radicalization (MaCauley, 2015). 
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The Islamic State understands the complexity of identity and power and utilizes in-group 
and out-group dynamics to persuade followers to join. An audiences’ attitudes are developed 
from individual values, and values of the groups that they belong to (Dubois, Rucker, & 
Galinsky, 2016). It is easier to change the attitude of a person if they do not value their group and 
more difficult if they do value their group (Dubois et al., 2016). The Islamic State repeatedly 
reminds the audience that they do not belong in their current group (i.e., the U.S., Europe, or 
Canada) because their current group treats them like second class citizens. However, they are 
welcome to join a new group, the Islamic State, which will welcome them with open arms and 
provide them with all the opportunities that their previous group withheld. An example of a 
competing-narrative under this approach would be Minhaj-ul-Qur’an International’s messaging. 
Minhaj-ul-Qur’an International reminds their audience that not only are they free to live and 
practice however they want in the United States, Europe, and Canada, but there are also many 
communities in these regions that provide social and even economic support for people of all 
religions. A counter-narrative would argue that the Islamic State is not as welcoming as it may 
appear. It would include testimonies of deradicalized terrorists who traveled to Iraq or Syria but 
were unable to find the sense of belonging that they were seeking. An understanding of the 
audience is crucial when deciding who the communicator should be, and what content should be 
posted. The internet is full of noise and for a narrative to break through the noise, it must be seen 
as relevant to users. 
The communicator should be credible to the audience due to their level of trustworthiness 
and expertise (Dubois et al., 2016). The communicators for the Islamic State often derive their 
level of trustworthiness and expertise from being perceived as religious scholars. However, many 
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of the communicators for the Islamic State have no formal schooling in religion and often do not 
even speak Arabic which is the language of the Quran and Hadith (Schmid, 2015). Instead, the 
communicators are simply able to claim that they are religious scholars and due to their 
substantial following on social media - they are believed (Schmid, 2015). In addition, many of 
the religious scholars also claim to have fighting experience having participated in the efforts to 
expel foreign invaders from Afghanistan and overthrow what they deem to be corrupt regimes in 
Iraq and Syria (Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment, 2015). 
Fighting experience is not easily substantiated but is often confirmed by other jihadists which 
makes it possible for users to blindly accept. This concept of fighting experience also contributes 
to the communicator’s credibility. Therefore, communicators of competing-narratives and 
counter-narratives have been mostly religious scholars but with credentials that prove their level 
of trustworthiness and expertise. In addition, there have been several communicators who are 
deradicalized terrorists who can make similar claims of fighting experience. However, these 
claims of fighting experience are often not widely confirmed and without many followers may be 
more difficult for users to accept. 
When it comes to content, the Islamic State focuses on images, videos, and statements 
that demonstrate their power, sense of belonging, the chance to become a part of something 
bigger than themselves, material luxuries, and an approaching apocalypse combined with a need 
to protect their religion. The tactics used are dependent on whether the Islamic State is 
attempting to recruit manpower, expertise, or gain general support. Existing research on 
persuasiveness suggests the effectiveness of the content of the communication is dependent on 
the vividness of the threat presented (Blondé & Girandola, 2016). This theory has gained 
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popularity with salient examples such as the viral picture of a stunned child sitting in the back of 
an ambulance after the bombings of Aleppo, Syria. The theory may also be deduced to suggest 
that counter-narratives are more effective than competing-narratives because of the mere 
presentation of a threat. However, there has been no research to validate such a claim. Given the 
lack of research on the topic, content of communication for competing-narratives and counter-
narratives has focused on capturing the attention of viewers and providing information that 
challenges their current views.  
The Islamic State is attempting to promote an image of a successful caliphate where the 
basic needs and desires of followers are met. They are losing territory and many of their 
followers are being forced to live in poor conditions. Haykel (2016) traveled to Yemen, Iraq, 
Syria, and Saudi Arabia where he interviewed Sunni and Shia Muslims to learn about their 
thoughts and feelings towards Sharia Law and the caliphate as interpreted by the Islamic State. 
He found that those living under the control of the Islamic State in the caliphate feel 
inconvenienced by Sharia Law but are willing to withstand those inconveniences because the 
Islamic State provides them with necessities such as jobs (Haykel, 2016). He found that 
sympathizers living outside of the control of the Islamic State and the caliphate support the 
overall strategy and goals but do not want to live under Sharia Law (Haykel, 2016). This 
evidence suggests that Sharia Law is largely seen as a deterrent that can be emphasized with a 
competing-narrative or counter-narrative. Haykel (2016) closes by explaining that the Islamic 
State has emerged from an unstable economic, political, and social environment but it’s 
foundation and ideas are not new as they have been discussed and practiced since the 7th century 
(Haykel, 2016). The Islamic State is concerned with gaining territory and influence in the Middle 
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East. Therefore, Haykel (2016); argues that there is no need to for the U.S. to intervene militarily. 
The population which is currently under control of Islamic State will eventually revolt because 
while they are seeing improvement in stability they will not see the promised utopia and once the 
true conditions are revealed to the world they will stop gaining followers (Haykel, 2016). 
Where many researchers vehemently disagree is about creating a dialogue with general 
users. Casptack (2015) and Bertram (2015) believe that competing-narratives and counter-
narratives should incorporate feedback mechanisms to help administrators determine whether 
information is appealing to the masses, and if necessary, make adjustments. This is due to the 
marginal success of immersive deradicalization programs in the Middle East that both 
researchers studied. However, feedback mechanisms such as a comment functionality may invite 
dissent that can distort the information the competing-narratives and counter-narrative are trying 
to relay as it did with Bush and Obama’s online counter-narrative programs. Therefore, feedback 
such as LIKES, and SHARES, may be a safest and most accurate option for measuring outreach.  
The article, Online Engagement Factors on Facebook Brand Pages, assessed the 
relationship between the content of social media posts and customer engagement measured by 
number of LIKES and SHARES, comments, and interaction duration for a page. The study found 
that certain types of content can increase the LIKES ratio, SHARES ratio, comments, ratio, and 
interaction duration ratio, while other types of content had no effect (Cvijikj & Michahelles, 
2013). In a related study, Do Social Media Marketing Activities Enhance Customer Equity? An 
Empirical Study of Luxury Fashion Brand, the researchers found that increases in engagement 
showed a correlation to a change in attitudes and behavior for retail companies (Kim & Ko, 
2012). Social media marketing increased value equity (β = .47, t = 3.47) and brand equity (β = 
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.66, t = 7.73) which increased purchase intention at a significant level of p < .001 (Kim & Ko, 
2012). Both studies demonstrate the validity of using LIKES and SHARES to determine the 
perception of relevance and credibility when viewing social media content. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The Islamic State has found itself repeatedly fighting against other regional terrorist 
organizations such as Al Shabab and Jabhat al-Nusra which rule with shared power and 
governance and oppose the Islamic State’s quest for complete control over forcibly conquered 
territory. Conflicts with other regional terrorist organizations drain the Islamic State’s already 
limited resources and distracts them from fulfilling their mission of establishing a caliphate 
(Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment, 2015). In addition to 
regional conflicts, the Islamic State is also losing territory due to the military strikes made by 
foreign powers including the U.S., France, Russia, Turkey, Lebanon, Australia, Great Britain, 
Canada, The Netherlands, Jordan, and Morocco (Haykel, 2016). Yet, the Islamic State continues 
to inspire attacks throughout the world due to their robust online presence that promotes a 
powerful image of growth and prosperity. As living conditions within the Islamic State 
deteriorate, foreign governments have an opportunity to reveal a different view of the caliphate 
that could potentially prevent individuals from radicalizing (Haykel, 2016). 
As addressed in this chapter, terrorist organizations are actively recruiting followers on 
social media and their efforts could be undermined by providing information about costs and 
benefits that a vulnerable individual may not be aware (McCauley, 2015). This chapter traced the 
evolution of the Islamic State and examined the issues revolving around previous and current 
counter-radicalization efforts. It specifically focused on the potential of social media, but the 
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challenges involved with uploading information that is relevant and credible enough to trend. 
While progress has been made with counter-radicalization efforts, there are many issues that still 
need to be studied and analyzed for improvement and validation. The existing research 
emphasized two overarching concepts. The first overarching concept is the need to understand 
the ideology behind terrorism (Cragin et al., 2015). While researchers may know what 
information entices a vulnerable individual to join a terrorist organization, there is very little 
insight into what information may dissuade a vulnerable individual from joining a terrorist 
organization. The second overarching concept is the need to provide information to the public 
that competes with the Islamic State’s narrative, or counters, the Islamic State’s narrative 
(McCauley, 2015). While much has been written about terrorist recruitment and counter-
radicalization, no studies have empirically researched what information is effective or ineffective 
at reaching the general population. 
Chapter 3 will discuss the quantitative research design. It will delve into methodology 
and include a discussion of the population, sampling and sampling procedures, data collection, 
and data analysis plan. In addition, Chapter 3 will address threats to validity and outline the 
ethical procedures that will be followed.  
87 
 
 
Chapter 3: Research Method 
This chapter outlines the parameters of the methodological approach used in this study. It 
includes an overview of the research design and explains why the design was chosen. It also co-
vers on the population and sampling procedures, and then discusses the data collection proce-
dures and statistical analyses techniques that will be used to conduct the analysis. The chapter 
ends with a discussion of the validity, reliability, and ethical considerations inherent in this 
study.  
Research Design and Rationale 
The nonexperimental, quantitative research descriptive design was appropriate for this 
study because counter-radicalization social media campaigns are already being administered and 
followed. Therefore, there was no need to create an environment to measure the outreach of 
social media posts; it already exists and was waiting to be observed and understood. Measuring if 
there was a relationship between CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION of 
posts and their level of engagement on social media was intended to determine if utilizing data 
analytics when administering counter-radicalization campaign on social media can ensure that 
the posts are reaching the general user population. This study used a nonexperimental descriptive 
design to observe relationships between variables without manipulation. Due to the lack of 
testing and treatment, the study was unable able to determine a cause-and-effect relationship but 
was able to determine correlation (Frankfort-Nachmias, Nachmais, & DeWaard, 2015). In 
addition, the nonexperimental descriptive design had few threats to internal and external validity.  
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Social media research is a relatively new field of study. As a result, there are few estab-
lished scales to provide a foundation for discerning reliability. However, many private compa-
nies use a variety of the vectors to measure and focus their outreach and engagement efforts 
(Stelzner, 2010). For example, DigitasLBi, a company that assists retailers in understanding their 
social media metrics, studies the number of impressions, day of the week, time, post type, num-
ber of SHARES, number of LIKES, number of comments, number of pages tagged in post, and 
number of hashtags used by social media platforms, over a period of time, to draw attention to 
which posts are effective and ineffective (Berger, 2013). Their outcome is called the “Contagious 
Index” because it provides a score of between 0 and 100 to the retailer. DigitasLBi is given ad-
ministrator privileges to complete their studies because this authority has access to much more 
information on posts. I did not have administrator privileges for the Quilliam Facebook page. 
Due to this limitation, I created a modified version of the Contagious Index by measuring only 
the LIKES and SHARES of Facebook posts. According to the DigitasLBi, a share means that a 
user found the information to be so important that they are willing to take personal responsibility 
to further its dissemination and a like means that a user wants the poster to know that they agree 
with them and support their view (Berger, 2013).  
Methodology 
This study utilized a quantitative method to measure the trending of posts on social 
media. Facebook was chosen as the social media platform for this study because it is the most 
popular social media platform; and unlike Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram, its users often share 
published content that aims to spread ideas and teach others (Bene, 2017). There are several 
radicalization counter-narratives on Facebook that are currently being administered by 
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governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Of the governmental radicalization counter-
narratives, The United Kingdom’s Prevent Tragedies, Canada’s Extreme Dialogue, the United 
States’ The Global Engagement Center, have relatively low outreach and engagement as 
previously mentioned. Therefore, they were not chosen for analysis. However, there were several 
radicalization counter-narratives that were being administered by nongovernmental organizations 
that have an adequate following, including Minhaj-ul-Quran International, The Israel Project, 
and Quilliam. 
Minhaj-ul-Quran International, The Israel Project, and Quilliam were all created and 
administered with the purpose of dissuading individuals from joining terrorist organizations but 
utilize varying strategies. Minhaj-ul-Quran International was eliminated because the posts often 
are not informational. Instead, Minhaj-ul-Quran International often posts to promote upcoming 
events where religious leaders and scholars would discuss counter-radicalization. The Israel 
Project was eliminated because it was focused only on Hamas and Hezbollah and did not address 
terrorism as a global issue but as only a threat to Israel. In contrast to both Minhaj-ul-Quran 
International and The Israel Project, Quilliam, presented a balanced feed with a variety of 
CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION making it the obvious choice for the 
study. 
Once the counter narrative, Quilliam, was chosen, it was evaluated to see what types of 
posts were typically made. This helped to define the CATEGORY, CONTENT and 
GEOPOLITICAL REGION as seen below in Table 3. After completing a preliminary evaluation 
of the data, it appears that the personal story has the most reach as measured by LIKES and 
SHARES. However, this conclusion needs to be verified by statistical analysis of the data 
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collected. The Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) test was used to analyze the data 
and test the hypotheses. The results of the MANOVA verify if the CATEGORY, CONTENT, and 
GEOPOLITICAL REGION have an impact on the dependent variable constructs, LIKES and 
SHARES as seen below in Table 4.  
Table 3 
Independent variable data coding 
Independent variables Data entry code 
CATEGORY 
1. personal story 
2. news article 
3. research/policy analysis 
4. military defeats 
5. religious doctrine 
CONTENT 
1. written status 
2. written status with link to website 
3. written status with video 
4. written status with photograph 
GEOPOLITICAL REGION 
1. West  
2. Middle East 
3. global 
4. cyber 
 
Table 4 
Dependent variable constructs 
Dependent variables Construct 
LIKES 
User agrees with information presented 
SHARES 
User wants others to view information pre-
sented 
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The strategic choice theory argues that individuals weigh the costs and benefits of joining 
a terrorist organization before choosing to join (Borum, 2011). According to the social movement 
theory and social identity theory, information about the resources and group membership offered 
by a terrorist organization should be of interest to an individual who is contemplating terrorism. 
When applied to terrorism, the social movement theory and social identity theory can be used to 
encourage or dissuade an individual who is considering joining a terrorist organization. 
The Islamic State recruits by offering resources and group membership. In reality, they 
are struggling financially and as a result have been unable to provide the cars, houses, and wea-
ponry that they have promised and this lack of resources has led to defections (Schmid, 2015). If 
the social movement theory and social identity theory are true, then information about the current 
condition of the Islamic State could interest an individual who is contemplating joining. The ap-
plication of the social movement theory and social identity theory to terrorism led to the initial 
research question posed by this study; are some categories of information posted on social media 
more appealing to the general user population than others? If accepted, the hypothesis that per-
sonal story reaches more social media users than other categories would mean that the absence of 
resources and group membership is of interest to those contemplating terrorism and could poten-
tially dissuade individuals from joining a terrorist organization. 
Considering what individuals who are contemplating terrorism may want to view on 
social media led to two additional research questions; are some contents on social media more 
appealing to the general user population than others and are some GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs 
on social media more appealing to the general user population than others? Individuals in the 
discovery phase of radicalization often seek information that is reputable. A post with a status, 
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picture, or video posted by a single source (a Facebook page) is often not enough to sway 
opinions. However, a post with a link to secondary source (website) is often seen as credible 
(Westerman et al., 2014). This belief led to the hypothesis that social media post CONTENT of 
written status with a link to a website will reach more social media users than the other 
CONTENT.”  Individuals in the discovery phase may also be more interested in CONTENT that 
discusses the Middle East. After all, individuals who have passed the sensitivity phase of 
radicalization often have begun mentally disassociating themselves with their homes in the West 
and have begun identifying with their homeland in the Middle East (Robinson et al., 2017). This 
belief led to the hypothesis that the social media post GEOPOLITICAL REGION of Middle East 
will reach more social media users than the other GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs. 
Population 
The population for this study were posts published on the Quilliam Facebook page be-
tween 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2018. These posts were LIKED and SHARED by the 
general user population. There are very few barriers to creating a Facebook account. All an indi-
vidual need to provide is a first name, last name, phone number or email address, password, date 
of birth, and gender. This information can easily be fabricated which has led to an abundance of 
duplicate accounts. While a user may have more than one account, they typically only use one. 
As a result, Facebook delineates between active users who have logged-on within the past day 
and in-active who have not logged in within the past day when determining their total users and 
categorizes users based on how recently they last logged into an account. As of 2018, Facebook 
had 2.01 billion active daily users (Donnelly, 2018).  
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The demographics of users on Facebook have significantly changed since its inception. 
When the social media platform was first launched in 2004, only college students could join. Us-
ers had to either be invited by another student to join or request that another student verify their 
academic enrollment to join. In 2005, registration was extended to U.S. high school students and 
users still had to either be invited to join or their student status had to be verified by another user 
who attended the same school. This registration strategy severely limited the demographics of 
users to white middle and upper-class Americans between the age of 14 and 22. In 2006 the so-
cial media platform expanded to include users who were not students. Many parents who were 
interested in what their children were doing online also joined. However, this expansion deterred 
many young users from using the social media platform and encouraged them to move onto other 
popular social media platforms such as Instagram, Snapchat, and Pinterest, which were less fre-
quented by parents. By 2018, only 88% of 18-29 year olds were using Facebook as seen in Table 
5. While this exodus effected Facebook, it was offset by the massive number of users in their for-
ties and fifties joining the social media platform. With even more users clicking on advertise-
ments and generating revenue, Facebook once again was able to expand and begin providing 
their services to other countries such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico as seen in Table 8 
with 79% of all Facebook Users logging on at least once a day as seen in Table 7 and reaching 
both men and women as seen in Table 6.  
Table 5 
Facebook Age Demographics 
Age Group Percent of Age Group Using Facebook 
18-29 year olds 88% 
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30-49 year olds 84% 
50-64 year olds 72% 
65 and older 62% 
 
Note. From “75 Super-Useful Facebook Statistics for 2018,” by G. Donnelly, 2018, September 7. 
Retrieved from https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2017/11/07/facebook-statistics  
 
Table 6 
Countries with Most Facebook Usage 
Nationality Percent of Total Facebook User Population 
U.S.A. 12% 
India 10% 
Brazil 7% 
Indonesia 5% 
Mexico 4% 
Note. From “75 Super-Useful Facebook Statistics for 2018,” by G. Donnelly, 2018, September 7. 
Retrieved from https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2017/11/07/facebook-statistics 
 
Table 7 
Usage of Facebook 
Log Ons Percent of Total Facebook User Population 
Once a Day 79% 
Multiple Times a Day 53% 
Note. From “75 Super-Useful Facebook Statistics for 2018,” by G. Donnelly, 2018, September 7. 
Retrieved from https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2017/11/07/facebook-statistics 
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Table 8 
Facebook Gender Demographics 
Gender Percent of Total Facebook User Population 
Men 56% 
Women 44% 
Note. From “75 Super-Useful Facebook Statistics for 2018,” by G. Donnelly, 2018, September 7. 
Retrieved from https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2017/11/07/facebook-statistics 
 
Quilliam posts do reach every demographic. The exposure of the Quilliam posts to the 
general user population is limited because they are in English and discuss counter-radicalization. 
Therefore, Quilliam posts will only reach users who are most likely to have a potential interest in 
counter-radicalization. Quilliam posts will populate on a Facebook Users newsfeed if a) a user is 
following the Quilliam Facebook page, b) a user has friends who are interested in counter-radi-
calization and several of those friends have interacted with (liked, shared, or commented on) a 
trending post, or c) a user has clicked on previous posts about counter-radicalization prompting 
the Facebook algorithm to populate a targeted post. Due to this constraint, the generalizability of 
this study is severely limited. 
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
To ensure that the study is perceived as timely, the sample included posts made by 
Quilliam during the most recent full calendar year of postings starting 1 January 2018 and ending 
31 December 2018. During this time, the administrators uploaded a total of 426 posts. Each post 
was recorded in Microsoft Excel 2016 and coded for CATEGORY, CONTENT, and 
GEOPOLITICAL REGION as seen below. The amount of LIKES and SHARES was also 
recorded to measure engagement. 
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The entire population was studied. There were nine terrorist attacks in 2018 as seen in 
Figure 1. In the immediate aftermath of these attacks, there was a significant amount of attention 
focused on the news reporting and the overall global issue of terrorism. As a result, the LIKES 
and SHARES may not be related to the content that could potentially skew the results. For 
example, if I had chosen a cluster of posts from 1 May to 31 May, the results would be highly 
influenced by the Surbaya Suicide Bombing, Paris Stabbing, and Liege Shooting. To preserve the 
integrity of the study, it is important that posts about terrorist attacks are included, but do not 
dominate the results. By studying the entire population, posts were more representative of all 
posts ever made by Quilliam.  
 
Note. From “Terrorism Timeline,” by Since 9/11, 2018, Retrieved from 
https://since911.com/explore-911/terrorism-timeline 
Figure 4. 2017 Terrorist attacks 
 
To calculate the sample size, I determined the statistical power, alpha, and effect size. 
Statistical power is the probability that a test will detect a correlational relationship. The 
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generally accepted value for statistical power is .80 (Walden University, 2009). High statistical 
power improves the chances that findings are not due to chance (Walden University r, 2009). The 
alpha is the probability of a Type I error (rejection of a true null hypothesis) or Type II (failing to 
reject a null hypothesis) error (Walden University, 2009). The generally accepted value for alpha 
is .05 (Walden University, 2009). The effect size is the indication of how strong the correlation is 
(Walden University, 2009). The stronger a relationship is, the smaller the sample is needed to 
detect an effect (Walden University, 2009). The weaker a relationship, the larger the sample will 
be needed to detect an effect (Berman, 2016). 
Table 9 
Effect size 
Effect size w2 
Small w2 < .06 
Medium .06 - .14 
Large w2 > .14 
 
An Assessment of Quantitative Research in Mass Communication was used to determine 
the appropriate effect size for this study (Chase & Baran, 1976). The authors of this article 
analyzed 48 studies published in mass communication journals for their methods in choosing 
sample sizes for research that used several tests including Pearson’s product-moment correlation 
coefficient (Chase & Baran, 1976). The researchers relied on investigators from several different 
research fields including; Cohen (Psychology), Brewer (Education), Chase/Tucker 
(Communication), Kroll/Chase (Speech Pathology), and Chase/Baran (Mass Communication) 
(Chase & Baran, 1976). Choices for the effect size of w2 are in the table below (see Table 3). The 
authors of “An Assessment of Quantitative Research in Mass Communication” found that a small 
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effect size of for w2 of .025 is appropriate for studies in mass communication (Chase & Baran, 
1976).  
There were 426 posts made between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2018. I 
determined the CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION of each Facebook 
post for these posts and manually record the respective coded values in Microsoft Excel 2016. 
Then I manually recorded the corresponding number of LIKES and SHARES for each post in 
Microsoft Excel 2016. Given the statistical power of .80, an alpha of .05, and the effect size of 
.025, the minimum sample size was calculated to be 375 posts as seen in Figure 5: G*Power 
Sample Size Calculation and Figure 6: G*Power Sample Size and Power Plot. However, in order 
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to decrease the margin of error, the statistical analysis for this study included the entire 
population of 426 posts. 
Figure 5. G*Power sample size calculation 
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Figure 5. G*Power sample size and power plot 
 
Procedures for Participation and Data Collection 
Facebook has a comprehensive data policy that was updated on 19 April 2018 to reduce 
public scrutiny following the disclosure that third parties were harvesting user information to in-
fluence behavior. In the updated data policy, which can be viewed in Appendix A, Facebook 
(2018) states that users are responsible for understanding what is public and private with regards 
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to general usage (see Figure 6). Public information can be mined and manipulated by users, Fa-
cebook, and third parties (Facebook, 2018). Facebook encourages users who are concerned about 
privacy to update their settings and have an awareness of what can be seen when interacting with 
public pages (Facebook, 2018). Facebook also stated that they expect and encourage academic 
institutions to use public information to conduct research that advances scholarship and innova-
tion on topics of general social welfare (Facebook, 2018).  
Figure 6. Facebook data usage policy 
The Quilliam Facebook page is public. Therefore, all Quilliam posts are public infor-
mation and when users like and share Quilliam posts that interaction also becomes public infor-
mation. According to Facebook’s data policy, this public information can be collected and used 
for research. Data collection involved recording the date and a general synopsis for each post 
made. Each post was categorized based on the criteria in Table 1 for CATEGORY, CONTENT, 
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and GEOPOLITICAL REGION. For CATEGORY, posts were coded as (1) if they were a per-
sonal story, (2) if they were a news article, (3) if they were a research/policy analysis, (4) if they 
concern military defeats, and (5) if they include religious doctrine. For CONTENT, posts were 
coded as (1) if they were a written status, (2) if they were a written status with a link to a web-
site, (3) if they were a written status with a video, and (4) if they were a written status with a 
photograph. For GEOPOLITICAL REGION, posts were coded as (1) if they discussed a location 
in the West, (2) if they discussed a location in the Middle East, (3) if they discussed global top-
ics, and (4) if they discussed cyber topics. A comprehensive example of how coding was com-
pleted can be understood by evaluating the figure below (see Figure 7).  
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Note. From “Quilliam,” in Facebook [Group page]. Retrieved December 28, 2018, from 
https://www.facebook.com/QuilliamInternational/ 
Figure 7. Post example 
The CATEGORY for this post was personal story (coded as 1) because it is about an in-
dividual whose father was killed in a terrorist attack. The CONTENT for this post was written 
104 
 
 
status with a link to a website (coded as 2) because it includes a brief synopsis of the article and 
the link to the article. The GEOPOLITICAL REGION for this post was West (coded as 1) be-
cause it was about a family living in the United Kingdom. In addition to the posting date, CATE-
GORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION, the corresponding number of LIKES (10) 
and SHARES (1) was also recorded in Microsoft Excel 2016 as seen in the table below (see Ta-
ble 10). 
Table 10 
Coding in Microsoft Excel 2016 example  
 
Posting 
date 
CATE-
GORY CONTENT 
GEOPOLITICAL 
REGION 
# of  
LIKES 
# of 
SHARES 
6/7/2018 1 2 1 10 1 
 
 
This process was followed for each of the 426 posts which were uploaded between 1 Jan-
uary 2018 and 31 December 2018. Then, the entire table was copied and pasted into IBM SPSS. 
I then ran the various statistical tests to determine if the assumptions were satisfied and if the dif-
fering categories of information, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs had a statistically 
significant effect on the amount of LIKES and SHARES. Then I copied and pasted the output 
into Microsoft Word to evaluate and draw conclusions.  
Data Analysis Plan 
The study utilized a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) because it is norm-
referenced and measures whether there are any significant differences between two or more 
vectors of means. This test is appropriate because the study was interested in determining 
whether the CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION influences the posts 
number of LIKES and SHARES. The MANOVA assumes that the dependent variable is 
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measured on a continuous scale and the independent variable consists of categorical independent 
groups and that the dependent variables are normally distributed within each group of categorical 
independent variables (Green & Salkind, 2014). The MANOVA also assumes that observations 
are randomly and independently sampled from the population. Lastly, the MANOVA assumes 
that there are no outliers and the population covariance matrices of each group, and (what) are 
equal. Microsoft SPSS was used to check for each of these assumptions (Green & Salkind, 
2014). 
Multivariate tests were run to demonstrate the effect of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and 
REGION individually on the combination of LIKES and SHARES. Univariate tests were run to 
demonstrate the effects of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION individually on LIKES and 
SHARES individually. The partial eta square (η2) was used to show how much variance is ex-
plained by the independent variable which will demonstrate which independent variables have 
the largest effects on the combination of LIKES and SHARES and LIKES and SHARES individ-
ually (Green & Salkind, 2014). Post hoc tests were also performed to determine where the signif-
icant differences lie and ensure that a Type I error has not been made (Green & Salkind, 2014). 
Threats to Validity 
Due to the non-experimental nature of this study, there were minimal threats to external 
and internal validity. However, the measurement of LIKES and SHARES was based on the as-
sumption that users purposely LIKE and SHARE posts because they agree with the message 
communicated. 
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External Validity 
This was not threatened by the effects of testing or selection of participants (Frankfort-
Nachmias et al., 2015). However, external validity could be threatened by bias. As the rater, I de-
termined the CATEGORY of each post and may have been more likely to choose categories 
which confirm my hypotheses (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). This threat to external validity 
was overcome by adhering to the coding criterion outlined in Table 2. 
Internal Validity 
The internal validity could be threatened by historical events (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 
2015). For example, a terrorist attack could have a significant effect on the LIKES and SHARES 
of posts that may not be attributed the varying independent variables (CATEGORY, CONTENT, 
and GEOPOLITICAL REGION). Several studies were conducted after 9/11 to develop an 
understanding of how people felt about their safety and how it changed the way that they went 
about their daily lives (Huddy & Feldman, 2011). By analyzing the results of interviews and 
surveys, researchers concluded that terrorist attacks had a significant effect on the behavior of 
Americans which decreased as time passed (Huddy & Feldman, 2011).  
Content Validity, Empirical Validity, and Construct Validity 
Content validity involves checking the operationalization against the content domain for 
the construct (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). This study compared the number of LIKES and 
SHARES on specific social media posts that have been coded based on CATEGORY, CON-
TENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION. The main threat to content validity with this measure-
ment is that users sometimes accidentally click when scrolling through a newsfeed. It is unlikely 
that a user will accidentally share a post because the interaction would require two targeted 
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clicks. Therefore, the measurement of SHARES has high content validity. It is however, possible 
that a user will accidentally like a post while scrolling through a newsfeed or wall and not even 
realize their mistake. As a result, the measurement of LIKES has low content validity (Berman, 
2016). 
Empirical validity describes how closely scores correlate with behavior as measured in 
other contexts (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). The methodology for data collection was cho-
sen for its strong validity across cultures and different types of organizations. A variety of studies 
have shown the measurement of Facebook LIKES and SHARES to be an effective measurement 
of a post’s appeal. For example, the measurement of Facebook LIKES and SHARES has been 
applied to studies of anti-cyberbullying campaigns (Alhabash, McAlister, Hagerstrom, Quilliam, 
Rifon, & Richards, 2013), anti-underage alcohol consumption campaigns (Glider, Midyett, 
Mills-Novoa, Johannessen, & Collins, 2001), and anti-obesity campaigns (de la Peña, 2015). All 
three studies have shown that high LIKES and high SHARES correspond with favorable atti-
tudes which can lead to favorable behaviors. In addition to public health campaigns, the meas-
urement of LIKES and SHARES are also commonly used for companies which are attempting to 
sell products. It is one of the most common ways to determine the effectiveness of a brand. As a 
result, the measurement of LIKES and SHARES have high empirical validity. 
Construct validity determines the degree in which inferences can be made from the 
operationalizations in the study to the theoretical constructs on which those operationalizations 
were based on (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). The participants in this study are registered 
Facebook users who use social media to view information about terrorism. The 
operationalization is the impact that posts have on these Facebook users. Does some information 
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provided in a post entice a user to LIKE or SHARE a post more than other information provided 
in other posts? It is assumed that if a person LIKES or SHARES a post, then they thought it was 
relevant and credible (Berger, 2013). These assumptions may not always hold true. A person may 
LIKE or SHARE a post without even agreeing with it because they want to appear informed, or 
because they find the post to be entertaining. The assumptions that the study is based could make 
the results less generalizable to the field of counter-radicalization efforts on social media.  
Ethical Procedures 
The participants in this study were followers and registered Facebook users who LIKED 
and SHARED content which was posted on the Quilliam Facebook page. Naturalistic observa-
tion is critical to ensuring the integrity of this study. If participants were to know that their 
LIKES and SHARES were being monitored for research, then it could influence their behavior. 
Due to a reliance on naturalistic observation, the study did not involve gaining the consent of 
participants. It is assumed that the participants realize that the Quilliam Facebook page is public 
and that anyone can view the page and see if a participant has shared or liked a post. The study 
also did not gain consent of the administrators of the Quilliam Facebook page because the page 
is public, and the study should not have an effect on the page’s popularity.  
Data collected was only be used to make inferences about the relationship between the 
content of social media posts and the level of appeal. Data collected was not be used outside of 
this study. Data collection involved counting the total number of LIKES and SHARES on spe-
cific posts. Data collection did not involve clicking to view the users that liked or shared posts. 
Therefore, there was no exposure to user names or personal information that is listed on accounts 
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such as place of work, place of education, location, names, or any other personal identifiable in-
formation. There was also no exposure to user’s friends lists, posted and tagged pictures, or 
posted and tagged posts. Research involving the analysis of publicly available information, 
where the data can be collected such that individual subjects cannot be identified in any way is 
exempt from Institutional Review Board (IRB) oversight (Marshall, 2003). The Institutional Re-
view Board for Walden University confirmed that the study met ethical standards on 11 April 
2019 with approval number 04-11-19-0541364. The study adhered to the exact procedures de-
scribed in the approved IRB materials. 
Summary 
This chapter outlined the parameters of the methodological approach used in this study. It 
included an overview of the research design and then provides specific information on data col-
lection procedures and statistical analysis techniques. The chapter ended with a discussion of the 
validity, reliability, and ethical considerations inherent in this study. Using a non-experimental 
descriptive quantitative approach, this study assessed the relationship between the content of so-
cial media posts and the level of appeal to the general user population as well as the differing ap-
proaches of counter-narratives. Given the nature and the scope of the research questions under 
scrutiny, the current research design provided both the informational depth and breadth neces-
sary to evaluate the independent and dependent variables across the varied demographics of so-
cial media users. The following chapter will address the data collection, analysis, and results of 
the study. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
This chapter outlines the results of the study. It includes an overview of the challenges 
encountered during data collection and while completing the statistical analysis. Three MANO-
VAs were conducted to test each hypothesis. The chapter delves into the results of each 
MANOVA and the results of the post hoc tests. 
Introduction  
  The purpose of this quantitative study was to assess the utility of data analytics when ad-
ministering counter-radicalization campaigns on social media, and to ensure that the posts are 
reaching and engaging the general user population. This chapter discusses the challenges en-
countered during data collection, how the data was prepared for statistical analysis, and the re-
sults of the research. The three independent variables for this study are CATEGORY, CON-
TENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION. The two dependent variables were LIKES and 
SHARES. The first research question examined whether categories of information posted on so-
cial media were more appealing to the general user population than others. The second research 
question examined whether some content on social media was more appealing to the general user 
population than others. The third research question examined whether some geopolitical regions 
on social media were more appealing to the general user population than others. A MANOVA 
analysis was used to answer the three research questions.  
Data Collection 
Facebook data is dynamic. Posts can be deleted by the administrators at any time. LIKES 
and SHARES can increase or decrease as users view and re-view posts. For example, a user who 
has just discovered the Quilliam Facebook page may take a few moments to peruse the last 
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month of posts and decide to like a few posts. Similarly, a follower of the Quilliam Facebook 
page who occasionally views their posts may notice that they accidentally liked a post yesterday 
and choose to un-like the post to correct their mistake. As time passes, the changes made to data 
become less frequent. When viewing any newsfeed or Facebook page, the latest posts appear at 
the top and as the Facebook user scrolls down to read older posts, it takes time to load. Facebook 
users not only are often not interested in older posts but they are often impatient and do not want 
to wait for older posts to load (Bik & Goldstein, 2013). Initial data collection was conducted on 
11 April 2019. Secondary data collection was conducted on 12 April 2019. There were no differ-
ences found in coding of CATEGORY, CONTENT, or GEOPOLITICAL REGION. There were 
no differences found in resulting LIKES and SHARES. By conducting data several months after 
the period of posts being studied (1 January 2018 to 31 December 2018) the study minimized its 
exposure to dynamic data. All data will be held on a USB drive and stored in a locked safe for a 
total of 7 years after CAO approval. 
Exclusion of Self-Promotional Posts 
During data collection, it was discovered that there was an additional CATEGORY. Quilliam 
page not only posted information that fell into categories such as personal story, news article, re-
search/policy analysis, military defeats, and religious doctrine, but they also uploaded posts that 
were Self-Promotional. Self-Promotional posts are intended to improve the image of Quilliam or 
the image of the founders of Quilliam. Self-Promotional posts were excluded because they do 
not provide information to the general public with the intent to dissuade individuals from joining 
terrorist organizations. Self-Promotional posts include: 
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1. Advertisements for upcoming Quilliam events (lectures and radio/television inter-
views) 
2. Holiday greetings from Quilliam 
3. Articles defending the founders of Quilliam who are frequently criticized for their 
controversial past and outspoken beliefs 
4. Solicitations for financial support for Quilliam 
5. Recruitment of talent to join Quilliam 
6. Selling merchandise 
7. Awards received by the founders of Quilliam 
Challenges Encountered When Coding Posts 
Posts in the study were coded based on CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL 
REGION. While determining the CONTENT was clear, there were several posts that had an un-
clear CATEGORY and GEOPOLITICAL REGION. There were several posts were the subject 
was about a person’s ideas and experiences but they were written by a third party. The applicable 
categories of information to choose from were personal story, news article, research/policy anal-
ysis, military defeats, and religious doctrine. While these posts represented a personal story they 
were coded as a news article or research/policy analysis (depending on the source) because they 
were not written from the person’s perspective. Instead, they were written from the perspective 
of a journalist or policy writer. There were also several posts about U.S. Troops striking targets 
in the Middle East and British terrorists and victims in the Middle East. The applicable GEOPO-
LITICAL REGIONs to choose from were West, Middle East, global, and cyber. These posts 
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were coded as global. This strategy for coding posts remained consistent throughout data collec-
tion to ensure that the results were not compromised. 
Statistical Analysis 
Three MANOVAs were conducted to compare the effect of three independent variables; 
CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION of a post on the dependent variables; 
LIKES and SHARES. The objective of the MANOVA was to discover if the dependent variables 
are influenced by the independent variables and to determine the strength of the effect (Green & 
Salkind, 2014). I determined that the relationship between two of the independent variables, 
CONTENT and GEOPOLITICAL REGION, did not have a statistically significant influence on 
the dependent variables, LIKES and SHARES. From this result, I inferred that Facebook Users 
do not prefer a written status, written status with a link to a website, written status with a video, 
or written status with a photograph. I can also infer that Facebook Users do not prefer posts that 
discuss the West, Middle East, global, or cyber GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs. Thus, I will accept 
the alternative hypothesis for my second and third hypotheses focus further research on the CAT-
EGORY of social media information which did have a statistically significant effect on the de-
pendent variables, LIKES and SHARES. 
Satisfying the Assumptions 
A MANOVA tests to see if there is a relationship across the levels of the independent var-
iable on the linear composite of the dependent variables, or on the dependent variables separately 
(Green & Salkind, 2014). The MANOVA demonstrates the main effect of CATEGORY, CON-
TENT, and REGION alone on LIKES and SHARES and also the interaction effect of the combi-
nation of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION combined on LIKES and SHARES. To be 
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confident in the results of a MANOVA, several assumptions should be satisfied: (a) a MANOVA 
assumes that the independent variables are measured on the interval scale, (b) the dependent var-
iables are measured on a continuous scale, (c) the observations are independent, and (d) the sam-
ple size is sufficient. All the conditions were satisfied in this study’s data collection method 
(Green & Salkind, 2014).  
A MANOVA also assumes multivariate normality because the test is sensitive to outliers 
(Green & Salkind, 2014). To test for outliers, a linear regression for each independent variable 
was conducted. Graphs were created to evaluate the distribution for each independent variable. 
The scatter plots in Appendix B: Data Dispersion show a linear relationship for the three inde-
pendent variables, CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION, as seen in Figures 8, 9, and 10, re-
spectively. The histograms in Appendix B show that the data are positively skewed for the de-
pendent variables, LIKES and SHARES, in Figure 11 and 12. The box plots in Appendix B: Data 
Dispersion also show that there are significant outliers for LIKES and SHARES in Figure 13 and 
14. The Q-Q plots in Appendix B: Data Dispersion also show that the data does not follow a nor-
mal distribution for LIKES and SHARES, as seen in Figure 15 and 16. Therefore, statistical tests 
were run to determine multivariate normality and determine the impact of outliers (Green & 
Salkind, 2014).  
The Shapiro-Wilks test was run to ensure multivariate normality. Significant values, 
where the p-value is greater than the α level, as seen below in Table 11: Tests of Normality indi-
cate multivariate non-normality for both dependent variables (p= .000 for LIKES and SHARES). 
Table 11 
Tests of normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
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Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
LIKES .280 426 .000 .531 426 .000 
SHARES .431 426 .000 .124 426 .000 
 
 
A linear regression was also run to determine the mahalanobis distance (Green & Salkind, 
2014). As seen in the Residual Statistics for CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL 
REGION (Tables 12, 13, and 14), the maximum value for the mahalanobis distance, 279.997, 
was greater than the maximum allowable critical value for mahalanobis distance, 16.27 (Green & 
Salkind, 2014). The mahalanobis distance demonstrates that there are significant outliers in the 
data (Green & Salkind, 2014). Because there are significant outliers and the assumption of non-
normality was not met, this study will rely on Pillai’s Trace when determining significance for 
this study (Green & Salkind, 2014). 
Table 12 
CATEGORY residuals statistics 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation N 
Predicted Value 1.3289 2.7017 2.5094 .13634 426 
Std. Predicted Value -8.658 1.411 .000 1.000 426 
Standard Error of Pre-
dicted Value 
.037 .626 .049 .042 426 
Adjusted Predicted Value 1.4049 4.0710 2.5114 .16085 426 
Residual -1.59509 2.48635 .00000 .76783 426 
Std. Residual -2.073 3.231 .000 .998 426 
Stud. Residual -2.076 3.234 -.001 1.003 426 
Deleted Residual -2.07099 2.49226 -.00202 .77889 426 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.084 3.271 .000 1.007 426 
Mahal. Distance .002 279.997 1.995 15.816 426 
Cook's Distance .000 1.596 .006 .080 426 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .659 .005 .037 426 
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Table 13 
CONTENT residuals statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation N 
Predicted Value .7952 2.0297 1.9178 .06714 426 
Std. Predicted Value -16.720 1.666 .000 1.000 426 
Standard Error of Pre-
dicted Value 
.013 .217 .017 .015 426 
Adjusted Predicted Value .3956 2.0323 1.9170 .08200 426 
Residual -.94389 .23149 .00000 .26661 426 
Std. Residual -3.532 .866 .000 .998 426 
Stud. Residual -3.565 1.316 .001 1.001 426 
Deleted Residual -.96136 .60439 .00080 .26931 426 
Stud. Deleted Residual -3.615 1.318 -.003 1.013 426 
Mahal. Distance .002 279.997 1.995 15.816 426 
Cook's Distance .000 1.127 .004 .055 426 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .659 .005 .037 426 
 
Table 14 
GEOPOLITICAL REGION residuals statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation N 
Predicted Value .9495 2.0005 1.9366 .11389 426 
Std. Predicted Value -8.667 .561 .000 1.000 426 
Standard Error of Pre-
dicted Value 
.050 .842 .066 .057 426 
Adjusted Predicted Value .4865 2.0036 1.9363 .12219 426 
Residual -1.00025 2.24057 .00000 1.03330 426 
Std. Residual -.966 2.163 .000 .998 426 
Stud. Residual -.967 2.187 .000 1.001 426 
Deleted Residual -1.00358 2.51354 .00031 1.04028 426 
Stud. Deleted Residual -.967 2.197 .001 1.002 426 
Mahal. Distance .002 279.997 1.995 15.816 426 
Cook's Distance .000 .368 .002 .018 426 
Centered Leverage Value .000 .659 .005 .037 426 
 
Lastly, a MANOVA relies on the assumption that there is no multi-collinearity and homo-
geneity of covariance matrices (Green & Salkind, 2014). Pearson’s Correlation Co-efficient is 
117 
 
 
.615, as seen in Table 15: Correlation. Pearson’s Correlation Co-efficient is greater than .2 means 
there is multi-collinearity and less than .8 is a positive relationship between the dependent varia-
bles, LIKES and SHARES. Several statistical tests were used to ensure homogeneity of covari-
ance. Significance for these tests were determined at the α =.001. Box’s Test-of-Equality of Co-
variances was used to determine that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent varia-
bles, LIKES and SHARES, are equal across groups. Non-significant values, where the p-value is 
less than the α level, as seen in Table 16: Box’s Test-of-Equality of Covariances, indicate equal 
covariances between groups. Levene’s Test-of-Equality of Variance was used to examine 
whether or not the variance between independent variables are equal. Non-significant values, 
where the p-value is less than the α level, as seen in Table 17: Levene’s Test of Equality of Vari-
ance, indicate equality of variance.  
Table 15 
Correlation 
 LIKES SHARES 
LIKES Pearson Cor-
relation 
1 .615** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.000 
N 426 426 
SHARES Pearson Cor-
relation 
.615** 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 
 
N 426 426 
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Table 16 
Box's test of equality of covariance matrices 
Statistic Value 
Box's M 1526.966 
F 30.297 
df1 45 
df2 3538.342 
Sig. .000 
 
 
Table 17 
Levene's test of equality of error variances 
 Levene statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
LIKES Based on Mean 5.851 16 403 .000 
Based on Median 2.316 16 403 .003 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
2.316 16 91.441 .007 
Based on trimmed mean 4.013 16 403 .000 
SHARES Based on Mean 28.809 16 403 .000 
Based on Median 20.058 16 403 .000 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
20.058 16 27.152 .000 
Based on trimmed mean 21.708 16 403 .000 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Prior to formally testing the hypotheses, a descriptive analysis of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables were conducted to document the distribution of each variable and discuss im-
plications to the analysis. Descriptive statistics provided information on the sample size, mean, 
and standard deviation.  
Looking at Table 18: the Between-Subjects Factors, the samples are not normally distrib-
uted. For CATEGORY, the majority of posts were a News Article (49%) or Policy Article (40%). 
For CONTENT, the majority of posts were a written status with a link to a website (91%). For 
REGION, the plurality of posts were about the West (50%) or global (29%). This uneven distri-
bution impacts the quality of analysis and increases the chance of error.  
Table 18 
Between-Subjects Factors 
 
Independent 
variable N 
CATEGORY 1.00 21 
2.00 207 
3.00 173 
4.00 10 
5.00 15 
CONTENT 1.00 35 
2.00 391 
GEOPOLITICAL REGION 1.00 213 
2.00 58 
3.00 124 
4.00 31 
  
Looking at Table 19 Descriptive Statistics: The combination of CATEGORY, CONTENT 
and REGION preformed with regards to the resulting mean for LIKES and SHARES. The best 
120 
 
 
performing combination for LIKES was news article, video, west (with an average 99.5 LIKES). 
The second best performing combination for LIKEs was personal story, video, west (with an av-
erage of 95 LIKES). However, the combination of news article, video, west only occurred one 
time and the combination of personal story, video, west only occurred two times. The best per-
forming combination for SHARES was news article, video, west with an average of 357.5 
SHARES and personal story, video, west an average of 91 SHARES. Once again, the combina-
tion news article, video, west only occurred two times and the combination of personal story, 
video, west only occurred one time. The lack of occurrences makes these findings less reliable. 
While the results for CATEGORY appear to be strongly influenced by outliers; the CONTENT 
of Video and REGION of West consistently received a high number of LIKES and SHARES.  
Table 19 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 CATE-
GORY 
CON-
TENT 
RE-
GION 
Mean Std. devia-
tion 
N 
LIKES 1.00 1.00 1.00 95.0000 . 1 
3.00 26.0000 . 1 
Total 60.5000 48.79037 2 
2.00 1.00 65.7500 63.94985 4 
2.00 40.8333 71.42945 6 
3.00 43.1111 107.06942 9 
Total 47.1579 85.39468 19 
Total 1.00 71.6000 56.90606 5 
2.00 40.8333 71.42945 6 
3.00 41.4000 101.09094 10 
Total 48.4286 81.84227 21 
2.00 1.00 1.00 99.5000 137.88582 2 
2.00 2.0000 . 1 
3.00 4.3333 2.51661 3 
Total 35.6667 79.06116 6 
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2.00 1.00 23.3697 27.46180 119 
2.00 18.4667 18.71701 30 
3.00 21.2258 33.37036 31 
4.00 17.6190 21.66443 21 
Total 21.7065 26.73440 201 
Total 1.00 24.6281 31.54392 121 
2.00 17.9355 18.63855 31 
3.00 19.7353 32.19289 34 
4.00 17.6190 21.66443 21 
Total 22.1111 29.17427 207 
3.00 1.00 1.00 29.6316 69.47278 19 
3.00 19.4286 20.22257 7 
Total 26.8846 59.95420 26 
2.00 1.00 17.2985 27.05831 67 
2.00 21.0833 40.92001 12 
3.00 8.9831 13.40418 59 
4.00 5.3333 8.04674 9 
Total 13.5374 23.57450 147 
Total 
 
 
 
1.00 20.0233 40.21266 86 
2.00 21.0833 40.92001 12 
3.00 10.0909 14.44217 66 
4.00 5.3333 8.04674 9 
Total 15.5434 31.89180 173 
4.00 2.00 2.00 25.1111 28.78995 9 
4.00 77.0000 . 1 
Total 30.3000 31.71768 10 
Total 2.00 25.1111 28.78995 9 
4.00 77.0000 . 1 
Total 30.3000 31.71768 10 
5.00 1.00 3.00 18.0000 . 1 
Total 18.0000 . 1 
2.00 1.00 3.0000 . 1 
3.00 5.3077 2.52932 13 
Total 5.1429 2.50713 14 
Total 1.00 3.0000 . 1 
3.00 6.2143 4.17278 14 
Total 6.0000 4.10575 15 
122 
 
 
Total 1.00 1.00 38.9545 74.96442 22 
2.00 2.0000 . 1 
3.00 16.0833 16.68128 12 
Total 30.0571 60.86288 35 
2.00 1.00 22.0209 28.95568 191 
2.00 22.4211 33.62341 57 
3.00 14.6875 36.42542 112 
4.00 15.9677 22.13968 31 
Total 19.4987 31.59332 391 
Total 1.00 23.7700 36.53454 213 
2.00 22.0690 33.43486 58 
3.00 14.8226 34.96317 124 
4.00 15.9677 22.13968 31 
Total 20.3662 34.93863 426 
SHARES 1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.00 1.00 91.0000 . 1 
3.00 6.0000 . 1 
Total 48.5000 60.10408 2 
2.00 1.00 18.7500 12.52664 4 
2.00 9.3333 19.47990 6 
3.00 23.1111 65.23505 9 
Total 17.8421 45.39978 19 
Total 1.00 33.2000 34.08372 5 
2.00 9.3333 19.47990 6 
3.00 21.4000 61.74176 10 
Total 20.7619 46.05096 21 
2.00 1.00 1.00 357.500
0 
505.58135 2 
2.00 .0000 . 1 
3.00 2.3333 3.21455 3 
Total 120.333
3 
291.33532 6 
2.00 1.00 4.7899 6.32707 119 
2.00 2.8333 3.96609 30 
3.00 3.2258 4.25605 31 
4.00 2.7143 3.40797 21 
Total 4.0398 5.53339 201 
Total 1.00 10.6198 64.87376 121 
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2.00 2.7419 3.93249 31 
3.00 3.1471 4.14241 34 
4.00 2.7143 3.40797 21 
Total 7.4106 49.72244 207 
3.00 1.00 1.00 32.2105 121.71897 19 
3.00 8.8571 10.49490 7 
Total 25.9231 103.94803 26 
2.00 1.00 5.2836 18.01078 67 
2.00 7.1667 18.27981 12 
3.00 2.7458 4.55841 59 
4.00 1.6667 2.29129 9 
Total 4.1973 13.52301 147 
Total 1.00 11.2326 59.29203 86 
2.00 7.1667 18.27981 12 
3.00 3.3939 5.68366 66 
4.00 1.6667 2.29129 9 
Total 7.4624 42.26556 173 
4.00 2.00 2.00 3.8889 6.35304 9 
4.00 10.0000 . 1 
Total 4.5000 6.29374 10 
Total 2.00 3.8889 6.35304 9 
4.00 10.0000 . 1 
Total 4.5000 6.29374 10 
5.00 1.00 3.00 3.0000 . 1 
Total 3.0000 . 1 
2.00 1.00 .0000 . 1 
3.00 1.0000 .70711 13 
Total .9286 .73005 14 
Total 1.00 .0000 . 1 
3.00 1.1429 .86444 14 
Total 1.0667 .88372 15 
Total 1.00 1.00 64.4545 184.45563 22 
2.00 .0000 . 1 
3.00 6.5000 8.44770 12 
Total 42.7429 147.85194 35 
2.00 1.00 5.2304 12.00567 191 
2.00 4.5965 10.90848 57 
124 
 
 
 
Testing the Hypotheses 
Table 20, Multivariate Tests, demonstrates the significant effect of CATEGORY, CON-
TENT, and REGION individually on the combination of LIKES and SHARES with a p < .05 for 
each independent variable. The partial eta square (η2) shows how much variance is explained by 
the independent variable (Green & Salkind, 2014). This measurement is important because a post 
often will not trend with a high quantity of LIKES or SHARES. However, a post often will trend 
with a high quantity of both LIKES and SHARES. For CATEGORY, η2 = 78.9. For CON-
TENT, η2 = 9.95. For REGION, η2 = 46.5. From these results, one can infer that CATEGORY 
and REGION have the largest effect on the combination of LIKES and SHARES. The level of 
significance for the combination of CATEGORY*CONTENT*REGION is 0 which informs us 
that there is a statistically significant effect on LIKES and SHARES as a combination with a η2 
of 77.457. Therefore, CATEGORY and REGION should be the focus when attempting to in-
crease the quantity of LIKES and SHARES of a post to improve a posts potential to trend. 
In addition, CATEGORY*CONTENT (η2 = 82.018), CATEGORY*REGION (η2 = 
84.051), and CONTENT*REGION (η2 = 62.098) also have a statistically significant effect on 
LIKES and SHARES. From these results, inferring that the independent variables are combined, 
3.00 4.3125 18.81730 112 
4.00 2.6452 3.35210 31 
Total 4.6701 13.76473 391 
Total 1.00 11.3474 61.85354 213 
2.00 4.5172 10.82920 58 
3.00 4.5242 18.06513 124 
4.00 2.6452 3.35210 31 
Total 7.7981 45.08044 426 
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they have an even larger effect on LIKES and SHARES. This finding is important because it in-
forms us that not only does CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION are important, but also the 
combination of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION are also important. 
Table 20 
Multivariate tests 
 
           
Intercept Value F 
Hy-
poth
esis 
df 
Er-
ror 
df 
Sig. 
Par-
tial 
eta 
squar
ed 
Non-
cent. 
param-
eter 
 
Observed 
powerd 
 
Pillai's 
Trace 
0.055 11.666b 2 402 0 0.055 23.332 
 
0.994 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
0.945 11.666b 2 402 0 0.055 23.332 
 
0.994 
Ho-
telling's 
Trace 
0.058 11.666b 2 402 0 0.055 23.332 
 
0.994 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
0.058 11.666b 2 402 0 0.055 23.332 
 
0.994 
CATE-
GORY 
Pillai's 
Trace 
0.178 9.862 8 806 0 0.089 78.9 
 
1 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
0.826 10.089b 8 804 0 0.091 80.713 
 
1 
Ho-
telling's 
Trace 
0.206 10.315 8 802 0 0.093 82.522 
 
1 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
0.177 17.852c 4 403 0 0.151 71.408 
 
1 
CON-
TENT 
Pillai's 
Trace 
0.024 4.977b 2 402 
0.0
07 
0.024 9.955 
 
0.81 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
0.976 4.977b 2 402 
0.0
07 
0.024 9.955 
 
0.81 
Ho-
telling's 
Trace 
0.025 4.977b 2 402 
0.0
07 
0.024 9.955 
 
0.81 
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Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
0.025 4.977b 2 402 
0.0
07 
0.024 9.955 
 
0.81 
GEO-
POLIT-
ICAL 
RE-
GION 
Pillai's 
Trace 
0.109 7.756 6 806 0 0.055 46.535 
 
1 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
0.891 7.956b 6 804 0 0.056 47.734 
 
1 
Ho-
telling's 
Trace 
0.122 8.155 6 802 0 0.058 48.929 
 
1 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
0.12 16.112c 3 403 0 0.107 48.335 
 
1 
CATE-
GORY 
* CON-
TENT 
Pillai's 
Trace 
0.185 13.67 6 806 0 0.092 82.018 
 
1 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
0.815 14.392b 6 804 0 0.097 86.35 
 
1 
Ho-
telling's 
Trace 
0.226 15.114 6 802 0 0.102 90.683 
 
1 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
0.225 30.262c 3 403 0 0.184 90.787 
 
1 
CATE-
GORY 
* GEO-
POLIT-
ICAL 
RE-
GION 
Pillai's 
Trace 
0.189 6.004 14 806 0 0.094 84.051 
 
1 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
0.814 6.232b 14 804 0 0.098 87.254 
 
1 
Ho-
telling's 
Trace 
0.226 6.461 14 802 0 0.101 90.452 
 
1 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
0.21 12.093c 7 403 0 0.174 84.648 
 
1 
CON-
TENT * 
GEO-
POLIT-
ICAL 
RE-
GION 
Pillai's 
Trace 
0.143 15.525 4 806 0 0.072 62.098 
 
1 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
0.857 16.129b 4 804 0 0.074 64.517 
 
1 
Ho-
telling's 
Trace 
0.167 16.732 4 802 0 0.077 66.93 
 
1 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
0.167 33.606c 2 403 0 0.143 67.212 
 
1 
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CATE-
GORY 
* CON-
TENT * 
GEO-
POLIT-
ICAL 
RE-
GION 
Pillai's 
Trace 
0.168 18.497 4 806 0 0.084 73.989 
 
1 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
0.832 19.364b 4 804 0 0.088 77.457 
 
1 
Ho-
telling's 
Trace 
0.202 20.231 4 802 0 0.092 80.922 
 
1 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
0.201 40.502c 2 403 0 0.167 81.004 
 
1   
  
Table 21, Tests of Between-Subjects Effects, shows us the univariate tests for the effects 
of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION on LIKES and SHARES. Individually, there is a sta-
tistically significant difference for CATEGORY on LIKES and SHARES, CONTENT on 
SHARES and REIGION on LIKES and SHARES. However, there is not a significant effect of 
CONTENT on LIKES. In addition, the partial eta-squared for the significant effects is very small 
which means that it does not explain much of the variance.  
When combining independent variables, there is a statistically significant difference for 
CATEGORY*CONTENT on SHARES, CATEGORY*REGION on SHARES, CATE-
GORY*CONTENT on LIKES and SHARES, and CATEGORY*CONTENT*REGION on 
LIKES and SHARES. However, there is not a significant effect of CATEGORY*CONTENT on 
LIKES or CATEGORY*REGION on LIKES. In addition, the partial eta squared for the signifi-
cant effects is very small which means that it does not explain much of the variance. From these 
results, inferring that the effect of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and REGION is much stronger on 
LIKES and SHARES as a combination than individually on LIKES and SHARES. 
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Table 21 
Tests of between-subjects effects 
Source 
Depend-
ent varia-
ble 
Type III 
sum of 
squares 
df 
Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
Par-
tial 
eta 
squar
ed 
Non-
cent. 
param-
eter 
Ob-
serv
ed 
pow
erc 
Corrected 
Model 
LIKES 
54623.942
a 
22 
2482.90
6 
2.16 
0.00
2 
0.105 47.43 
0.99
5 
SHARES 
271701.51
1b 
22 
12350.0
7 
8.41 0 0.315 184.96 1 
Intercept 
LIKES 26840.23 1 
26840.2
3 
23.30 0 0.055 23.30 
0.99
8 
SHARES 16076.03 1 
16076.0
3 
10.94 
0.00
1 
0.026 10.94 0.91 
CATE-
GORY 
LIKES 14234.29 4 
3558.57
1 
3.09 
0.01
6 
0.03 12.36 0.81 
SHARES 78966.39 4 19741.6 13.44 0 0.118 53.76 1 
CON-
TENT 
LIKES 648.008 1 648.008 0.56 
0.45
4 
0.001 0.56 
0.11
6 
SHARES 11858.67 1 
11858.6
7 
8.07 
0.00
5 
0.02 8.07 
0.80
9 
GEOPO-
LITICAL 
REGION 
LIKES 11052.88 3 
3684.29
4 
3.20 
0.02
3 
0.023 9.60 
0.73
7 
SHARES 66790.35 3 
22263.4
5 
15.16 0 0.101 45.47 1 
CATE-
GORY * 
CON-
TENT 
LIKES 1686.794 3 562.265 0.49 
0.69
1 
0.004 1.46 
0.14
9 
SHARES 93368.37 3 
31122.7
9 
21.19 0 0.136 63.56 1 
CATE-
GORY * 
GEOPO-
LITICAL 
REGION 
LIKES 11434.3 7 
1633.47
1 
1.42 
0.19
6 
0.024 9.93 
0.60
1 
SHARES 100358.3 7 14336.9 9.76 0 0.145 68.32 1 
CON-
TENT * 
GEOPO-
LITICAL 
REGION 
LIKES 7254.619 2 
3627.30
9 
3.15 
0.04
4 
0.015 6.30 
0.60
3 
SHARES 85011.04 2 
42505.5
2 
28.94 0 0.126 57.87 1 
CATE-
GORY * 
LIKES 7800.317 2 
3900.15
9 
3.39 
0.03
5 
0.017 6.77 
0.63
7 
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CON-
TENT * 
GEOPO-
LITICAL 
REGION 
SHARES 100555.1 2 
50277.5
6 
34.23 0 0.145 68.45 1 
              
 
Hypothesis 1 
To review, the first hypothesis for Part I: 
Part I, Ho1: The social media post CATEGORY of personal story will reach more social 
media users than other categories. 
Part I, Ha1: The social media post CATEGORY of personal story will not reach more 
social media users than other categories.  
I ran a Simple Contrast test in SPSS on each level of the independent variable, 
CATEGORY, to see how each performs when compared to personal story. Personal story was 
coded as (1), news story was coded as (2), research/policy analysis was coded as (3), military 
defeats was coded as (4), and religious doctrine was coded as (5). Looking at the contrast results 
for CATEGORY in Table 22, there is not a statistically significant difference between personal 
story and news article, personal story and military defeats, or personal story and religious 
doctrine for LIKES or SHARES. However, there is a statistically significant difference between 
personal story and research/policy analysis on LIKES (but not SHARES) with p = .035. The 
confidence interval was wide with (-57.278, -2.156). The multivariate and univariate results (as 
seen in Table 23 and 24) were not statistically significant. From this result, inferring that the 
independent variable, CATEGORY information, does have a statistically significant effect on the 
dependent variables, LIKES and SHARES but the interaction effect is not consistent across the 
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different levels. Specifically, the social media post CATEGORY of personal story is preferred to 
research/policy analysis. As a result, this study fails to reject the null hypothesis.  
Table 22 
CATEGORY contrast results (k matrix) 
CATEGORY simple contrast LIKES SHARES 
Level 2 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate -28.644 -12.504 
Hypothesized Value 0 0 
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) -28.644 -12.504 
Std. Error 14.902 16.829 
Sig. .055 .458 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Difference 
Lower Bound -57.939 -45.587 
Upper Bound .650 20.579 
Level 3 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate -29.717 -10.325 
Hypothesized Value 0 0 
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) -29.717 -10.325 
Std. Error 14.020 15.833 
Sig. .035 .515 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Difference 
Lower Bound -57.278 -41.450 
Upper Bound -2.156 20.801 
Level 4 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate 39.158 -4.541 
Hypothesized Value 0 0 
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) 39.158 -4.541 
Std. Error 42.057 47.497 
Sig. .352 .924 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Difference 
Lower Bound -43.522 -97.914 
Upper Bound 121.837 88.831 
Level 5 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate -36.184 -14.620 
Hypothesized Value 0 0 
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) -36.184 -14.620 
Std. Error 20.976 23.689 
Sig. .085 .537 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Difference 
Lower Bound -77.421 -61.189 
Upper Bound 5.052 31.949 
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Table 23 
CATEGORY multivariate test results 
  Value F 
Hy-
pothe-
sis df 
Error 
df 
Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parame-
ter 
Observed 
Powerc 
Pillai's 
trace 
0.028 1.448 8 806 0.173 0.014 11.584 0.661 
Wilks' 
lambda 
0.972 1.454a 8 804 0.17 0.014 11.633 0.663 
Ho-
telling's 
trace 
0.029 1.46 8 802 0.168 0.014 11.681 0.665 
Roy's 
largest 
root 
0.029 2.875b 4 403 0.023 0.028 11.499 0.778 
 
Table 24 
CATEGORY univariate test results 
Source 
Depend-
ent vari-
able 
Sum of 
squares 
df 
Mean 
square 
F 
Sig
. 
Partial 
eta 
square
d 
Non-
cent. 
param-
eter 
Ob-
served 
powera 
Con-
trast 
LIKES 10299.47 4 2574.867 2.236 
0.0
65 
0.022 8.942 0.654 
SHARE
S 
975.707 4 243.927 0.166 
0.9
56 
0.002 0.664 0.085 
Error 
LIKES 464176.9 403 1151.804      
SHARE
S 
592003.1 403 1468.99      
 
Hypothesis 2 
To review, the second hypothesis for Part I: 
Part I, Ho2: The social media post CONTENT of written status with video will reach 
more social media users than other CONTENTs. 
Part I, Ha2: The social media post CONTENT of written status with video will not reach 
more social media users than other CONTENTs. 
132 
 
 
I ran a Simple Contrast test in SPSS on each level of the independent variable, CON-
TENT, to see how each performs when compared to written status with a video. Video was coded 
as (1) and written Status with a link was coded as (2). Looking at the contrast results for CATE-
GORY in Table 25, there is not a statistically significant difference between written status with a 
video and written status with a link to a website on LIKES. However, there is a statistically sig-
nificant difference between written status with a video and written status with a link to a website 
on SHARES with p = .000. The confidence interval was wide with (-77.129, -32.662). Multivari-
ate tests were statistically significant for LIKES and SHARES meaning that the interaction effect 
is consistent across the different levels. With a partial eta squared of .070, I can infer that only 
7% of the variance in the combination of LIKES and SHARES is explained by the level of CON-
TENT which is a small effect. However, univariate tests were only statistically significant for 
SHARES. From this result, I can infer that the independent variable, CONTENT, does have a 
statistically significant effect on the dependent variable, SHARES. Specifically, the CONTENT 
of written status with a video is preferred to written status with link to a website. The null hy-
pothesis should be rejected, with the alternative hypothesis having validity. 
Table 25 
CONTENT contrast results (K Matrix) 
CONTENT simple contrasta LIKES SHARES 
Level 2 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate -11.298 -54.895 
Hypothesized Value 0 0 
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) -11.298 -54.895 
Std. Error 10.015 11.310 
Sig. .260 .000 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Difference 
Lower Bound -30.985 -77.129 
Upper Bound 8.390 -32.662 
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Table 26 
CONTENT multivariate results 
 
Valu
e F 
Hy-
pothe-
sis df Error df Sig. 
Partial eta 
squared 
Non-
cent. pa-
rameter 
Observed 
powerb 
Pillai's trace .070 15.014a 2.000 402.000 .000 .070 30.028 .999 
Wilks' lambda .930 15.014a 2.000 402.000 .000 .070 30.028 .999 
Hotelling's trace .075 15.014a 2.000 402.000 .000 .070 30.028 .999 
Roy's largest root .075 15.014a 2.000 402.000 .000 .070 30.028 .999 
  
Table 27 
CONTENT univariate test results 
Source 
Depend-
ent varia-
ble 
Sum of 
squares 
df 
Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
 
Partial 
eta 
squared 
Non-
cent. 
param-
eter 
Ob-
served 
powera 
Contrast 
LIKES 
1465.8
37 
1 
1465.8
37 
1.273 0.26 
 
0.003 1.273 0.203 
SHARES 
34608.
35 
1 
34608.
35 
23.55
9 
0 
 
0.055 23.559 0.998 
Error 
LIKES 
464176
.9 
4
0
3 
1151.8
04 
    
 
      
SHARES 
592003
.1 
4
0
3 
1468.9
9 
    
 
      
 
Hypothesis 3 
Part I, Ho3: The social media posts concerning the GEOPOLITICAL REGION of West 
will reach more social media users than other GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs. 
Part I, Ha3: The social media posts concerning the GEOPOLITICAL REGION of West 
will not reach more social media users than other GEOPOLITICAL REGIONs. 
I ran a Simple Contrasta test in SPSS on each level of the independent variable, REGION, 
to see how each performs when compared to West. West was coded as (1), Middle East was 
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coded as (2), global was coded as (3), and cyber was coded as (4). Looking at the contrast results 
for GEOPOLITICAL REGION in Table 28, there is not a statistically significant difference be-
tween GEOPOLITICAL REGION on LIKES or SHARES. Multivariate tests were statistically 
significant meaning that the interaction effect is consistent across the different levels. With a par-
tial eta squared of .070, inferring that only 6% of the variance in the combination of LIKES and 
SHARES is explained by the level of CONTENT with is a very small effect. In addition, univari-
ate tests were not statistically significant as seen in Table 29 and 30. From this result, I can infer 
that the independent variable, GEOPOLITICAL REGION, does have a statistically significant 
effect on the dependent variables, LIKES and SHARES, rejecting the null hypothesis is accepta-
ble and accepting the alternative hypothesis, as a result. 
Table 28 
Region contrast results (k matrix) 
 
REGION simple contrasta LIKES SHARES 
Level 2 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate -20.622 -3.010 
Hypothesized Value 0 0 
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) -20.622 -3.010 
Std. Error 12.997 14.678 
Sig. .113 .838 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Difference 
Lower Bound -46.172 -31.865 
Upper Bound 4.929 25.845 
Level 3 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate -5.230 -2.051 
Hypothesized Value 0 0 
Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) -5.230 -2.051 
Std. Error 4.570 5.161 
Sig. .253 .691 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Difference 
Lower Bound -14.214 -12.197 
Upper Bound 3.755 8.095 
Level 4 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate -8.858 -2.846 
Hypothesized Value 0 0 
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Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) -8.858 -2.846 
Std. Error 7.240 8.177 
Sig. .222 .728 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Difference 
Lower Bound -23.092 -18.921 
Upper Bound 5.376 13.228 
 
Table 29 
REGION multivariate test results 
  Value F 
Hy-
pothe-
sis df 
Error 
df 
Sig. 
Partial 
eta 
squared 
Noncent. pa-
rameter 
Observed 
powerc 
Pillai's 
trace 
0.013 0.868 6 806 0.518 0.006 5.21 0.347 
Wilks' 
lambda 
0.987 .869a 6 804 0.517 0.006 5.213 0.348 
Ho-
telling's 
trace 
0.013 0.869 6 802 0.517 0.006 5.216 0.348 
Roy's 
largest 
root 
0.013 1.723b 3 403 0.162 0.013 5.17 0.45 
 
 
Table 30 
REGION univariate test results 
Source 
Depend-
ent varia-
ble 
Sum of 
squares 
df 
Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
eta 
squared 
Non-
cent. 
pa-
rame
ter 
Ob-
served 
powera 
Con-
trast 
LIKES 4569.568 3 1523.189 1.322 0.267 0.01 3.967 0.353 
SHARES 357.611 3 119.204 0.081 0.97 0.001 0.243 0.065 
Error 
LIKES 464176.9 403 1151.804      
SHARES 592003.1 403 1468.99      
 
 
Post Hoc Tests 
When there is a significant difference between groups, post hoc tests are performed to de-
termine where the significant differences lie and ensure that a Type I error has not been made 
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(Green & Salkind, 2014). Post hoc tests were not performed for CONTENT because it only had 
two levels (written status with video and written status with link to a website). Post hoc tests 
were also not performed for GEOPOLITICAL REGION because they did not show a statistically 
significant difference. The post hoc test for CATEGORY showed that there is a statistically sig-
nificant difference between the means for personal story, news article, research/policy analysis, 
military defeats, and religious doctrine on LIKES as seen in Table 31: CATEGORY Multiple 
Comparisons. However, there was no statistically significant difference between the levels of 
CATEGORY and SHARES.  
Table 31 
CATEGORY multiple comparisons 
 
Depend-
ent varia-
ble 
(I) 
CAT-
EGOR
Y 
(J) 
CAT-
EGOR
Y 
Mean 
differ-
ence (I-
J) 
Std. er-
ror 
Sig. 
95% Confidence interval 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
LIKES 
1 
2 26.3175* 7.77252 0.007 5.0194 47.6155 
3 32.8852* 7.84255 0 11.3953 54.3751 
4 18.1286 13.03949 0.634 -17.6018 53.859 
5 42.4286* 11.47322 0.002 10.99 73.8671 
2 
1 
-
26.3175* 
7.77252 0.007 -47.6155 -5.0194 
3 6.5678 3.49601 0.331 -3.0119 16.1474 
4 -8.1889 10.98839 0.946 -38.2989 21.9211 
5 16.1111 9.07476 0.389 -8.7553 40.9775 
3 
1 
-
32.8852* 
7.84255 0 -54.3751 -11.3953 
2 -6.5678 3.49601 0.331 -16.1474 3.0119 
4 -14.7566 11.03803 0.668 -45.0027 15.4894 
5 9.5434 9.13481 0.834 -15.4876 34.5743 
4 
1 -18.1286 13.03949 0.634 -53.859 17.6018 
2 8.1889 10.98839 0.946 -21.9211 38.2989 
3 14.7566 11.03803 0.668 -15.4894 45.0027 
5 24.3 13.85523 0.402 -13.6657 62.2657 
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5 
1 
-
42.4286* 
11.47322 0.002 -73.8671 -10.99 
2 -16.1111 9.07476 0.389 -40.9775 8.7553 
3 -9.5434 9.13481 0.834 -34.5743 15.4876 
4 -24.3 13.85523 0.402 -62.2657 13.6657 
SHARES 
1 
2 13.3513 8.77773 0.549 -10.7012 37.4037 
3 13.2995 8.85682 0.562 -10.9697 37.5686 
4 16.2619 14.72586 0.804 -24.0894 56.6132 
5 19.6952 12.95703 0.55 -15.8092 55.1997 
2 
1 -13.3513 8.77773 0.549 -37.4037 10.7012 
3 -0.0518 3.94814 1 -10.8704 10.7668 
4 2.9106 12.4095 0.999 -31.0935 36.9147 
5 6.344 10.24838 0.972 -21.7383 34.4262 
3 
1 -13.2995 8.85682 0.562 -37.5686 10.9697 
2 0.0518 3.94814 1 -10.7668 10.8704 
4 2.9624 12.46557 0.999 -31.1953 37.1202 
5 6.3958 10.3162 0.972 -21.8724 34.6639 
4 
1 -16.2619 14.72586 0.804 -56.6132 24.0894 
2 -2.9106 12.4095 0.999 -36.9147 31.0935 
3 -2.9624 12.46557 0.999 -37.1202 31.1953 
5 3.4333 15.6471 0.999 -39.4424 46.309 
5 
1 -19.6952 12.95703 0.55 -55.1997 15.8092 
2 -6.344 10.24838 0.972 -34.4262 21.7383 
3 -6.3958 10.3162 0.972 -34.6639 21.8724 
4 -3.4333 15.6471 0.999 -46.309 39.4424 
 
Table 32 
CATEGORY LIKES 
 
CATEGORY N 
Subset 
1 2 
5.00 15 6.0000  
3.00 173 15.5434  
2.00 207 22.1111 22.1111 
4.00 10 30.3000 30.3000 
1.00 21  48.4286 
Sig.  .121 .075 
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Table 33 
CATEGORY SHARES 
 
CATEGORY N 
Subset 
1 
5.00 15 1.0667 
4.00 10 4.5000 
2.00 207 7.4106 
3.00 173 7.4624 
1.00 21 20.7619 
Sig.  .427 
 
Table 34 
GEOPOLITICAL REGION multiple comparisons 
 
Depend-
ent varia-
ble 
(I)GE-
OPO-
LITI-
CAL 
RE-
GION 
(J)GE-
OPO-
LITI-
CAL 
RE-
GION 
Mean 
differ-
ence 
(I-J) 
Std. er-
ror 
Sig. 
95% Confidence interval 
Lower bound Upper bound 
LIKES 
1 
2 1.701 5.02655 0.987 -11.2664 14.6684 
3 8.9474 3.83357 0.092 -0.9424 18.8372 
4 7.8022 6.52399 0.63 -9.0283 24.6327 
2 
1 -1.701 5.02655 0.987 -14.6684 11.2664 
3 7.2464 5.39884 0.537 -6.6814 21.1742 
4 6.1012 7.55074 0.851 -13.378 25.5805 
3 
1 
-
8.9474 
3.83357 0.092 -18.8372 0.9424 
2 
-
7.2464 
5.39884 0.537 -21.1742 6.6814 
4 
-
1.1452 
6.81496 0.998 -18.7263 16.436 
4 
1 
-
7.8022 
6.52399 0.63 -24.6327 9.0283 
2 
-
6.1012 
7.55074 0.851 -25.5805 13.378 
3 1.1452 6.81496 0.998 -16.436 18.7263 
SHARES 1 
2 6.8302 5.67663 0.625 -7.8143 21.4746 
3 6.8232 4.32936 0.393 -4.3456 17.992 
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4 8.7023 7.36773 0.639 -10.3049 27.7094 
2 
1 
-
6.8302 
5.67663 0.625 -21.4746 7.8143 
3 -0.007 6.09706 1 -15.736 15.7221 
4 1.8721 8.52726 0.996 -20.1264 23.8706 
3 
1 
-
6.8232 
4.32936 0.393 -17.992 4.3456 
2 0.007 6.09706 1 -15.7221 15.736 
4 1.879 7.69633 0.995 -17.9758 21.7339 
4 
1 
-
8.7023 
7.36773 0.639 -27.7094 10.3049 
2 
-
1.8721 
8.52726 0.996 -23.8706 20.1264 
3 -1.879 7.69633 0.995 -21.7339 17.9758 
 
 
Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the challenges encountered during data collection 
and statistical analysis. It also presented the results from the three MANOVAs which included 
multivariate tests, univariate tests, and post hoc tests. The MANOVAs showed that posts coded 
with the CATEGORY of personal story resulted in a higher number of LIKES than research/pol-
icy analysis and posts coded with the CONTENT of written status with a video resulted in a 
higher number of SHARES than written status with a link There was no relationship between the 
independent variable; GEOPOLITICAL REGION; and the dependent variables to LIKES and 
SHARES.  
Chapter 5 will interpret the results and provide conclusions and recommendations. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
Individuals are often radicalized over social media (Gill et al., 2017). Therefore, it seems 
intuitive to attempt to counter-radicalize using social media. The purpose of this quantitative 
study was to assess the utility of data analytics when administering a counter-radicalization cam-
paign on social media to ensure that the posts are reaching and engaging the general user popula-
tion. The independent variables in this study are attributes of social media posts that may contrib-
ute to a post’s virality, which is measured by the resulting LIKES and SHARES. By searching 
for patterns in posts that have a high number of LIKES and SHARES, resulting data analytics 
could improve the outreach of a counter-radicalization social media efforts. The purpose of this 
chapter is to discuss and the results, limitations of the study, and implications. 
The literature in the field of counter-radicalization and social media have not addressed 
what strategies and tactics have been successful in reaching the general population. The United 
States, United Kingdom, and Canada administered counter-radicalization campaigns on multiple 
social media platforms but have been unable to develop an adequate following. This research 
used data from a popular counter-radicalization campaign’s Facebook Page, Quilliam, to deter-
mine whether the CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION of a post had an 
effect on outreach. I then ran a MANOVA to determine which of the categories of information, 
CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION had the strongest effect and should therefore be-
come the focus of counter-radicalization social media efforts and provide a basis for further stud-
ies.  
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Discussion of Findings 
By measuring the effect of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION on 
LIKES and SHARES, this study aimed to determine which independent variables have the great-
est effect on the two dependent variables. The study shows that there is a relationship between 
the CATEGORY and the resulting LIKES and CONTENT of a post and resulting SHARES. Spe-
cifically, it shows that when evaluating posts made between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 
2018, posts that were categorized as a personal story resulted in a higher number of LIKES than 
research/policy analysis. Posts that were a written status with a video resulted in a higher number 
of SHARES than written status with a link. Also, the study shows that there is no relationship be-
tween the independent variable, GEOPOLITICAL REGION, and the dependent variables LIKES 
and SHARES. This finding indicates that expending resources attempting to post only about the 
West, Middle East, global, or cyber topics to improve outreach will not meet with success. 
The results of the MANOVA also proved that CATEGORY and CONTENT individually 
and combined (CATEGORY*CONTENT) had a significant effect on resulting LIKES and 
SHARES. This finding should indicate to administrators the need to focus on posting personal 
story as a written status with a video to maximize both LIKES and SHARES. It is possible that 
people are more likely to like a post with a CATEGORY that resonates with them, such as a per-
sonal story, and more likely to share a post with an engaging CONTENT, such as a video. This 
finding is important because for a post to trend it needs to be both liked and shared in high vol-
ume. Therefore, the combination of personal story for CATEGORY and written status with a 
video for CONTENT could have the strongest effect on resulting LIKES and SHARES and may 
be a useful combination to study when attempting to create viral posts.  
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The Most Liked and Shared Posts 
In addition to running a MANOVA to determine if the independent variables had a signif-
icant effect on the dependent variables, I also compiled a list of the 10 most liked and shared 
posts in order to gain more insight into what attributes contribute to the virality of a post. During 
this exercise, I found that an overwhelming majority of the posts, listed in Table 34 and Table 35, 
involve genuine public figures and local messaging. These are two areas that further research 
should investigate.  
Table 35 
Top 10 liked posts 
Date 
(2018) 
Public 
figure CATEGORY 
CON-
TENT 
Re-
gion LIKES SHARES Subject 
11/14 yes personal story link global 326 197 
Asia Bibi re-
quests asylum 
from U.K. 
3/18 yes 
research/policy 
analysis 
video 
(24K 
views) West 299 534 
Maajid Nawaz 
talks about 
grooming gangs 
8/17 no news article 
video 
(26K 
views) West 197 715 
Manchester 
Didsbury 
Mosque's ex-
tremist Imam 
has links to 
bombing terror-
ist 
12/6 yes personal story link 
Mid-
dle 
East 186 49 
Yazdi victims 
share their story 
9/18 yes news article Link West 183 14 
Maajid Nawaz 
finds the man 
who saved him 
from being 
stabbed 
11/21 no news article Link global 173 14 
Mosul Univer-
sity recovering 
10/11 yes personal story link West 156 30 
Skateboarder 
who attacked 
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London Bridge 
terrorists 
5/15 no 
research/policy 
analysis link 
Mid-
dle 
East 145 64 
Israeli/Palestin-
ian conflict pol-
icy 
6/19 yes news article link West 126 16 
Maajid Nawaz 
talking about 
being labeled 
anti-muslim ex-
tremist 
4/19 yes 
research/policy 
analysis link West 134 12 
Maajid Nawaz 
talking about 
being labeled 
anti-muslim ex-
tremist 
 
Table 36 
Top 10 shared posts 
Date 
(2018) 
Pub-
lic 
figure CATEGORY 
CON-
TENT Region LIKES SHARES Subject 
8/17 no news article 
video 
(26K 
views) West 197 715 
Extremist 
Imam has 
links to 
Manchester 
Bomber 
3/18 yes 
research/policy analy-
sis 
video 
(24K 
views) West 299 534 
Maajid Na-
waz dis-
cusses 
grooming 
gangs 
11/14 yes personal story link global 326 197 
Asia Bibi 
requests 
asylum 
from U.K. 
9/17 no 
 
research/policy analy-
sis link West 110 130 
Labour 
party sup-
ports anti-
semitism 
7/20 no 
research/policy analy-
sis 
video 
(12K 
views) West 95 91 
Interview 
with 
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Maajid Na-
waz 
4/25 no 
research/policy analy-
sis link West 112 70 
New mem-
ber of La-
bour Party 
praised ter-
rorist 
 
5/15 no 
research/policy analy-
sis link 
Middle 
East 145 64 
Israeli/Pal-
estinian 
Conflict 
Policy 
12/6 yes personal story link 
Middle 
East 186 49 
Yazdi Vic-
tims 
10/11 yes personal story link West 156 30 
Hero who 
attacked 
London 
Bridge ter-
rorists 
12/12 no news article link West 88 30 
Interview 
with 
Maajid Na-
waz 
 
Genuine Public Figures 
During the period of data collection (1 January 2018 to 31 December 2018) there were 
several significant events that received attention. There were attacks in Carcasonne and Trebes, 
Toronto, Surabaya, Paris, Liege, Mastung, Sweida, Danghara, and Pittsburgh (Terrorism Time-
line, 2018). Yet none of these news articles even made it into the Top Ten Liked Post or Top Ten 
Shared Posts. In addition, posts that discussed thwarted attacks and arrests of those charged with 
planning the thwarted attacks also did not make it into the Top Ten Liked Post or Top Ten 
Shared Posts. It is possible that over time, social media users have become desensitized to news 
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articles about prior terrorist attacks or thwarted terrorist attacks. It is also possible that social me-
dia users were being bombarded by these stories through other channels such as radio, television, 
newspapers, etc. and did not feel the need to engage with social media posts about the terrorist 
attacks. Either way, this is an occurrence that counter-radicalization administrators may want to 
investigate. 
In addition to terrorist attacks, there was another event that received significant press cov-
erage during the period of data collection. Aasiya Noreen, a Christian woman from Pakistan who 
had been convicted of blasphemy in 2010 following a dispute with neighbors was acquitted 
based on insufficient evidence by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The trial sparked international 
outrage over the initial conviction. As a result, a post discussing her request for asylum in the 
U.K., presented in Figure 19, was the most liked post in the study and one of the most shared 
posts in the study (Quilliam, 2018c). This finding led me to develop a theory that stories about 
women who have been victims of terrorism would have a high amount of LIKES and SHARES. 
However, I noticed that posts about the girls kidnapped from their school and held hostage by 
Boko Haram were some of the least popular posts with a surprising average of only 4.5 LIKES. 
This may be due to the fact that it is more difficult to empathize with a group than an individual 
(Turner, 1956).  
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Note. From “Quilliam,” in Facebook [Group page]. Retrieved December 28, 2018, from 
https://www.facebook.com/QuilliamInternational/ 
Figure 9. Asia Bibi post 
 
The top posts discuss a variety of subjects including brutality, injustice, and resilience. 
The top posts have one attribute in common – a relatable public figure. After coming to this real-
ization, I went back through the year of posts and coded each post as a 1 if it had a public figure 
behind the message, and 2 if it did not have a public figure behind the message. The results were 
demonstrative – posts that had a public figure behind the message were more popular than posts 
that did not have a public figure behind the message. The results of this study prove that it is not 
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only the story that trends, but the person behind it. This theory could also explain why videos 
were so popular. Videos reveal the person behind the post which makes the story more palpable 
to a viewer. When reviewing all of the videos included in the year of posts, the videos where the 
person is unscripted were more popular than the highly edited documentaries. Videos where a 
person is speaking freely about their experiences and ideas may also seem more genuine whereas 
a published piece may seem like an attempt to manipulate viewers.  
Local Messaging 
Seventy percent of the most liked posts and 80% of the most shared posts were about 
events and policies that specifically effected the United Kingdom. The majority of users follow-
ing Quilliam are assumed to be individuals living in the United Kingdom. This assumption is 
based on the knowledge that Quilliam is headquartered in the United Kingdom. In addition, the 
founder of Quilliam is a local celebrity in the United Kingdom, Maajid Nawaz. This specific au-
dience may explain why posts about the United Kingdom tended to receive a higher number of 
LIKES and SHARES. People are often more concerned about information that directly effects 
them – especially when it comes to terrorist attacks and resulting governmental policies. This 
finding provides a strong argument for tailoring counter-radicalization campaigns to local popu-
lations which will be discussed as a recommendation for further study. 
Limitations of the Study 
The participants in this study are Facebook Users who share and like content which is 
posted on the Quilliam Facebook Page. In order to see posts made by Quilliam a Facebook User 
has to either be following the Facebook Page, friends with other Facebook Users who engage 
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with the Facebook Page, or following similar Facebook Pages. Therefore, it is likely that the Fa-
cebook Users who liked or shared the posts being studied already have an interest in terrorism 
and may already condemn terrorism. Therefore, the posts studied probably did not reach individ-
uals who are at risk of joining a terrorist organization. While it may not seem productive to 
measure the impact of counter-radicalization posts on individuals who are not considering radi-
calization it is a crucial step in developing information that trends. In order for information to 
trend it has to be liked and shared by a massive amount of users. For example, the previously 
mentioned dress that trended in 2015 due to the differences in human color perception had 4.4 
million tweets in 24 hours (Warzel, 2015). Once information is trending it will be seen by indi-
viduals who are at risk of joining a terrorist organization. Therefore, users who may already con-
demn terrorism are an integral part of the process to get posts to trend even if they are not the in-
tended audience for the posts.  
Other Factors Effecting Outreach 
 While the study found a statistically significant correlational relationship between the 
CATEGORY and the resulting amount of LIKES and CONTENT and the resulting amount of 
SHARES, there are many other variables that impact the popularity of a post. There are several 
research studies that argue that the day of the week and time that a post is uploaded has an effect 
on LIKES and SHARES. While the specific recommendations vary, there is consensus among 
researchers that posts uploaded during business hours on weekdays have the most potential to 
trend (Berger, 2013). When looking at the data collected, the majority of posts were uploaded on 
weekdays during business hours in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) because that is when and 
where Quilliam is staffed and headquartered. However, many Facebook Users live in other time 
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zones. For example, if a post was uploaded at 1600 in GMT it may not have been viewed by Fa-
cebook Users in Australia and New Zealand because that would be the middle of the night and 
by the time they awaken their newsfeed could be populated by more recent postings. In addition, 
the language of a post could also have an effect on LIKES and SHARES. Quilliam posts are all 
in English. As a result, they may not be read and understood by Facebook Users who speak other 
languages. Therefore, the amount of LIKES and SHARES on posts is this study may have been a 
result of variables other than the CATEGORY and CONTENT. Timing and language are two var-
iables that should be considered when administering a counter-radicalization campaign. These 
obstacles can be overcome by posting during weekdays and business hours in multiple time 
zones and in multiple languages. 
Lurkers 
Lurkers are unavoidable when conducting observational social media research (Leiner, 
Kobilke, Rueß, & Brosius, 2018). Not every Facebook User wants to interact with posts. After 
all, liking and sharing a post is public information. It is possible that a Facebook User may not 
want their Facebook Friends to see that they liked or shared a controversial post or maybe they 
simply do not agree with the post and therefore do not want to like or share it (Leiner, Kobilke, 
Rueß, & Brosius, 2018). It is difficult to measure how many social media users are exposed to a 
post because of the existence of lurkers. However, the number of social media users who clicked 
to view a video is counted and displayed. This provided some insight into the impact of lurkers 
on this study. For example, the video posted on 8/17/2018 about the Manchester Didsbury 
Mosque's extremist Imam who called for armed Jihad in his sermon in Manchester had links to 
the Salman Abedi only receive 197 LIKES and 715 SHARES but had over 26,000 views. Due to 
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the apparent presence of lurkers, further research should attempt to measure how many views a 
post receives in addition to the level of engagement. 
Re-posts 
Quilliam administrators routinely re-posted policy pieces, occasionally multiple times in 
one day. This may have increased the exposure of these posts but may have also decreased the 
amount of collective LIKES and SHARES. For example, the Quilliam administrators re-posted a 
personal story about an individual who was a terrorist in Al Qaeda but who defected and began 
spying with MI-6 on 10/31/2018, 10/30/2018, 10/25/2018, 10/24/2018, and twice on 10/23/2019 
(Quilliam, 2018a). Each post had 2.7 LIKES and 1 SHARE on average. However, collectively 
the posts had a total of 16 LIKES and 6 SHARES. It is impossible to know how the post would 
have performed if it was only uploaded once. I could have overcome this challenge by consist-
ently consolidating posts which had the same topic and were uploaded on the same day, or two 
days, or three days. However, I felt that this would add more subjectivity to the study. 
Policy and Social Change Implications 
The Quilliam Facebook Page has 26,697 followers who receive notification of new posts 
and can choose to like and share any posts (Quilliam, 2018a). In addition, any registered Face-
book User can view the page and like or share any of the posts. When followers or registered Fa-
cebook Users like and share posts, it increases the likelihood that those posts will appear in the 
newsfeed of their Facebook Friends. By using data analytics to discover what past posts result in 
the highest number of LIKES and SHARES an administrator can potentially increase the number 
of LIKES and SHARES that they receive for future posts.  
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Intervention 
Social media has the potential to make a movement feel larger than it is. Terrorist organi-
zations use bots who share content to make it seem that there are more supporters (Berger & 
Morgan, 2015). When an individual feels that they are one of many with the same beliefs it may 
make them feel re-affirmed in their beliefs and provide them with the courage to act (Malthaner 
& Lindekilde, 2017). Just as an echo chamber can radicalize individuals, it can also deradicalize 
individuals (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). A robust counter-radicalization campaign can make 
an individual who is considering joining a terrorist organization and committing terrorist attacks 
realize that they are actually in the minority (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017.  
As previously mentioned, the sensitivity and discovery phases provide the most promis-
ing opportunities to prevent radicalization (Cragin, 2017). An individual completes the sensitiv-
ity phase when they find that they are not alone in their beliefs (Cragin, 2017). An individual 
completes the discovery phase when they search for more information online and are enticed by 
the promises of resources and identity offered by terrorist organizations (Cragin, 2017). Mal-
thaner & Linekilde (2017) found that two of the most effectual motivators are the influence of 
friends and family and the individuals experience indoctrinated to a terrorist organization. If ei-
ther of these motivators are interrupted, there is a possibility that radicalization could be pre-
vented (Malthaner & Linekilde, 2017). By ensuring that counter-radicalization trends, individu-
als who are interested in becoming a terrorist will realize that their friends and family may not 
support terrorism and that joining a terrorist organization may not be as lucrative as it seems. 
Counter-radicalization efforts also have the potential to mobilize communities. It is an in-
dividuals parents, relative, friends, and teachers who are the first to recognize that an individual 
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is becoming radicalized and the last than an individual will remain in contact with once they be-
come isolated (Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2017). Communities need resources to them to help with 
prevention and intervention. Social media can be used to disseminate counter-radicalization re-
sources that are specifically tailored to help parents, relatives, friends, and teachers to start a dia-
logue about radicalization and discuss the ramifications of terrorism. 
Prevention 
Counter-radicalization efforts have the potential to not only convince individuals to re-
frain from joining terrorist organizations and committing attacks but to also change the attitude 
toward Muslims. When researching social media users who voiced radical opinions, Lara-
Cabrera et al (2017) found a strong correlation between perception of discrimination for being 
Muslim and expressing negative views of the West and positive views of jihadism individuals 
who became radicalized online. In addition, Cragin et al (2015) found that individuals who were 
considering becoming involved with terrorism were often motivated to feel accepted by others. 
Counter-radicalization efforts could potentially change the culture of religious discrimination 
which could prevent radicalization. 
Muslims need to feel supported. Counter-radicalization social media efforts could combat 
the misperception that all Muslims are radical. In addition to posting information that dismantles 
radical ideologies, counter radicalization social media efforts could post stories that emphasize 
Islamic values of religious tolerance and social cohesion. Counter-radicalization social media ef-
forts can provide a platform for local community leaders and religious scholars to serve as an ex-
ample for others to emulate. These efforts could foster a sense of acceptance for Muslims so that 
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they will not feel tempted to seek social movement and social identity from a terrorist organiza-
tion. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
This study found that some categories of counter-radicalization information are more 
compelling than other categories of counter-radicalization information on social media. The fo-
cus for this study was on trending information to reach the general population. This study did not 
involve measuring what information is most effective in dissuading individuals from joining ter-
rorist organizations. Three concepts that warrant further study are focused content, source power, 
and message framing of counter-radicalization information. Most importantly, further research 
should focus not only on what content trends but also on what content can deradicalize individu-
als. 
Focused Content 
The CATEGORY, personal story, received more LIKES and SHARES than other catego-
ries of information. Further research should focus on what kind of personal stories have the most 
potential to trend due to the public figure behind them and the topic they discuss. In addition, it is 
also possible that further research into the localization of messages could reveal additional in-
sight into trend patterns.  
There are many different types of public figures in counter-radicalization. This dataset 
specifically featured victims of terrorism, heroes of terrorism, and defectors of terrorist 
organizations. It is possible that some types of public figures may be more popular than other 
types of public figures. Further study should determine if specific attributes about a public figure 
increases their ability to trend. For example, comparing the education level, ethnicity, gender, 
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and age of various public figures who are the subject of counter-radicalization information to 
determine if there are significant differences between these variables and the level of 
engagement. These findings could help counter-radicalization campaigns determine who should 
be the face of their brand.  
Different topics appeal to different audiences. For example, counter-radicalization cam-
paigns such as “Families against Terrorism and Extremism” focuses on children in the Muslim 
community and “She Is Here” focuses on women in the Muslim community. It may be useful to 
compare the performance of posts about children to posts about women to posts about women 
and children. If a statistically significant differences is found, it could potentially uncover addi-
tional attributes that contribute to trending posts. For example, Personal Stories may be more ap-
pealing when they are about women and children.  
The coding for West and Middle East in this study may have been too broad. If this study 
had coded for specific countries it could have potentially uncovered a pattern that Facebook Us-
ers seem to care more about subjects that impact their specific country. People are often more 
concerned about information that directly affects them – especially when it comes to terrorist at-
tacks and resulting governmental policies (Wilner & Rigato, 2017). While it is effective to target 
an entire country – it may be even more beneficial to target specific towns and cities (Wilner & 
Rigato, 2017). Further research should investigate if counter-radicalization campaigns focused 
on a specific region such as New York City, London, or Toronto can reach a large percentage of 
each cities population. Administrators can also upload posts which are about topics that directly 
effects their audience and upload posts about broader topics that do not directly effect their audi-
ence and compare the level of engagement.  
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Source Power 
As previously discussed, the counter-radicalization social media efforts made by the U.S., 
United Kingdom, and Canada have consistently low levels of engagement. It is possible that this 
is not a result of their posts but a result of the source. Source credibility contributes to persua-
sion. Receiving information from a source with high credibility will lead to a positive acceptance 
and receiving information from a source with low credibility will lead to rejection (Berger, 
2013). It’s possible that social media users are less likely to trust or be interested in information 
coming from their government. There are several counter-radicalization social media efforts be-
ing made by nongovernmental organizations such as Quilliam. It may be useful to compare the 
level of engagement of posts made by Governmental Organizations and nongovernmental organ-
izations to determine if there is a statistically significant difference. If it is found that posts made 
by nongovernmental organizations consistently receive more LIKES and SHARES, then govern-
mental organizations may have to consider partnering with Nongovernmental Organizations ra-
ther than administering their own counter-radicalization campaigns. 
Message Framing 
This study did not delve into the content of specific counter-radicalization information 
but it is possible that certain topics, such as risk, could influence how a user perceives terrorism. 
Messages can either be framed in a positive or negative way to influence behavior (Rothman & 
Salovey, 1997). Information about risk, when presented in different ways, will likely modify an 
individual’s perspective and actions (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). For example, communicating 
the life expectancy of a member of the Islamic State could dissuade individuals from joining 
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even when paired with information about the houses, cars, and brides that they could receive if 
they join.  
A follow-on study could measure the effect of risk information on the perception of ter-
rorist organizations. The risks of joining a terrorist organization can include: death, being re-
quired to take innocent lives, isolation from friends and family, being shunned by friends and 
family, and poor living conditions. Researchers should investigate if certain risks are particularly 
discouraging to individuals and if the amount of risk information available has an effect on a per-
son’s desire to join a terrorist organization. These questions could help counter-radicalization re-
searchers to develop more effective messages. 
In addition to framing risk, the simple wording of a post has an effect on how many 
LIKES and SHARES it receives. For example, during the period of data collection the Quilliam 
administrators posted links to the same article with two different statuses. The first status up-
loaded on 6/3/2018 read, “He was a teenage terrorist. Now he’s fighting extremism” and re-
ceived 34 LIKES and 24 SHARES. The second status uploaded on 7/6/2018 read, “Quilliam 
launches new report on the deradicalization of the youngest person to be indicted on terror 
charges in the US.” and received 4 LIKES and 0 SHARES. It is possible that by providing sensa-
tionalized headlines, the administrators were able to draw the interest of more Facebook Users 
and increase the level of engagement. The concept of sensationalized headlines should be studied 
in order to determine what makes a story clickable. 
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Information that Can Trend and Deradicalize 
Posting information that can trend and information that can deradicalize are equally im-
portant. This study argues that posts which involve a personal story and are displayed as a writ-
ten status with a video may be more likely to trend. However, studies published by Cragin et al 
(2015) argue that posts that promote feelings of apathy are what actually deradicalizes individ-
ual. This can be accomplished by posting about defectors from the Islamic State who were disap-
pointed by the lack of resources and camaraderie that terrorist organization provided (McDowell-
Smith et al., 2017). Administrators need to find a balance between what can trend and what can 
actually deradicalize. This will require expanding data collection to not only measure LIKES and 
SHARES but to also ask individuals what their thoughts are on the content. Thoughts on content 
can be measured in the comments section of posts but it may be more beneficial to have partici-
pants view content and then provide their reactions (McDowell-Smith et al., 2017).  
Conclusions 
Governments in the U.S., Europe, and Canada have centered their current domestic coun-
terterrorism strategies around law enforcement. Law enforcement relies on the public to report 
individuals who exhibit suspicious behavior and monitor those individuals. However, law en-
forcement is only able to intervene once the intent and the means to commit an attack have been 
established. Intent and means to commit an attack are not only difficult to determine but often 
too late. This strategy has been unsuccessful in preventing attacks such as the San Bernardino 
shooting where the terrorists were completely radicalized by viewing information on the internet 
and did not communicate with any known terrorist affiliates (Foster & Hader, 2016). 
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Planning and executing an attack is as simple as buying a gun and firing it in a public 
place. In this operational environment, counter-radicalization may be one of the only solutions to 
inspired terrorism. Social media is the primary source of radicalization which makes it a power-
ful tool that if properly used could disseminate counter-radicalization information to the general 
population (Gill et al., 2017). If a counter-radicalization campaign can create viral posts, then 
they could reach individuals who are considering planning and executing an attack or individuals 
who know of others who are considering planning and executing an attack and potentially thwart 
an impending attack. To be successful, counter-radicalization efforts should encourage individu-
als to practice a moderate interpretation of Islam, promote religious tolerance, and condemn Is-
lamic terrorism. 
By measuring the effect of CATEGORY, CONTENT, and GEOPOLITICAL REGION on 
LIKES and SHARES this study determined that there is a relationship between the CATEGORY 
and the resulting LIKES and CONTENT of a post and resulting SHARES. Specifically, it shows 
that when evaluating posts made between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2018, posts which 
were categorized as a personal story resulted in a higher number of LIKES than “research/policy 
analysis and posts which were a written status with a video resulted in a higher number of 
SHARES than written status with a link. In addition, the results of the MANOVA proved that 
CATEGORY and CONTENT individually and combined (CATEGORY*CONTENT) had a sig-
nificant effect on resulting LIKES and SHARES. Therefore, the combination of personal story 
for CATEGORY and video for CONTENT could have the strongest effect on resulting LIKES 
and SHARES and may be a useful combination to study when attempting to create viral posts.  
159 
 
 
While this study was intended to reveal what engages users, it also provides insight into 
what does not engage them. For example, research/policy analysis pieces are needed to contrib-
ute to the existing literature on counter-radicalization, but sharing them on social media does not 
seem to improve a campaigns outreach. In addition, the study also showed that there is no rela-
tionship between the independent variable; GEOPOLITICAL REGION; and the dependent vari-
ables; LIKES and SHARES. This finding should indicate to the administrators that they should 
not expend resources on creating research/policy analysis pieces or only posting about a specific 
GEOPOLITICAL REGION to improve outreach. This study also emphasized specific areas that 
further research should investigate. For example; focused CONTENT, source power, and mes-
sage framing should all be investigated to gain a better understanding of what makes a counter-
radicalization post trend. 
Data analytics should be utilized when uploading information to social media to ensure 
that a post is liked and shared to ensure that it reaches the general population which includes the 
at risk population. Data analytics could improve intervention efforts by providing counter-radi-
calization information to individuals in the sensitivity and discovery phases of radicalization. 
Data analytics could also potentially improve prevention efforts by promoting religious tolerance 
which will make Muslims less likely to seek social movement and social identity from a terrorist 
organization. 
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Appendix A: Facebook Data Policy 
Data Policy 
This policy describes the information we process to support Facebook, Instagram, Messenger and other 
products and features offered by Facebook (Facebook Products or Products). You can find additional tools 
and information in the Facebook Settings and Instagram Settings. 
I. What kinds of information do we collect? 
To provide the Facebook Products, we must process information about you. The types of information we 
collect depend on how you use our Products. You can learn how to access and delete information we col-
lect by visiting the Facebook Settings and Instagram Settings. 
Things you and others do and provide. 
• Information and content you provide. We collect the content, communications and other information 
you provide when you use our Products, including when you sign up for an account, create or share 
content, and message or communicate with others. This can include information in or about the content 
you provide (like metadata), such as the location of a photo or the date a file was created. It can also 
include what you see through features we provide, such as our camera, so we can do things like suggest 
masks and filters that you might like, or give you tips on using camera formats. Our systems automatically 
process content and communications you and others provide to analyze context and what's in them for 
the purposes described below. Learn more about how you can control who can see the things you share. 
• Data with special protections: You can choose to provide information in your Facebook profile fields or 
Life Events about your religious views, political views, who you are "interested in," or your health. This 
and other information (such as racial or ethnic origin, philosophical beliefs or trade union membership) 
could be subject to special protections under the laws of your country. 
• Networks and connections. We collect information about the people, Pages, accounts, hashtags and 
groups you are connected to and how you interact with them across our Products, such as people you 
communicate with the most or groups you are part of. We also collect contact information if you choose 
to upload, sync or import it from a device(such as an address book or call log or SMS log history), which 
we use for things like helping you and others find people you may know and for the other purposes 
listed below. 
• Your usage. We collect information about how you use our Products, such as the types of content you 
view or engage with; the features you use; the actions you take; the people or accounts you interact with; 
and the time, frequency and duration of your activities. For example, we log when you're using and have 
last used our Products, and what posts, videos and other content you view on our Products. We also 
collect information about how you use features like our camera. 
• Information about transactions made on our Products. If you use our Products for purchases or other 
financial transactions (such as when you make a purchase in a game or make a donation), we collect 
information about the purchase or transaction. This includes payment information, such as your credit or 
debit card number and other card information; other account and authentication information; and billing, 
shipping and contact details. 
• Things others do and information they provide about you. We also receive and analyze content, com-
munications and information that other people provide when they use our Products. This can include 
information about you, such as when others share or comment on a photo of you, send a message to you, 
or upload, sync or import your contact information. 
 
Device Information 
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As described below, we collect information from and about the computers, phones, connected TVs and 
other web-connected devices you use that integrate with our Products, and we combine this information 
across different devices you use. For example, we use information collected about your use of our Products 
on your phone to better personalize the CONTENT (including ads) or features you see when you use our 
Products on another device, such as your laptop or tablet, or to measure whether you took an action in 
response to an ad we showed you on your phone on a different device. 
Information we obtain from these devices includes: 
• Device attributes: information such as the operating system, hardware and software versions, battery 
level, signal strength, available storage space, browser type, app and file names and types, and plugins. 
• Device operations: information about operations and behaviors performed on the device, such as 
whether a window is foregrounded or backgrounded, or mouse movements (which can help distinguish 
humans from bots). 
• Identifiers: unique identifiers, device IDs, and other identifiers, such as from games, apps or accounts 
you use, and Family Device IDs (or other identifiers unique to Facebook Company Products associated 
with the same device or account). 
• Device signals: Bluetooth signals, and information about nearby Wi-Fi access points, beacons, and cell 
towers. 
• Data from device settings: information you allow us to receive through device settings you turn on, such 
as access to your GPS location, camera or photos. 
• Network and connections: information such as the name of your mobile operator or ISP, language, time 
zone, mobile phone number, IP address, connection speed and, in some cases, information about other 
devices that are nearby or on your network, so we can do things like help you stream a video from your 
phone to your TV. 
• Cookie data: data from cookies stored on your device, including cookie IDs and settings. Learn more 
about how we use cookies in the Facebook Cookies Policy and Instagram Cookies Policy. 
 
Information from partners. 
Advertisers, app developers, and publishers can send us information through Facebook Business Tools they 
use, including our social plug-ins (such as the Like button), Facebook Login, our APIs and SDKs, or the 
Facebook pixel. These partners provide information about your activities off Facebook—including infor-
mation about your device, websites you visit, purchases you make, the ads you see, and how you use their 
services—whether or not you have a Facebook account or are logged into Facebook. For example, a game 
developer could use our API to tell us what games you play, or a business could tell us about a purchase 
you made in its store. We also receive information about your online and offline actions and purchases from 
third-party data providers who have the rights to provide us with your information. 
Partners receive your data when you visit or use their services or through third parties they work with. We 
require each of these partners to have lawful rights to collect, use and share your data before providing any 
data to us. Learn more about the types of partners we receive data from. 
To learn more about how we use cookies in connection with Facebook Business Tools, review the Facebook 
Cookies Policyand Instagram Cookies Policy. 
 
II. How do we use this information? 
We use the information we have (subject to choices you make) as described below and to provide and 
support the Facebook Products and related services described in the Facebook Terms and Instagram Terms. 
Here's how: 
Provide, personalize and improve our Products. 
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We use the information we have to deliver our Products, including to personalize features and content 
(including your News Feed, Instagram Feed, Instagram Stories and ads) and make suggestions for you (such 
as groups or events you may be interested in or topics you may want to follow) on and off our Products. To 
create personalized Products that are unique and relevant to you, we use your connections, preferences, 
interests and activities based on the data we collect and learn from you and others (including any data with 
special protections you choose to provide); how you use and interact with our Products; and the people, 
places, or things you're connected to and interested in on and off our Products. Learn more about how we 
use information about you to personalize your Facebook and Instagram experience, including features, 
CONTENT and recommendations in Facebook Products; you can also learn more about how we choose 
the ads that you see. 
• Information across Facebook Products and devices: We connect information about your activities on 
different Facebook Products and devices to provide a more tailored and consistent experience on all Fa-
cebook Products you use, wherever you use them. For example, we can suggest that you join a group on 
Facebook that includes people you follow on Instagram or communicate with using Messenger. We can 
also make your experience more seamless, for example, by automatically filling in your registration in-
formation (such as your phone number) from one Facebook Product when you sign up for an account on 
a different Product. 
• Location-related information: We use location-related information-such as your current location, 
where you live, the places you like to go, and the businesses and people you're near-to provide, person-
alize and improve our Products, including ads, for you and others. Location-related information can be 
based on things like precise device location (if you've allowed us to collect it), IP addresses, and infor-
mation from your and others' use of Facebook Products (such as check-ins or events you attend). 
• Product research and development: We use the information we have to develop, test and improve our 
Products, including by conducting surveys and research, and testing and troubleshooting new products 
and features. 
• Face recognition: If you have it turned on, we use face recognition technology to recognize you in pho-
tos, videos and camera experiences. The face-recognition templates we create may constitute data with 
special protections under the laws of your country. Learn more about how we use face recognition tech-
nology, or control our use of this technology in Facebook Settings. If we introduce face-recognition tech-
nology to your Instagram experience, we will let you know first, and you will have control over whether 
we use this technology for you. 
• Ads and other sponsored content: We use the information we have about you-including information 
about your interests, actions and connections-to select and personalize ads, offers and other sponsored 
content that we show you. Learn more about how we select and personalize ads, and your choices over 
the data we use to select ads and other sponsored content for you in the Facebook Settings and Instagram 
Settings. 
 
Provide measurement, analytics, and other business services. 
We use the information we have (including your activity off our Products, such as the websites you visit 
and ads you see) to help advertisers and other partners measure the effectiveness and distribution of their 
ads and services, and understand the types of people who use their services and how people interact with 
their websites, apps, and services. Learn how we share information with these partners. 
 
Promote safety, integrity and security. 
We use the information we have to verify accounts and activity, combat harmful conduct, detect and prevent 
spam and other bad experiences, maintain the integrity of our Products, and promote safety and security on 
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and off of Facebook Products. For example, we use data we have to investigate suspicious activity or vio-
lations of our terms or policies, or to detect when someone needs help. To learn more, visit the Facebook 
Security Help Center and Instagram Security Tips. 
 
Communicate with you. 
We use the information we have to send you marketing communications, communicate with you about our 
Products, and let you know about our policies and terms. We also use your information to respond to you 
when you contact us. 
 
Research and innovate for social good. 
We use the information we have (including from research partners we collaborate with) to conduct and 
support research and innovation on topics of general social welfare, technological advancement, public in-
terest, health and well-being. For example, we analyze information we have about migration patterns during 
crises to aid relief efforts. Learn more about our research programs. 
 
III. How is this information shared? 
Your information is shared with others in the following ways: 
Sharing on Facebook Products 
People and accounts you share and communicate with 
When you share and communicate using our Products, you choose the audience for what you share. For 
example, when you post on Facebook, you select the audience for the post, such as a group, all of your 
friends, the public, or a customized list of people. Similarly, when you use Messenger or Instagram to 
communicate with people or businesses, those people and businesses can see the content you send. Your 
network can also see actions you have taken on our Products, including engagement with ads and sponsored 
content. We also let other accounts see who has viewed their Facebook or Instagram Stories. 
Public information can be seen by anyone, on or off our Products, including if they don't have an account. 
This includes your Instagram username; any information you share with a public audience; information in 
your public profile on Facebook; and content you share on a Facebook Page, public Instagram account or 
any other public forum, such as Facebook Marketplace. You, other people using Facebook and Instagram, 
and we can provide access to or send public information to anyone on or off our Products, including in 
other Facebook Company Products, in search results, or through tools and APIs. Public information can 
also be seen, accessed, reshared or downloaded through third-party services such as search engines, APIs, 
and offline media such as TV, and by apps, websites and other services that integrate with our Products. 
Learn more about what information is public and how to control your visibility on Facebook and Instagram. 
Content others share or reshare about you 
You should consider who you choose to share with, because people who can see your activity on our Prod-
ucts can choose to share it with others on and off our Products, including people and businesses outside the 
audience you shared with. For example, when you share a post or send a message to specific friends or 
accounts, they can download, screenshot, or reshare that content to others across or off our Products, in 
person or in virtual reality experiences such as Facebook Spaces. Also, when you comment on someone 
else's post or react to their content, your comment or reaction is visible to anyone who can see the other 
person's content, and that person can change the audience later. 
People can also use our Products to create and share content about you with the audience they choose. For 
example, people can share a photo of you in a Story, mention or tag you at a location in a post, or share 
information about you in their posts or messages. If you are uncomfortable with what others have shared 
about you on our Products, you can learn how to report the content. 
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Information about your active status or presence on our Products. 
People in your networks can see signals telling them whether you are active on our Products, including 
whether you are currently active on Instagram, Messenger or Facebook, or when you last used our Products. 
Apps, websites, and third-party integrations on or using our Products. 
When you choose to use third-party apps, websites, or other services that use, or are integrated with, our 
Products, they can receive information about what you post or share. For example, when you play a game 
with your Facebook friends or use a Facebook Comment or Share button on a website, the game developer 
or website can receive information about your activities in the game or receive a comment or link that you 
share from the website on Facebook. Also, when you download or use such third-party services, they can 
access your public profile on Facebook, and any information that you share with them. Apps and websites 
you use may receive your list of Facebook friends if you choose to share it with them. But apps and websites 
you use will not be able to receive any other information about your Facebook friends from you, or infor-
mation about any of your Instagram followers (although your friends and followers may, of course, choose 
to share this information themselves). Information collected by these third-party services is subject to their 
own terms and policies, not this one. 
Devices and operating systems providing native versions of Facebook and Instagram (i.e. where we have 
not developed our own first-party apps) will have access to all information you choose to share with them, 
including information your friends share with you, so they can provide our core functionality to you. 
Note: We are in the process of restricting developers’ data access even further to help prevent abuse. For 
example, we will remove developers' access to your Facebook and Instagram data if you haven't used their 
app in 3 months, and we are changing Login, so that in the next version, we will reduce the data that an 
app can request without app review to include only name, Instagram username and bio, profile photo and 
email address. Requesting any other data will require our approval. 
New owner. 
If the ownership or control of all or part of our Products or their assets changes, we may transfer your 
information to the new owner. 
 
Sharing with Third-Party Partners 
We work with third-party partners who help us provide and improve our Products or who use Facebook 
Business Tools to grow their businesses, which makes it possible to operate our companies and provide free 
services to people around the world. We don't sell any of your information to anyone, and we never will. 
We also impose strict restrictions on how our partners can use and disclose the data we provide. Here are 
the types of third parties we share information with: 
Partners who use our analytics services. 
We provide aggregated statistics and insights that help people and businesses understand how people are 
engaging with their posts, listings, Pages, videos and other CONTENT on and off the Facebook Products. 
For example, Page admins and Instagram business profiles receive information about the number of people 
or accounts who viewed, reacted to, or commented on their posts, as well as aggregate demographic and 
other information that helps them understand interactions with their Page or account. 
Advertisers. 
We provide advertisers with reports about the kinds of people seeing their ads and how their ads are per-
forming, but we don't share information that personally identifies you (information such as your name or 
email address that by itself can be used to contact you or identifies who you are) unless you give us per-
mission. For example, we provide general demographic and interest information to advertisers (for exam-
ple, that an ad was seen by a woman between the ages of 25 and 34 who lives in Madrid and LIKES software 
engineering) to help them better understand their audience. We also confirm which Facebook ads led you 
to make a purchase or take an action with an advertiser. 
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Measurement partners. 
We share information about you with companies that aggregate it to provide analytics and measurement 
reports to our partners. 
Partners offering goods and services in our Products. 
When you subscribe to receive premium content, or buy something from a seller in our Products, the con-
tent creator or seller can receive your public information and other information you share with them, as 
well as the information needed to complete the transaction, including shipping and contact details. 
Vendors and service providers. 
We provide information and content to vendors and service providers who support our business, such as 
by providing technical infrastructure services, analyzing how our Products are used, providing customer 
service, facilitating payments or conducting surveys. 
Researchers and academics. 
We also provide information and content to research partners and academics to conduct research that ad-
vances scholarship and innovation that support our business or mission, and enhances discovery and inno-
vation on topics of general social welfare, technological advancement, public interest, health and well-
being. 
Law enforcement or legal requests. 
We share information with law enforcement or in response to legal requests in the circumstances outlined 
below. 
Learn more about how you can control the information about you that you or others share with third-party 
partners in the Facebook Settings and Instagram Settings. 
 
IV. How do the Facebook Companies work together? 
Facebook and Instagram share infrastructure, systems and technology with other Facebook Compa-
nies (which include WhatsApp and Oculus) to provide an innovative, relevant, consistent and safe experi-
ence across all Facebook Company Products you use. We also process information about you across the 
Facebook Companies for these purposes, as permitted by applicable law and in accordance with their terms 
and policies. For example, we process information from WhatsApp about accounts sending spam on its 
service so we can take appropriate action against those accounts on Facebook, Instagram or Messenger. We 
also work to understand how people use and interact with Facebook Company Products, such as under-
standing the number of unique users on different Facebook Company Products. 
 
 
 
V. How can I manage or delete information about me? 
We provide you with the ability to access, rectify, port and erase your data. Learn more in your Facebook 
Settings and Instagram Settings. 
We store data until it is no longer necessary to provide our services and Facebook Products, or until your 
account is deleted - whichever comes first. This is a case-by-case determination that depends on things like 
the nature of the data, why it is collected and processed, and relevant legal or operational retention needs. 
For example, when you search for something on Facebook, you can access and delete that query from within 
your search history at any time, but the log of that search is deleted after 6 months. If you submit a copy of 
your government-issued ID for account verification purposes, we delete that copy 30 days after submission. 
Learn more about deletion of  content you have shared and cookie data obtained through social plugins. 
When you delete your account, we delete things you have posted, such as your photos and status updates, 
and you won't be able to recover that information later. Information that others have shared about you isn't 
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part of your account and won't be deleted. If you don't want to delete your account but want to temporarily 
stop using the Products, you can deactivate your account instead. To delete your account at any time, please 
visit the Facebook Settings and Instagram Settings. 
VI. How do we respond to legal requests or prevent harm? 
We access, preserve and share your information with regulators, law enforcement or others: 
• In response to a legal request (like a search warrant, court order or subpoena) if we have a good faith 
belief that the law requires us to do so. This may include responding to legal requests from jurisdictions 
outside of the United States when we have a good-faith belief that the response is required by law in that 
jurisdiction, affects users in that jurisdiction, and is consistent with internationally recognized standards. 
• When we have a good-faith belief it is necessary to: detect, prevent and address fraud, unauthorized use 
of the Products, violations of our terms or policies, or other harmful or illegal activity; to protect ourselves 
(including our rights, property or Products), you or others, including as part of investigations or regulatory 
inquiries; or to prevent death or imminent bodily harm. For example, if relevant, we provide information 
to and receive information from third-party partners about the reliability of your account to prevent fraud, 
abuse and other harmful activity on and off our Products. 
Information we receive about you (including financial transaction data related to purchases made with Fa-
cebook) can be accessed and preserved for an extended period when it is the subject of a legal request or 
obligation, governmental investigation, or investigations of possible violations of our terms or policies, or 
otherwise to prevent harm. We also retain information from accounts disabled for terms violations for at 
least a year to prevent repeat abuse or other term violations. 
 
 
 
VII. How do we operate and transfer data as part of our global ser-
vices? 
We share information globally, both internally within the Facebook Companies, and externally with our 
partners and with those you connect and share with around the world in accordance with this policy. Your 
information may, for example, be transferred or transmitted to, or stored and processed in the United States 
or other countries outside of where you live for the purposes as described in this policy. These data transfers 
are necessary to provide the services set forth in the Facebook Terms and Instagram Terms and to globally 
operate and provide our Products to you. We utilize standard contract clauses, rely on the European Com-
mission's adequacy decisions about certain countries, as applicable, and obtain your consent for these data 
transfers to the United States and other countries. 
 
 
 
VIII. How will we notify you of changes to this policy? 
We'll notify you before we make changes to this policy and give you the opportunity to review the revised 
policy before you choose to continue using our Products. 
 
 
 
IX. How to contact Facebook with questions 
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You can learn more about how privacy works on Facebook and on Instagram. If you have questions about 
this policy, you can contact us as described below. We may resolve disputes you have with us in connection 
with our privacy policies and practices through TrustArc. You can contact TrustArc through its website. 
You can contact us online or by mail at:  
 
Facebook, Inc. 
ATTN: Privacy Operations 
1601 Willow Road 
Menlo Park, CA 94025 
Date of Last Revision: April 19, 2018 
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Appendix B: Data Dispersion 
  
Figure B-1. CATEGORY scatter plot 
 
Figure B-2. CONTENT scatter plot 
 
182 
 
 
Figure B-3. REGION scatter plot 
 
Figure B-4. Histogram for LIKES 
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Figure B-5. Histogram for SHARES 
 
 
Figure B-6. Box Plot for LIKES 
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Figure B-7. Box Plot for SHARES 
 
Figure B-8. Q-Q Plot for LIKES 
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Figure B-9. Q-Q Plot for SHARES 
